Highly-structured software for network systems and its protection by Mizuno, Masaaki
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1987
Highly-structured software for network systems
and its protection
Masaaki Mizuno
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mizuno, Masaaki, "Highly-structured software for network systems and its protection " (1987). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations.
11710.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/11710
INFORMATION TO USERS 
While the most advanced technology has been used to 
photograph and reproduce this manuscript, the quality of 
the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of 
the material submitted. For example: 
• Manuscript pages may have indistinct print. In such 
cases, the best available copy has been filmed. 
• Manuscripts may not always be complete. In such 
cases, a note will indicate that it is not possible to 
obtain missing pages. 
® Copyrighted material may have been removed from 
the manuscript. In such cases, a note will indicate the 
deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, and charts) are 
photographed by sectioning the original, beginning at the 
upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in 
equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is 
also filmed as one exposure and is available, for an 
additional charge, as a standard 35mm slide or as a 17"x 23" 
black and white photographic print. 
Most photographs reproduce acceptably on positive 
microfilm or microfiche but lack the clarity on xerographic 
copies made from the microfilm. For an additional charge, 
35mm slides of 6"x 9" black and white photographic prints 
are available for any photographs or illustrations that 
cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography. 

Order Number 8721912 
Highly-structured software for network systems and its 
protection 
Mizuno, Masaaki, Ph.D. 
Iowa State University, 1987 
Copyright ©1987 by Mizuno, Masaaki. All rights reserved. 
U M I  
300N.ZeebRd. 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 

Highly-structured software for network systems 
and its protection 
by 
Masaaki Mizuno 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of t he 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major: Computer Science 
Approved: 
In Charge of Major Wor 
For the Major DeparfAent 
For the Graduat*^ College 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1987 
Copyright ©Masaaki Mizuno, 1987. All rights reserved. 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Overview 1 
1.2 Statement of Problems 3 
1.2.1 Issues in access control 3 
1.2.2 Issues in information flow control 4 
1.3 Organization of Thesis 6 
2 THE RESOURCE MODULE SYSTEM 9 
2.1 An Overview of the Resource Module System 9 
2.1.1 Access component 9 
2.1.2 Synchronization component 11 
2.1.3 Protection component 11 
2.1.4 Flow of messages 12 
4 
2.2 Classes, Instances, Names and Types 14 
2.2.1 Class concept and class hierarchy 14 
2.2.2 Name management 15 
2.2.3 Classes and types 15 
2.3 Program Examples 16 
2.4 Class Operations and Instance Operations 25 
iii 
2.5 Inheritance 32 
2.6 Implementation of the RM System 35 
3 THE ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM 41 
3.1 Access Matrix Model 41 
3.2 Access Control Mechanisms 43 
3.3 Comparison of Capabilities and Access Control Lists 44 
3.3.1 Efficiency 44 
3.3.2 Ownership 45 
3.3.3 Revocation of access 46 
3.3.4 Propagation of access 47 
3.3.5 Review of access • 48 
3.3.6 Least privilege 48 
3.4 Proposed Access Control Mechanism 54 
3.4.1 Four-tuple ACL entry 54 
3.4.2 Access-rights expression 60 
4 THE INFORMATION FLOW MECHANISM 66 
4.1 Definition of Flow Control and a Review of Previous Work 66 
4.1.1 Access matrix model 66 
4.1.2 Information flow model 68 
4.1.3 Restrictions of the access matrix model 73 
4.1.4 Problems of applying existing information flow models to the 
RM system 74 
4.2 Overview of the Information Flow Control Mechanism 83 
iv 
4.2.1 Introduction 83 
4.2.2 Handling implicit flows 94 
4.2.3 Some remarks on probes and dynamically bound state variables 105 
4.3 The Compile-Time Algorithm 107 
4.3.1 Reduction rules 107 
4.3.2 Generation of information flow templates 109 
4.4 The Run-Time Algorithm 124 
4.5 Program Examples 130 
4.5.1 A program with no dynamically bound state variables 130 
4.5.2 A program with dynamically bound state variables 144 
5 LINK-TIME INFORMATION FLOW CERTIFICATION 155 
5.1 The Link-Time Mechanism 157 
5.2 Termination and Correctness of the Link-Time Algorithm 173 
5.3 The Modified Link-Time Mechanism 176 
5.4 The Link-time/Run-time Algorithm Allowing Dynamically Bound State 
Variables 194 
5.5 Comparisons of the Information Flow Mechanisms 205 
6 CONCLUSION 212 
6.1 Summary 212 
6.2 Areas of Future Research 215 
6.2.1 Access component 215 
6.2.2 Protection component 216 
7 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
V 
217 
8 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 221 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1. Internal Structure of a Resource Module 10 
Figure 2.2. A Program with No Resource Sharing 18 
Figure 2.3. A Program for a Telephone Directory 20 
Figure 2.4. A Program for a Private Mail Service 22 
Figure 2.5. An Object as Encapsulated Data 27 
Figure 2.6. An Object as a Computational Entity 28 
Figure 2.7. A Program for MATRIX without Class Operations 30 
Figure 2.8. A Program for MATRIX with Clciss Operations 31 
Figure 2.9. Structuring Software Using Inheritance . ' 34 
Figure 2.10. A Program for Traffic Simulation Using a Trait 36 
Figure 2.11. Prototype Support Software for Implementing Resource Modules 38 
Figure 4.1. Lattice Structure Defining an Information Flow Policy .... 69 
Figure 4.2. A Simple Program Example to Illustrate the Information Flow 
Control Mechanism 90 
Figure 4.3. Implicit Flows Across Module Boundaries 96 
Figure 4.4. An Example Program with No Dynamically Bound State Vari­
ables and Its Information Flow Templates 131 
vii 
Figure 4.5. An Example Program with Dynamically Bound State Vari-, 
ables and Its Information Flow Templates 145 
Figure 5.1. Information Flow Templates for Program with No Recursion . 161 
Figure 5.2. An Example Program with Recursion and Its Information Flow 
Templates 168 
Figure 5.3. Over-Classification Caused by the Link-Time Algorithm . . . 177 
Figure 5.4. Information Flow Paths Due to Procedure Invocations (Case 1) 183 
Figure 5.5. Information Flow Paths Due to Procedure Invocations (Case 2) 184 
Figure 5.6. Another Example for the Modified Link-Time Algorithm . . . 193 
Figure 5.7. Information Flow Templates for Program with Dynamically 
Bound State Variables 197 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
In recent years, technological advances have made it cost effective to construct 
large computer systems from collections of computers connected via networks. In or­
der to support such systems, there is a growing need for effective ways to organize and 
maintain distributed programs in which modules reside and execute at geographically 
distinct locations. 
The modularity afforded by an object-based approach is believed to be especially 
valuable in an distributed network environment. Object-oriented programming sys­
tems have been widely investigated in the field of operating systems and programming 
languages [2,26,32,38,42,51]. An object is an instance of an abstract data type which 
encapsulates data along with operations on the data. These operations are called 
exported procedures of an object. The only way to access encapsulated data from 
the outside of an object is to invoke the exported procedures. An object is assumed 
to have an extensively long life, usually longer than the lifetime of most programs. 
This characteristic differentiates an object-oriented approach from the original ab­
stract data type approach such as that defined by SIMULA-67 [13]. Theoretically, 
these objects are addressed by system wide one-time unique identifiers. 
Even though other fundamental characteristics to construct effective network 
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software, such as synchronization of access [4,10], protection [11,16,17,41,45] and re­
liability [38,47], have been major issues in the field of operating systems, they have 
been studied, in most céises, separately, or, in some cases, combined with non-object-
oriented systems. 
The research presented in this thesis forms part of a larger project involving a 
highly-structured, distributed object-oriented system. The purposes of this project 
are to develop protection, synchronization and recovery mechanisms and to integrate 
these ideas into a single programming system for network applications. 
The perceived usefulness of this system is in the design of operating systems and 
user application programs. Specific goals of our system are to realize 
1. total encapsulation of data (along with operations on the data) 
2. resource sharing with powerful mechanisms for 
• synchronization of access; and 
• three aspects of protection (type checking, access control and information 
flow control). 
3. separate specification of protection, synchronization and access in order to fa­
cilitate programming and proofs of correctness, and 
4. high software reusability — capability for building software baaed on the previ­
ous work of others. 
Our basic unit for constructing a network object is a "resource module (RM)" 
[40] which is in complete charge of its own protection, synchronization, access of en­
capsulated resource (device or data), and error recovery. RMs can communicate by 
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only one method: invoking exported procedures in other RMs along with subsequent 
replies. By integrating numerous principles of software design into a single program­
ming system, the system can provide an effective easy-to-use facility for building 
network software systems. 
An RM is internally constructed from three components: protection, synchro­
nization and access. Each of the three components is separately specified and encap­
sulated within the parent module and the three may be implemented as concurrent 
communicating processes. Previous research on the specification of a synchronization 
language has been done by Headington, Oldehoeft, Kumar and Jennings (Headington 
[30], Oldehoeft and Headington [31], Kumar [35], Oldehoeft and Jennings [39]). Issues 
involving recovery and an implementation of the prototype system are left to future 
research. The contributions of the author to this project are to 
1. specify an overall implementation model of the entire system, and 
2. develop new protection mechanisms suitable for a distributed object-oriented 
environment. 
1.2 Statement of Problems 
1.2.1 Issues in access control 
In order to effectively share resources in the system, two types of security poli­
cies are significant; an access control policy and an information flow control pol­
icy [16,21,45]. An access control policy specifies authorization for access to objects 
based on the identities of subjects. Two types of mechanisms are widely used to 
implement an access control policy: capabilities and access control lists [16,21,45]. 
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Some researchers feel that access control lists provide more security than capabili­
ties [21,32,45]. However, capabilities can implement the principle of "least privilege" 
more effectively than access control lists [11,21]. We need to develop an access control 
mechanism which has the advantages of access control lists and yet effectively enforces 
the principle of least privilege. 
Controlling the order of procedure invocations to an object is sometimes impor­
tant and should be specified by the designer of the object. Consider a file object which 
defines OPEN, READ, WRITE and CLOSE operations as exported procedures. The 
OPEN procedure must be invoked before any READ or WRITE operations. Also, the 
CLOSE operation should follow all invocations of READ or WRITE. An access-rights 
expression was developed by Kieburtz and Silberschatz to specify the order of invoca­
tion of procedures in Concurrent Pascal [34]. However, in their original work, the use 
of access-rights expressions was controlled by the cooperation of a programmer of the 
procedures and a user. Hence, there is a way for a user to avoid the restriction on the 
order of invocation of procedures enforced by the access-rights expressions [34]. We 
find access-rights expressions very useful to control the behavior of individual users 
of an object and would like to incorporate them with an access control mechanism to 
effectively enforce the use of an RM in a way defined only by the designer and owner 
of the RM. 
1.2.2 Issues in information flow control 
An information flow control policy regulates the flow of information between 
classified objects. Given a set of "security classes" corresponding to the sensitivities 
of information and a specification of all the paths among objects by which information 
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can flow (an information flow policy), an information flow mechanism must guarantee 
that the flows caused by program executions do not violate the specification. Denning 
introduced the use of a lattice structure to define an information flow policy [15]. 
Based on a policy defined by a lattice, Denning developed an algorithm for certi­
fying the secure execution of a program in an environment in which the security class 
of each object (program variable or file) remains constant throughout the lifetime of 
the program. In this environment, a programmer needs to specify the security class 
of each program variable. The algorithm certifies the security of a given program at 
compile time. Since constant security clcisses of parameters must also be specified, 
separate versions of functionally equivalent procedures are required to handle differ­
ent security classes of parameters. This restriction severely reduces the possibility of 
resource sharing. 
Denning also developed a run-time certification algorithm in an environment 
in which the security clciss of each object changes, during execution of the program, 
according to the information contained in the object. This approach relies on a special 
hardware support. Without such hardware, the mechanism is very inefficient. Since 
security classes of output devices or sensitive files will change during execution, a 
secure system cannot be constructed baaed on this approach. 
Andrews and Reitman developed a compile-time certification algorithm based on 
Hoare's technique of program verification [6]. This mechanism allows the security 
class of each variable either to remain constant or to change during execution of 
the program. In this mechanism, the verification of a procedure invocation requires 
previous verification of the body of the called procedure and an access to its pre/post 
conditions. In a general distributed object-oriented system, modules of a program may 
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be geographically distributed or constructed at different points in time. Therefore, 
it may not be feasible to access protection information of other modules at compile 
time. 
We need to develop an information flow control mechanism which 
1. allows the security class of an object either to remain constant or to change 
during execution of a program, 
2. can establish the "internal" information flow security of each exported procedure 
in a module independently of other modules (this indicates that the certification 
of the entire program is deferred until link time or run time), and 
3. is efficient. 
1.3 Organization of Thesis 
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 describes the overall imple­
mentation model of the RM system. We first define the role of each component, the 
naming convention, and the inter-module and intra-module message flows of the RM 
system. Simple program examples are shown for easy understanding of the system. 
We then introduce a class concept, class and instance operations, and inheritance. 
Finally, we show a prototype implementation model. 
The following three chapters are devoted to two common protection issues: access 
control and information flow control. Chapter 3 describes the access control mech­
anism of the system. We first illustrate two common implementations of an access 
control policy: capabilities and access control lists. We then compare capabilities 
and access control lists and propose an access control mechanism for the RM system 
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which has all the advantages of access control lists and yet realizes the principle of 
least privilege as provided by capability-based systems. Finally, we combine access-
rights expressions with the proposed access control mechanism and demonstrate the 
resulting power. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, the proposed information flow control mechanisms are pre­
sented. Chapter 4 reviews previous work and introduces a proposed information flow 
mechanism which is a combination of compile-time and run-time algorithms. The 
compile-time algorithm establishes the internal information flow security of individ­
ual procedures independently of other modules and creates a special data structure for 
efficient run-time certification of inter-module communication. The run-time mech­
anism completes the certification of the entire program at message passing time by 
verifying every information flow caused by exported procedure invocations. Two pro­
gram examples are shown. 
The information flow mechanism proposed in Chapter 4 may have significant run­
time overhead. In Chapter 5, we propose a link-time algorithm that uses the data 
structure created by the compile-time algorithm described in Chapter 4 and certifies 
the security of the program at link time by verifying all possible information flows 
which may occur during execution of the program. This mechanism has no run-time 
overhead, but it does not allow the classes of encapsulated data to change at run time. 
Since actual execution paths of a program may not be known at link time, the 
certification algorithm must account for all possible information flows. Consequently, 
the algorithm sometimes regards a secure program to be insecure. We therefore pro­
pose an improved link-time mechanism which, to some extent, considers the individual 
execution paths of a program. We also propose a mechanism which is a combination 
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of compile-time, link-time and run-time approaches and allows a module to contain 
encapsulated data whose classes change during execution of the program. Several 
program examples are shown to facilitate understanding the mechanisms. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the results of this research and indicates areas of future 
research. 
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2 THE RESOURCE MODULE SYSTEM 
2.1 An Overview of the Resource Module System 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the internal construction of an RM. 
2.1.1 Access component 
This component is the reason for the existence of the module. It may encapsulate 
the state values for data or devices along with operations on the value, or it may 
provide the facility for defining an executable program. More precisely, the access 
component contains 
1. state variables local to the RM, 
2. program bodies of exported procedures and local procedures within the RM, 
and 
3. an initialization procedure which is executed when the RM is first instantiated. 
The invocation of an exported procedure or the initialization procedure results in 
the creation of an independent active entity (in the access component) called a process. 
Synchronous communication occurs when a process in the access component in one 
RM invokes an exported procedure in another RM. The calling process is suspended 
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Figure 2.1. Internal Structure of a Resource Module 
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awaiting a reply. This is similar to a remote procedure call and is implemented in 
numerous other systems [8,23,28,29,49]. 
The final version of the specification language for the access component has not 
been defined. In this research, we assume a PASCAL-like structured language to 
specify the component. 
2.1.2 Synchronization component 
As the result of procedure calls made to an RM, numerous processes may be 
executing concurrently in the access component. The synchronization component 
controls the initiation of new processes in the access component and manages any 
necessary blocking and resumption of those processes which invoke exported pro­
cedures in other RMs. "Extended open predicate path expressions (EOPPEs)" have 
been proposed to specify synchronization constraints [30,39]. They are an extension of 
the very high-level notation of both open path expressions and predicate path expres­
sions [4,9,10]. Semantically, EOPPEs are compatible with highly-parallel applicative 
languages and architectures. Syntactically, an EOPPE consists of a very-high level 
path expression which extends to a high-level language in those cases where the very 
high-level notation lacks the required expressive power. 
A discussion of the details of the synchronization specifications is beyond the 
scope of this research. 
2.1.3 Protection component 
In order to construct a system for secure resource sharing, powerful protection 
mechanisms should be provided at a base language level, for (1) strong typing, (2) 
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information flow control, and (3) access control. In our model, the protection com­
ponent deals with the above three types of protection on incoming messages. Type 
checking insures compatibility between the types of the actual parameters and the 
type specifications of the formal parameters. When a call is made from one RM to 
another, the types of the actual parameters are packed into the message along with 
the actual parameter values. The type checking is based on structured equivalence. 
If a complex type (e.g., structure) is involved, it is transformed into a list of its com­
ponent types, which are system pre-defined types (integer, real, boolean, character, 
string etc.) or the identifiers of RM classes.^ Access control and information flow 
control mechanisms are described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
The protection component also manages the authorization of returns from pro­
cedures, called in external RMs, by establishing an expendable "return capability". 
A return capability avoids an erroneous return message from being received and pro­
cessed by the module. 
2.1.4 Flow of messages 
The inter-module and intra-module flow can be described in the following manner. 
A message, arriving from some external module, is first processed by the protection 
component of the receiving module. If the message is to invoke a procedure exported 
by this module, it is checked for the correct designation of the class of the receiver, 
a valid procedure name and acceptable parameter types. Then, information fiow 
and access control are checked. If the specified protection is violated, the message is 
^ An identifier of an RM is described in Section 2.2.2. A class is described in Section 
2.2.1. 
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rejected; otherwise, the protection component records the reply capability (which is 
established by the calling module when the invocation was initiated), and forwards the 
message to the synchronization component. The synchronization component, based 
on the integrity specification in the EOPPE, may temporarily delay the message. 
When the integrity specifications are satisfied, the message is forwarded to the access 
component and the access component initiates a new process to execute the specified 
exported procedure. 
If a message to the module is a return from an exported procedure in another 
module previously invoked, the expendable reply capability is validated, and type 
checking and information flow certification of the return values are performed in the 
protection component. If no error is detected, the message is forwarded to the synchro­
nization component. The synchronization component updates the synchronization 
state and forwards the message to the access component and the access component 
resumes the invoking process which has been blocked. 
A procedure in the access component may call an exported procedure in another 
module and reply to a calling module. The resulting message is forwarded to the 
synchronization component which records the corresponding suspension or possible 
termination of the calling procedure. The message is then forwarded to the protection 
component which 
1. establishes an expendable reply capability for the called module if it is a request 
for an external procedure invocation in another module, or 
2. finds the corresponding reply capability if it is a reply message. 
The protection component also determines the security classes of actual parameters. 
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Finally, the message is sent to the underlining message passing system for delivery to 
the destination module. 
2.2 Classes, Instances, Names and Types 
2.2.1 Class concept and class hierarchy 
The concept of a class, along with related ideas, has been used by other re­
searchers [13,26], and we are adopting a similar approach. A "class" describes the 
implementation of a set of RMs, all of which have the same description of protection 
(list of exported procedures, although the specifications of access control and infor­
mation flow control may be difl'erent), synchronization and access components. The 
individual RMs described by a class are called its instances. A class describes the 
form of its instances' private memory, and how they carry out their operations. 
A cleiss itself is an RM and has its own protection component, synchronization 
component, and access component. The protection component contains protection 
specifications for some system defined exported procedures. These procedures in­
clude such operations as "INSTANTIATE" (to instantiate its instance RMs) and 
"DESTROY.CLASS" (to destroy itself). The synchronization specifications for these 
operations are typically null, and the access component has, in addition to a de­
scription of the exported procedures, a definition of state variables which serves as 
template information necessary to create its instances. 
A class is an instance of the distinguished class called METACLASS. M ETA-
CLASS is unique in the system and provides only for the creation of classes. META­
CLASS, classes, and instances define a three-level tree structure. 
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2.2.2 Name management 
An RM is identified by a site generated unique identifier (ID). The "INSTANTI­
ATE" operation binds an ID to a user defined symbolic name of an instance. Instances 
of the system defined class DIRECTORY, which we will call directories, are used to 
maintain the correspondences between symbolic names and their local IDs. This is 
done by having a directory encapsulate an array of pairs as a state variable. Each pair 
consists of a symbolic name and the unique ID of the corresponding module. These 
directories form a UNIX-like tree structured directory system, with each site of the 
network having a unique root directory RM. 
Referring to an RM by name at a remote site requires prefixing the site name to 
the RM's path name. The site name is resolved locally and the RM name is resolved 
by the remote directory to form a unique system identification. 
Note that within a program, a called module can be represented either by a 
symbolic name or by a variable whose type is the class of the called module. If a 
symbolic name is used, the compiler determines the ID of the called module. If a 
variable is used, the compiler finds the representation of the type of the variable (i.e., 
the ID of the class of the called module) and the ID of the called module is resolved 
at run time. In both cases, this is done by consulting directories. 
2.2.3 Classes and types 
The type of an RM instance is designated by the ID of its class RM, and copies 
of a class may exist at more than one site with the same ID or different IDs. To 
provide flexibility, it is desirable that these copies designate the same type. Consider 
the following example. Assume that a modules Ml is an instances of a class CI, and 
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both reside at a site Si. Also, assume that a class C2 is a copy of Cl and resides 
at a site S2. A procedure P2 in a module M2 at S2 specifies a formal parameter of 
type C2. If a procedure at Si calls P2 with actual parameter Ml, the request message 
carries Cl as well as Ml. Since C2 is a copy of Cl, the actual parameter type matches 
the formal paranjeter type. However, it is not feasible for the protection component 
of M2 to keep track of the equivalence relation for classes. In order to maintain this 
equivalence, a system-wide database is maintained. Each entry in the database is a 
list of (site identifier, class identifier) pairs of equivalent types. In the above example, 
the database maintains a list 
..., (SI, Cl), ..., (S2, C2), .... 
When the ID of an RM is carried by a message across site boundaries, the run-time 
type checking facility will consult this database to determine the equivalence of the 
actual and formal parameter types. 
The database is explicitly managed by the programmer, using METACLASS 
operations CREATE.CLASS-PUBLIC, COPY.CLASS.PUBLIC, and UNPUBLIC to 
add/delete class IDs to/from the database. 
2.3 Program Examples 
In this section, several program examples are given to illustrate the utility of 
RMs. The examples range from very simple programs, which require no explicit 
resource sharing, to more complex examples where the user explicitly defines shared 
resources. 
Even though the precise syntax for specifying a class has not been defined, we 
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assume the following: 
• A class definition starts with "class name = class". 
• The declaration following "specification =" specifies the external interface to 
this module. Parameters following IN are "call-by-value" and those following 
OUT are "call-by-result". 
• The declaration following "protection =" specifies the default access control 
for each exported procedure of its instances. This default may be overwritten 
by different specifications in the instantiate operation or may be modified by 
the owner of the module. 
• The declaration following "synchronization =" defines a synchronization spec­
ification. 
• The declaration following "access =" specifies the access component. 
• The declaration of a variable whose security class is constant, say SECRET, is 
followed by "of security class SECRET". This is further described in Chapters 
4 and 5. 
• Procedure declarations following class operations define class operations and 
those following instance operations define instance operations. Class opera­
tions and instance operations are explained in Section 2.4. 
• The declaration for a state variable follows "state". 
The first example, shown in Figure 2.2, illustrates a program which has no explicit 
resource sharing. Since instances of the class do not export any procedures, the 
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Pi = class 
specification = null 
protection = null 
synchronization = null 
access = 
state X : integer; 
class operations 
instance operations 
initialize 
begin 
while not lO.eof do 
begin 
lO.read(x); 
lO.write(x-M); 
end 
end 
end Pi 
Figure 2.2. A Program with No Resource Sharing 
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parameter type, access control, and synchronization specifications are all null. In this 
example, integers are read from the default input device and their incremented values 
are written to the default output device. 
The second example shown in Figure 2.3 illustrates the construction of a tele­
phone directory. State variables are an array of directory entries with components for 
names and telephone numbers (directory), and a pointer which keeps track of the last 
entry of the directory (num_names). Note that directory and num_names are bound 
to the constant security class CONFIDENTIAL. The two instance operations on this 
resource are specified as procedures LOOKUP and ENTER (code left unspecified). 
Since LOOKUP is a read-type operation and ENTER is a write-type operation, the 
synchronization of concurrent operations is specified as a readers-writers open path 
expression. The path expression specifies that, at any point in time, either a sin­
gle ENTER procedure or a single burst of overlapping LOOKUP procedures may be 
executing. 
The final example, shown in Figure 2.4, illustrates a private mail service, the use 
of which is restricted to a specified set of users. For simplicity, a fixed number of 
users, identified by unique (but publicly known) identities 1 ... m, is assumed. An 
instance MAIL of the class "post.office" is used to encapsulate the identity of queues 
of modules, one for each user of the mail service. Each member of a queue encapsu­
lates an individual mail message. The latter are instantiations of class "message.bin" 
and are dynamically created by MAIL and assigned system generated unique names 
(which we will denote as $Mi). In order to trace the flow of messages, suppose some 
entity sends mail to user i by invoking the SND procedure in MAIL. MAIL calls on a 
system defined "INSTANTIATE" procedure to create an instance, say $M3, of class 
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tel.dir = class 
specification = 
class operations 
instance operations 
LOOKUP(IN name : string, OUT number : integer); 
ENTER(IN name : string, number : integer); 
protection = 
(access control specification) : LOOKUP 
(access control specification) : ENTER 
synchronization = 
path 1 : ({LOOKUP}, ENTER) end 
access = 
type 
entry = record 
u_name : string; 
teLno : integer; 
end 
state 
directory : array [L.lOOj of entry 
of security class CONFIDENTIAL; 
numjiames : 0.100 of security class CONFIDENTIAL; 
Figure 2.3. A Program for a Telephone Directory 
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class operations 
instance operations 
procedure LOOKUP(IN name : string; OUT number : integer); 
var ptr : integer; found : boolean; 
begin 
ptr := 1; found := false; 
while (ptr <= numjiames) and not found do 
if directory [ptr j.uname = name 
then found := true 
else ptr := ptr + 1; 
if found 
then number := directory [ptr].tel JIG 
else number ;= 0; 
end 
procedure ENTER( ... ) 
initialize 
begin 
num_names := 0; 
for i := 1 to 100 do 
end 
end teLdlr 
Figure 2.3. (continued) 
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post.office = class 
specification = 
class operations 
instance operations 
SND(IN receiver! : userid, message : string) 
RCV(IN receiver2 : userid; OUT string) 
protection = 
(access control specification for SND) : SND 
(access control specification for RCV) : RCV 
synchronization = 
state active : array [l..m] of boolean = false; 
start_func 
RCV : active[receiver2] := true; 
SND : active(receiverl] := true; 
end jfunc 
RCV : active[receiver2] := false; 
SND : active[receiverl] := false; 
path RCV[activ[receiver2] = false], SND[active[receiverl] = false] 
access = 
type msg.buf.type = 
record 
first : message.bin; 
last : message.bin; 
end 
state mess.buff : array[userid] of msg.buf.type; 
class operations 
instance operations 
procedure SND (IN receiver 1 : userid, message : string); 
var tmp : message.bin.type; 
begin 
message.class.INSTANTIATE(OUT tmp); 
tmp.WRITE(IN message); 
Figure 2.4. A Program for a Private Mail Service 
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if msg_buf[receiverl].first = null 
then 
begin 
msg_buf[receiverl].first := tmp; 
msg_buf[receiverl].last := tmp; 
end 
else 
begin 
msg_buf(receiverl].last.PUTNEXT(IN tmp); 
msg_buf[receiverl].last := tmp; 
end 
end 
procedure RCV(IN receiver2 : userid; OUT message : string); 
var tmp : mess age .ci ass; 
begin 
if msg.buf[receiver2].first = null 
then message := 'NO MAIL' 
else 
begin 
tmp := msg.buf[receiver2].first; 
tmp.GETNEXT(OUT msg_buf[receiver].first); 
tmp.READ(OUT message); 
tmp.DESTROYJNSTANCEO; 
end 
end 
initialize 
var i : userid; 
begin 
for i := 1 to m do 
begin 
msg.buf[i].first := null; 
msg.buf[i].last := null; 
end 
end 
end post-office 
Figure 2.4. (continued) 
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message.bin = class 
specification = 
class operations 
instance operations 
WRITE (IN message : string) 
READ (OUT message : string) 
PUTNEXT (IN next : message.bin) 
GETNEXT (OUT next : message.bin) 
protection = 
(access control specifiction for WRITE) WRITE; 
(access control specifiction for READ) READ; 
(access control specifiction for PUTNEXT) PUTNEXT; 
(access control specifiction for GETNEXT) GETNEXT; 
synchronization = 
path 1 : (WRITE, READ, PUTNEXT, GETNEXT) 
access = 
type message.type 
record 
message : string; 
next : message.type; 
end; 
state 
mail .message : message.type; 
class operations 
instance operations 
procedure WRITE(IN message : string); 
begin mailjnessage.message := message; end; 
procedure READ(OUT message ; string); 
begin message := mail_message.message; end; 
procedure GETNEXT(IN next : message.bin); 
begin mail_message.next.nest := next; end; 
procedure PUTNEXT (OUT next : message.bin); 
begin next := mailjnessage.nextJiest; end; 
end message.bin 
Figure 2.4. (continued) 
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message.bin. MAIL then invokes $M3.WRITE, requesting $M3 to store the mes­
sage, and calls $M2.PUTNEXT to accomplish the linking of $M2 to $M3. Finally it 
changes its internal table to reflect the fact that $M3 is now at the tail of the queue. 
Suppose user i eisks for mail by invoking MAIL.RCV. MAIL retrieves the first item 
of mail for user i by invoking $M1.READ. It then determines the next member of the 
queue by invoking SMl.GETNEXT, changes its internal table to reflect that $M2 is 
now the head of the queue, and calls on a system defined "DESTROY.INSTANCE" 
procedure to eliminate SMI. Finally, it returns the mail as a message to user i. The 
path expression guarantees an exclusive access to each entry of "msg.buf" but allows 
concurrent access mail activity for different "msg.buf" entries [40]. 
2.4 Class Operations and Instance Operations 
Ishikawa and Tokoro classify object-oriented systems into two models: the model 
of an object aa encapsulated data and the model of an object as a computational 
entity [32]. In the first model, an object is protected data. Even if a subject owns the 
identifier of an object, it cannot access the internal structure of the object directly 
(the object is "sealed"). The internal structure of an object can be manipulated only 
through invocation of a procedure which is declared as an exported procedure in 
the class of the object (the object is "unsealed"). Conceptually, exported procedures 
reside in the class in which these procedures are defined. Thus, in order for a subject 
to access its object, the subject sends a message with an invocation request to the 
class of the object along with the identifier of the object and a requested procedure 
name as parameters. Since a message to invoke an exported procedure is sent to the 
class, this type of exported procedure is called a "class operation". To create a new 
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object, a subject sends a message with a creation request to the class. This object 
model is used by CLU, ALPHARD and HYDRA [32]. 
For example, suppose class MATRIX defines the structure of a two-dimensional 
array and the exported procedure which adds each element of two arrays. As­
sume variables "a" and "b" hold identifiers of instances of MATRIX. If statement "c 
:= a + b" is executed, a message is sent to class MATRIX with "a" and "b" as 
parameters as shown in Figure 2.5. Exported procedure can unseal "a" and "b" 
and manipulate each element of "a" and "b" because "a" and "b" are instances of 
MATRIX. A new object is created as the result of adding the matrices. Finally, the 
newly created object is sealed, and its identifier is sent back to the subject and stored 
in variable "c". 
In the second model, an object encapsulates data along with exported procedures. 
A class has a template necessary to instantiate an object and the operation to create 
instances. Conceptually, exported procedures reside in each instance object whose 
class defines these procedures. In order for a subject to access its object, it sends a 
message with an invocation request to the object along with the requested procedure 
name. Since a message to invoke an exported procedure is sent to an instance of 
the class which defines the procedure, this type of procedure is called an "instance 
operation". To create a new object, a subject sends a message to the class to invoke 
the creation procedure. 
Now consider the same example as described above. Since the "+" operation 
resides in each object, the execution of "c := a + b" causes a message to be sent 
to object "a" with "+" and the identifier "b" as parameters as shown in Figure 2.6. 
When object "a" receives the message, it creates a new object which is the result of 
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Caller class MATRIX 
+ (IN a, b. OUT c) 
instance a  instance b instance c  
Figure 2.5. An Object as Encapsulated Data 
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Caller class MATRIX 
= a + b 
+ (IN b. OUT c) 
instance a instance b instance c 
Figure 2.6. An Object as a Computational Entity 
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adding each element of its internal data to the corresponding element of "b" and the 
identifier of the newly created object is sent back to the subject. This object model 
is used by SMALLTALK, LOOPS and ACTOR [32]. 
An RM is classified as a computational entity (i.e., the second model). A mod­
ule totally encapsulates state variables along with exported procedures manipulat­
ing these variables, and a message to invoke an exported procedure is sent to an 
instance module (not to a class). However (as in SMALLTALK), the system also 
provides essence of the first object model by allowing users to define class operations 
(in addition to system defined default operations such as "1NSTANTL\TE" and "DE-
STROY-CLASS"). However, since the system does not provide the seal and unseal 
operations, exported class operations must invoke exported instance operations of 
these modules that are passed as parameters in order to access their internal data. 
In order to implement the above example, there are two possibilities. Figure 2.7 
shows the case in which exported procedure "plus" is implemented as an instance 
operation. Suppose "a" and "b" are instances of class MATRIX. The statement 
"a.plus(IN b, OUT c)" adds each element of matrices "a" and "b" and stores the 
identifier of the resulting module in "c". Figure 2.8 shows the second case (exported 
procedure "plus" is implemented as a class operation). In order to access each element 
of an instance of the MATRIX class, instance operations "get" and "put" are provided. 
The statement "MATRIX.plus(IN a, b, OUT c)" adds "a" and "b", and stores each 
result of addition into "c". "MATRIX.plus" invokes the "get" operation on formal IN 
parameters "x" and "y" to access each element of the modules passed as parameters. 
It also invokes the put operation on formal OUT parameter "z" to store a resulting 
value in each element of "c". The choice of whether an instance operation or a class 
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MATRIX = class 
specification = 
class operations 
instance operations 
procedure get (IN i, j : inteter; OUT x : real); 
procedure put (IN i, j : integer; x : real); 
procedure plus(JN b ; MATRIX; OUT c : MATRIX); 
protection = ... ; 
synchronization = ... ; 
access = 
state A : array [1..5, 1..5] of real; 
class operations 
instance operations 
procedure get (IN i, j : inteter; OUT x : real); 
begin x := A[i, j]; end; 
procedure put(IN i, j : integer; x : real); 
begin A[i, j] := x; end 
procedure plus(IN b : MATRIX; OUT c : MATRIX); 
var i, j : integer; x : real; 
begin 
MATRIX.INSTANTIATE(OUT c); 
for i := 1 to 5 do 
for j ;= 1 to 5 do 
begin 
b.get(IN i,j, OUT x); 
c.put(IN i ,  j ,  X + A[ i ,  j ] ) ;  
end; 
end; 
initialize 
begin 
end; 
end MATRIX 
Figure 2.7. A Program for MATRIX without Class Operations 
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MATRIX = class 
specification = 
class operations 
procedure plus(IN a, b: MATRIX; OUT c : MATRIX); 
instance operations 
procedure get (IN i, j ; inteter; OUT x : real); 
procedure put(IN i, j : integer; x : real); 
protection = ... ; 
synchronization = ... ; 
access = 
state A : array [1..5, 1..5] of real; 
class operations 
procedure plus(IN a, b : MATRIX; OUT c : MATRIX); 
var i, j : integer; x, y : real; 
begin 
MATRIX.INSTANTIATE(OUT c); 
for i := 1 to 5 do 
for j := 1 to 5 do 
begin 
a.get(IN i, j, OUT x); 
b.get(IN i, j, OUT y); 
c.putjlN i, j, x+y); 
end; 
end; 
instance operations 
procedure get (IN i, j : inteter; OUT x : real); 
begin x := A[i, j]; end; 
procedure put(IN i, j : integer; x : real); 
begin A(i, j| := x; end 
initialize 
begin 
end; 
end MATRIX 
Figure 2.8. A Program for MATRIX with Class Operations 
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operation is used depends on the situation and the implementer's preference. 
2.5 Inheritance 
We are adopting the concept of inheritance in the RM system [13,26]. A class can 
be defined to be a modification of a previously defined class called its superclass. The 
newly defined class is called a subclass of the superclass and inherits attributes from 
the superclass. The subclass can inherit attributes from more than one independent 
superclass and be a superclass of other classes thereby allowing an arbitrary directed 
acyclic graph structure of superclass-subclass relations. 
In some object-oriented languages such as SMALLTALK, a subclass inherits all 
state variables and exported procedures of the superclass. In general, the subclass can 
also override a definition of an exported procedure in the superclciss by defining a new 
exported procedure with the same name. This approach raises a problem in the RM 
system since concurrent access of state variables, via exported procedures, might be 
allowed. Concurrent access of the state variables of any instance may be restrained via 
an EOPPE in a synchronization component. If new exported procedures are defined 
which access state variables declared in the superclass, concurrent access problems 
may arise unless the EOPPE is redefined for the subclass. This new EOPPE would 
have to include not only the newly declared exported procedures but also all exported 
procedures declared in all of the ancestor superclcisses. If there are many ancestor 
superclasses or there are many procedures declared in ancestor superclasses, it might 
be difficult to redefine the EOPPE. Thus, a different approach is required in our 
system. 
In an EOPPE, all of the procedure names to be exported must appear. There are. 
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however, often cases in which some exported procedures in the ancestor superclasses 
may not need to be inherited by the subclass. Thus, our system assumes the default of 
not inheriting exported procedures from its superclasses. Procedures to be inherited 
from the superclcisses must be explicitly specified and a new EOPPE in the subclass 
must be defined only upon those procedures inherited from the superclasses and those 
procedures newly declared in the subcleiss. We call this approach "multiple partial 
inheritance". 
An example of inheritance is shown in Figure 2.9. M is specified to be a superclass 
by M'. 01 is inherited from M, procedure 02' replaces 02 (simply by not inheriting 
02 and defining a new 02), and 03 and R2 are newly defined in M'. 02' and 03 may 
access Rl U R2. In this way, the class M' builds on selected parts of the class M. The 
synchronization component must be redefined in M' for 01, 02' and 03. 
The system defines the distinguished class RESOURCE. Every class but RE­
SOURCE and METACLASS directly inherits the attributes of RESOURCE by de­
fault. The class operations defined in RESOURCE includes "INSTANTIATE" and 
"DESTROY-CLASS". The instance operations defined in RESOURCE includes "DE­
STROY JNSTANCE". 
The RM system is strongly typed. This requires some special facilities since 
strong typing can severely degrade the flexibility of inheritance. For example, sup­
pose we want to simulate a traffic system by realizing cars, people and a signal in 
object forms. People and cars waiting at the signal are represented by instances of 
"PERSON" class and instances of "CAR" class and are linked together to form "peo­
ple queue" and "car queue", respectively. We may want to have two levels of an 
inheritance hierarchy. The first level is a LINK clciss to allow construction of gen-
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M M' 
RI U R2 
M' = class 
specification = 
superclass = M 
protection = 
(access control specification for OJ) O] 
(access control specification for 02') 02' 
(access control specification for 03) 03 
synchronization = "new specs for 01, 02% 03; 
access = 
state R2 
class operations 
instance operations 
procedure Ol(...) : inherit from M 
procedure 02'(.,. ) 
procedure 03(... ) 
initialize 
end M' 
Figure 2.9. Structuring Software Using Inheritance 
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eral linked list structures. The LINK class has a state variable "NEXT" to store a 
pointer to the next element (RM) in a linked list. Classes in the second level of the 
inheritance hierarchy are "CAR" and "PERSON" which inherit the LINK class. In 
this structure, however, a type of NEXT is not known at the LINK level. It must be 
of type "CAR" to be inherited by "CAR", or of type "PERSON" to be inherited by 
"PERSON". 
Many object-oriented systems are dynamically typed, thereby avoiding this prob­
lem. In order to maintain the flexibility of inheritance in a strongly typed circum­
s t a n c e ,  w e  u s e  t h e  " t r a i t s "  c o n c e p t  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  t h e  X E R O X  S T A R  w o r k s t a t i o n  [ 1 2 ]  
or the "abstract superclass" concept in SMALLTALK [26]. Traits are introduced to 
optimize compiled code, and abstract superclasses are introduced to construct mutual 
superclasses for several classes which share a part of their descriptions and yet none is 
properly a subclass of another. These special classes can be inherited by other classes 
but cannot be instantiated. In the RM system, a special class called a "trait.class", 
which does not have instantiation power, is introduced for those cases where strong 
typing restricts flexibility. A trait.class is allowed to use a DUMMY.RM in its vari­
able declaration to indicate that the actual class will not be known until inheritance 
takes place, at which time a DUMMY.RM will be replaced by an actual class name. 
The solution to the above example is shown in Figure 2.10. 
2.6 Implementation of the RM System 
In this section, we suggest a possible implementation of a prototype system. 
An outline of the support system is shown in Figure 2.11. The architecture layer 
provides the following execution environment facilities: 
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LINK = trait.class 
specification = 
class operations 
instance operations 
procedure PUTNEXT(... ) 
procedure GETNEXT(... ) 
access = 
state 
NEXT : Dummy RM; 
class operations 
instance operations 
procedure PUTNEXT(... ); 
procedure GETNEXT(... 
end LINK 
PERSON = class 
specification = 
superclass = LINK 
access = 
state 
NEXT : DummyRM = PERSON; 
class operations 
Figure 2.10. A Program for Traffic Simulation Using a Trait 
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instance operations 
procedure PUTNEXT(... ) ; 
inherit from LINK; 
procedure GETNEXT(... ); 
inherit from LINK; 
end PERSON 
CAR = class 
specification = 
superclass = LINK 
access = 
state 
NEXT : Dummy RM = CAR; 
class operations 
instance operations 
procedure PUTNEXT(... ) : 
inherit from LINK; 
procedure GETNEXT(... ); 
inherit from LINK; 
end CAR 
Figure 2.10. (continued) 
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APPLICATION LAYER 
SYSTEM LAYER 
KERNEL LAYER 
ARCHITECTURE LAYER y 
concept of module, 
process mgt. in RM, 
RM mem. mgt., 
RM slate 
instantiate, destroy 
0 system utilities - compiler, editor, 
file type module, 
module directories, I/O 
anything 
Figure 2.11. Prototype Support Software for Implementing Resource Modules 
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• 1, the management of the run-time stacks for the processes in the RMs, 
2. RM memory management (relocation, garbage collection, main/secondary mem­
ory management), 
3. the management of the execution of each component in an RM and the inter-
/intra-module communication, and 
4. basic type operations (e.g., integer, boolean, real and character operations, etc.) 
and basic I/O operations. 
Porting an implemented system from one machine to another would require rewriting 
the architecture.layer. 
The kernel implements the distinguished classes METACLASS and RESOURCE. 
The system layer is where system defined classes and some system instances exist. 
This layer contains classes and instances of high-level I/O devices and the RM system 
compiler, the directory class, and the file class. 
The highest layer is the application layer, where all user defined RMs exist. In 
addition to the standard directory and file objects, provided by the system layer, the 
user has, at his disposal, a virtual address space of objects of his own choosing. 
Each component of a module (protection, synchronization and access) may be 
implemented by a separate process, called a manager process in order to diff'erentiate 
them from processes created as a result of procedure invocations. Since a manager 
process in each component can access only its own state, each may be executed on 
a separate processor. Furthermore, since the synchronization component regulates 
concurrent accesses of user processes to state variables encapsulated in the access 
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component, user processes may run on separate processors which access a shared 
memory storing state variables. 
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3 THE ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM 
3.1 Access Matrix Model 
Access control regulates the authorization of access to objects bcised on the iden­
tity of subjects. The access matrix model was developed as a framework for describing 
protection systems [27,36]. The model is defined in terms of a triple (S, O, A) where 
1. S is a set of subjects which are active entities that access objects; 
2. O is a set of objects to which access must be controlled; and 
3. A is an access matrix in which rows correspond to subjects and columns corre­
spond to objects, where an entry A[s,o] stores the access rights of subject s to 
object o. 
In operating systems, the objects may be files, directories, memory segments or 
processes, and the subjects may include users or processes. Typical access rights are 
read, write, search (in the case of directory) and execute rights. At any point of 
execution, a subject is associated with a protection environment called a domain. A 
domain is a set of objects which the subject is authorized to access; thus, a domain 
may be represented by a list of objects and the corresponding access rights that the 
subject currently has to these objects. 
In object-oriented systems, two levels of access rights must be considered. 
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1. encapsulation of objects: read/write access authorizations of exported proce­
dures to object variables, local variables and parameters (if basic types are 
passed as parameters); and 
2. procedure invocation rights: rights of subjects to invoke exported procedures of 
an object. 
For example, the access rights for an object of type integer-Stack may be invocation 
rights to push and pop procedures from the user's point of view. However, the pop 
and push procedures have access authorization only to the internal representation of 
the stack (which may be an array of integer and a pointer to the array), and an integer 
parameter to be pushed on to the stack (in the case of the push procedure). 
This research focuses attention on the representation of invocation rights to ex­
ported procedures. We will not consider mechanisms for encapsulation of objects. 
The RM system éissumes an underlying layer to implement this latter feature. 
In this view, the protection state of the system (S, O, A) may be restricted in 
the following way. 
1. S is a set of subjects, which may be users. 
2. O is a set of modules in the system. 
3. A is an access matrix of which entry A[s,o] lists the exported procedures of 
module o which subject s is authorized to invoke. 
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3.2 Access Control Mechanisms 
Implementation of a protection mechanism requires complete mediation of every 
access to an object by a reference monitor [3,16]. In RM systems, the reference 
monitor is the code of the protection component and implemented in the kernel. The 
protection component intercepts every message coming to a module. The reference 
monitor checks not only access authorization but also information flow and parameter 
type compatibility. The details of the mechanism for information flow control will be 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Conceptually, in order to implement access control mechanisms, the reference 
monitor needs to refer to the access matrix. Direct realization of the access matrix 
as a two-dimensional structure is impractical because of the sparseness of the matrix. 
Instead, the access matrix is retained in either a row-based or column-based repre­
sentation in real implementations. Two types of implementations are widely used: 
capabilities and access control lists (ACLs). 
Conceptually, a capability-based system is an implementation of the row-based 
representation. Each subject "s" holds a list of pairs (o, A[s,o]) called a capability, 
where A(s,o] is a nonempty entry of the access matrix. Thus the list, called a capability 
list or C-list, corresponds to a single row of the access matrix and defines the domain 
of the subject. An important assumption is that each object in the system has an 
unforgeable unique identifier, and the capability (o, A[s,o]) itself is unforgeable. The 
capability is like a ticket in that possession authorizes its holder "s" to access object 
"o" with rights specified in A[s,o]. Under our assumption, the A[s,o] entry of capability 
(o, A[s,o]) lists the exported procedures of module "o" which "s" is authorized to 
invoke. 
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An access control list is an implementation of the column-based representation. 
Each object stores a list of pairs (s, A[s,o]), where A[s,o] is a nonempty entry of the 
access matrix. Thus a list, called an access control list or ACL, corresponds to a single 
column of the access matrix. Implementation requires that each subject in the system 
be associated with an unforgeable unique identifier "s", called the subject ID, and 
each entry in an access control list (s, A[s,o]) itself be unforgeable. For each object 
"o", only subject "s" whose id is on the access control list is allowed access to "o" 
with rights given in A[s,o|. 
3.3 Comparison of Capabilities and Access Control Lists 
There are several well-known protection problems to be considered when com­
paring access control mechanisms [11,21,45]. In the following subsections. We will 
introduce these problems and compare capabilities with access control lists in order 
to make clear the advantages and disadvantages of each implementation. 
3.3.1 Efficiency 
In a capability-based system, possession of the capability (o, A[s,o]) authorizes 
subject "s" to access object "o" with rights given in A[s,o]. Thus, the reference monitor 
only compares A[s,o] with the access request. The A[s,o] part of the capability (o, 
A[s,o]) is usually represented by a bit vector. Therefore, testing whether a capability 
contains a certain right requires a simple bitwise logical comparison. 
On the other hand, an ACL implementation requires the reference monitor to 
search the list for every access request to verify the access authorization. Since a list 
search tends to be much slower than a simple bitwise logical comparison, the ACL 
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approach is much more inefficient than the capability-based approach. In particular, if 
the method is applied to such objects as memory segments, the ACL approach may be 
unrealistic. In RM systems, however, the list search is necessary only when a message 
arrives at a module and therefore differences in the costs of these two implementations 
may not affect system performance significantly as compared to applications with 
frequently accessed objects. 
3.3.2 Ownership 
The owner of an object has the exclusive authority to grant/revoke access rights 
to the object to/from other users, and to delete the object. Usually, the creator of 
an object becomes the owner of the object unless he transfers the ownership of the 
object to another user. 
The strict ownership policy has advantages and disadvantages. The creator of a 
object may want total control of his object. However, users of the object may want a 
guarantee that their rights to access the object will not be revoked by the owner after 
they have written some valuable information into the object. The existence of owners 
is a philosophical problem. Some implementations are based on an ownership policy 
[44]. Others deny the existence of an exclusive owner [11]. 
ACL systems are suitable for implementing an ownership policy. Typically, the 
owner of an object is the only one who can modify the access control list of the object. 
Capability-based systems, on the other hand, have a diffuse concept of ownership. 
Any holder of a capability for an object shares control of the object according to the 
access rights to the object. This diffuseness of ownership is one of the reasons for 
the difficulty of solving, in capability-based systems, the security problems discussed 
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in the following two subsections (revocation of access and propagation of access). 
Because of this, it appears necessary to us to introduce a clear ownership policy. 
Note that even with a strict ownership policy, the existence of a special user with no 
access restrictions (even the right to modify access control states) similar to the UNIX 
super user is useful. For example, the owner of an object may leave the organization 
in which the system exists, while other users still want to utilize his objects. 
3.3.3 Revocation of access 
In a capability-based system, if subject Si wants to share object 01 with subject 
S2, SI can give the capability for 01 to S2. In an ACL system, sharing can be done 
by modifying the ACL associated with 01. If Si, who is the owner of 01, adds user 
identifier of S2 to the ACL of 01, S2 can access 01. In an ACL system, in order for 
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ACL associated with 01. 
However, a capability-based system does not provide an easy way to revoke access 
once it has been given to other subjects. Redell proposed a solution to this problem by 
using indirect addressing [43]. Instead of giving the capability for 01 to S2, Si creates 
an new object 02 that stores a capability for 01 and gives a capability for 02 to S2. 
52 can access 01 indirectly though 02. Revocation is accomplished by deactivating 
or removing 02. If Si gives access for 01 to several subjects, Si has to construct a 
separate indirect object for each different subject in order for SI to have the ability to 
selectively revoke access for 01. In spite of this solution, a capability-based approach 
has less control over revocation of access and is more dangerous. If SI did not make 
an indirect object and passed the original capability for 01 to S2 by mistake, there is 
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no way for Si to revoke S2's access for 01 unless Si destroys 01. 
3.3.4 Propagation of access 
In the above discussion, after S2 acquires access for 01, S2 may pass the access 
rights to a third subject S3 without asking Si for permission. This cannot happen 
in an ACL system. In order for 82 to pass the access rights for 01 to S3, S2 has to 
modify the ACL of 01 to include S3's entry. However, S2 is not the owner of 01 and 
cannot modify the ACL of 01 even though S2's entry is in the ACL. 
In capability-based systems, controlling propagation of access is more difficult. 
S2 can give a copy of the direct or indirect capability for 01 to S2 without Si's 
permission. Some capability-based systems provide for limited mechanism to control 
propagation. Hydra's solution to this problem is to introduce the ENVRTS right in a 
capability [ll]. A capability may be stored in an object only if the capability contains 
ENVRTS right. If SI stores a capability for 01 in 02 without ENVRTS right and 
grants S2 indirect capability to 02, S2 cannot store the capability for 01 in another 
object, say 03, in order to give S3 an indirect access to 01. Note that Si must be 
sure that the capability for 02 in the domain of S2 also does not contain ENVRTS. 
Otherwise, S2 can pass its capability for 02 to S3 and S3, in turn, acquires an indirect 
access to 01. Even with the ENVRTS feature, the capability-based system provides 
for less control of the propagation of access than that provided by ACL systems. Si 
must consider S2's capability-list before giving access to S2. 
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3.3.5 Review of access 
A subject may sometimes want to know the list of all subjects who have access 
to its object 01. This can be done very easily in an ACL system by searching the 
list associated with 01. On the other hand, a capability-based system requires the 
searching of every capability-list in the system in order to determine who can access 
Ol. The search must account not only for direct capabilities but also for indirect 
capabilities. 
3.3.6 Least privilege 
A Trojan Horse is a program which performs functions other than that specified 
by the program. For example, a Trojan Horse compiler may copy or destroy files 
in the user's domain which are not relevant to the given source file. In order to 
protect objects or minimize damage from Trojan Horses or undebugged programs, 
each program should be executed in the smallest domain necessary for the task. This 
principle is called "least privilege" or "need-to-know". 
Since capabilities naturally provide mechanisms to change a domain dynamically 
for each procedure invocation, the capability-based systems nicely implement the least 
privilege principle at the procedure invocation level. A principal feature to realize this 
mechanism is based on an "enter" capability jl9) or, similarly a "call" operation and 
CALLRTS access rights [11]. The following paragraphs describe how Hydra's call 
operation realizes the least privilege principle at the procedure invocation level. 
3.3.6.1 A procedure invocation mechanism in Hydra Each procedure in 
Hydra has its own C-list, which includes capabilities for the procedure's code (with 
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read and execute rights set), capabilities for local objects (with probably read and 
write rights set) and templates for the parameters. There are two types of templates; 
parameter templates and amplification templates.^ A template does not reference a 
specific object but is considered as a prototype capability for all objects of a given 
type. The purpose of a parameter template is for type checking of actual parameters; 
thus it contains a type field and a required-rights field. The type and rights field of a 
capability passed as an actual parameter are compared with those of the corresponding 
template. If the type fields match and the rights field of the capability is a subset 
of that of the template, the actual parameter is valid. An amplification template 
contains a type field, a required-rights field and a new-rights field. The type field and 
the rights field of the capability passed as an actual parameter are validated in the 
same way as a parameter template. If valid, a new capability is produced with the 
rights specified in the new-rights field of the template. 
In order to invoke a procedure, the currently executing domain (C-list) must 
contain the capability for the procedure with its CALLRTS bit set. A call operation 
requires capabilities for a procedure and capabilities and rights masks for objects 
passed as actual parameters. For each invocation, a new C-list is created based on 
the C-list of the invoked procedure. Each C-list slot, that corresponds to a parameter 
template or an amplification template, is filled with the matching capability passed as 
a parameter. In the case of a parameter template, the resulting capability of the newly 
created C-list holds the rights field restricted by the associated mask. Therefore, to 
some extent, the caller can restrict the usage of objects passed as a parameters from the 
'Actually there are three types. However, a creation template is excluded from our 
discussion, since it has nothing to do with implementing the least privilege principle. 
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invoked procedure. For an amplification template, the resulting capability holds the 
rights field specified by the new-rights field. An amplification template is a powerful 
tool for data encapsulation of an abstract data type. 
If a subject S instantiates object X of class C, the system gives S a capability for 
X with read/write bits off as well as capabilities for a subset of exported procedures 
of C with CALLRTS bits on. S then may call these exported procedures with X as 
a parameter. The C-list corresponding to these exported procedures has amplifica­
tion templates for their instances to be passed as parameters (in this case, X) with 
read/write bits in their new-rights field. Therefore, S cannot read or write from/to X 
directly, but the exported procedures can read or write from/to X only when these 
procedures are invoked and X is passed as a parameter (encapsulation of objects). 
Hydra does not distinguish between the two levels of protection: encapsulation 
of objects and procedure invocation rights. 
3.3.6.2 Implementation of least privilege in capability-based systems 
From the above discussion, it is now clear how a capability-based system can nicely 
realize the least privilege principle. For each invocation, a totally new C-list (an 
execution environment) is created, and upon termination of the procedure, the corre­
sponding C-list is erased. The C-list associated with a procedure invocation contains 
only capabilities necessary to do the task and a caller can mask out those rights bits 
of capabilities that are irrelevant. More detail is shown by the following example. 
Assume that object HEALTH stores medical information and object SALARY 
stores income information about a community of users. Exported procedures are GET 
and PUT for retrieving or inserting records to/from these objects. INSURANCE 
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and TAX are other objects. One of the exported procedures HEALTH-CHECK in 
INSURANCE takes object HEALTH as a parameter to determine the current health 
status of a user. Exported procedure FEDERAL.TAX.CALC in TAX takes object 
SALARY as a parameter to calculate the federal tax of a user. 
There are two protection issues related to the least privilege principle. 
1. Users should not be able to access data stored In HEALTH and SALARY objects 
even though users have capabilities for (or can locate) these objects. GET and 
PUT procedures of these objects, thus, should not be invoked directly by users. 
This may sound like a protection issue of encapsulating objects as discussed ear­
lier, since this issue may be avoided if a programmer combines object HEALTH 
and SALARY into INSURANCE and TAX objects, respectively. However, there 
may be other totally independent objects which require access to HEALTH and 
SALARY objects and a decision of dividing the problem into objects is totally 
up to the programmer. Thus, this kind of situation must also be considered as 
an issue of procedure invocation rights. 
2. Procedure HEALTH.CHECK should have call access to only the GET procedure 
of HEALTH when it is invoked with HEALTH as a parameter. It should not have 
access authorization to PUT of HEALTH and GET/PUT of SALARY. Similarly, 
FEDERAL.TAX.CALC should have call access to only the GET procedure of 
its parameter SALARY object and should not have access to PUT of SALARY 
nor any access to HEALTH. 
The above scenario can easily be implemented with capability-based systems as 
follows: 
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• HEALTH.CHECK procedure in object INSURANCE holds an amplification 
template whose type field is the class of HEALTH and the new-rights field 
contains a call right for GET; 
• The FEDERAL-TAX-CALC procedure in object TAX holds an amplification 
template whose type field is the class of SALARY and the new-rights field 
contains a call right for GET; and 
• The C-list of a subject contains capabilities for the HEALTH and SALARY 
objects with no GET/PUT access rights, a capability for the INSURANCE 
object with CALLRTS access right for HEALTH.CHECK and a capability for 
TAX with CALLRTS access right for FEDERAL.TAX.CALC. 
Even though the subject holds capabilities for the HEALTH and SALARY objects, it 
cannot invoke their exported procedures PUT and GET directly because it does not 
have call rights for these procedures within the capabilities. If the HEALTH-CHECK 
procedure is invoked by the user with a capability for the HEALTH object passed as a 
parameter, a new C-list is created which contains a capability for only the HEALTH 
object with an amplified call right for the GET procedure. Thus, the invoked proce­
dure has access authorization only to the state variables of the INSURANCE object 
and procedure GET in the HEALTH object. Similarly, if FEDERAL.TAX.CALC is 
invoked by the user with a capability for SALARY as a parameter, a newly created 
C-list contains a capability for only the object SALARY with an amplified call right 
for the GET procedure. 
3.3.6.3 Implementation of least privilege in ACL systems Now we will 
consider an implementation of the least privilege principle with an ACL system. In 
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an ACL system, a subject usually corresponds to a user. Under this assumption, 
the same level of the least privilege principle as provided by capability-bcised systems 
cannot be achieved. In the previous example, in order for the HEALTH-CHECK 
procedure executing on behalf of user S to acquire a call access authorization for 
GET in the HEALTH object, the ACL for HEALTH must contain the (S, GET) 
entry. Similarly, SALARY must contain the (S, GET) entry in its ACL in order for 
FEDERAL.TAX.CALC executing on behalf of S to access GET in SALARY. This 
allows S to invoke GET procedures in HEALTH and SALARY directly. Moreover, 
HEALTH-CHECK can access not only GET in HEALTH but also GET in SALARY. 
In the same manner, FEDERAL-TAX-CALC has access authorizations for GET in 
both SALARY and HEALTH. 
One way of realizing the least privilege principle in ACL systems is the concept of 
a group [41]. A group is a mechanism for representing a set of subjects; thus, multiple 
subjects are identified by a group name. The group mechanism in Multics (called 
projects) allows a subject to be active in only one group at a time, even though it 
can be a member of more than one group. The possible improvement in the above 
example may be as follows: 
• User S is a member of two different groups, say Gl and G2; 
• The ACLs for HEALTH and INSURANCE contain entries (Gl, GET) and (Gl, 
HEALTH-CHECK), respectively; and 
• The ACLs for SALARY and TAX contain (G2, GET) and (G2, FEDERAL-
-TAX-CALC), respectively. 
Then, HEALTH-CHECK, when executing on behalf of S, can only access GET in 
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HEALTH, and FEDERAL.TAX.CALC, executing on behalf of S, has access only 
to GET in SALARY. However, even with this mechanism, S can still access GET 
in HEALTH or SALARY directly. Moreover, changing the active group in Multics 
requires users to log off the system and log in again under a new group identifier. 
ACL systems need a mechanism to change domains dynamically for each procedure 
invocation in order for the systems to realize the same flexibility of implementation 
of the least privilege principle provided by capability-based systems. 
3.4 Proposed Access Control Mechanism 
3.4.1 Four-tuple ACL entry 
As discussed in the previous section, capability-based systems have difficulties 
in the following areas: revocation of access, control of propagation of access, and 
review of access. ACL-based systems solve all these problems nicely, but are inefficient 
and cannot implement the least privilege principle as effectively as capability-based 
systems. 
As mentioned by other researchers [21,32,45]. the problems of capability-based 
systems are fundamental and it is difficult to construct secure systems based on them. 
These problems come from the fundamental characteristic of capability-based systems 
— diffuseness of clear ownership. On the other hand, the inefficiency of ACL-based 
systems, as mentioned earlier, may not be a big obstacle if the mechanisms are applied 
at places where less frequent traffic is expected. The use in RM systems is considered 
to be in this category, because access control checks are done only when messages 
arrive at a module. Thus, we apply an ACL approach to RM systems to implement 
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discretionary protection for individual users to invoke exported procedures of each 
module. However, as discussed in the previous section, the choice of mechanisms to 
encapsulate states variables within a module is left to the implementor. Thus, this 
discussion does not preclude capabilities to implement protection at lower levels. 
In orer to enforce the principle of least privilege as provided by capability-based 
systems, we use a four-tuple entity in the access control list. Each subject "s" in an 
ACL entry (s, A[s,o]) is represented by a four tuple, (user ID, class ID, module ID, 
exported procedure name), not just by a simple user ID. In ACL systems, changing 
a subject ID is the essence of changing domains, because subject IDs are in one-to-
one correspondence with their domains [45]. The four-tuple uniquely determines the 
exported procedure in the system which is currently under execution on behalf of the 
user. A subject specified by a four tuple dynamically changes its ID for each procedure 
invocation, thereby realizing the least privilege principle at the procedure invocation 
level. This is the same level of flexibility offered by capability-based systems. 
From another point of view, the four-tuple gives users a fine grain of access 
control. The first component provides access control at the user level. The second 
component may be used to enforce access through a front end module of a specified 
class. This is useful in presenting a "view" for the user, as in database systems, and 
preventing direct access which would circumvent the view. Since numerous instances 
of the same class may exist in the system, the third component of an entity may 
be used to further qualify the second component and force access through a specific 
instantiation of a designated class. The fourth component allows fine grain control by 
forcing the calling module through one of its specific procedure. These four levels are 
a natural feature of the system. Since owners of classes, owners of instantiations, and 
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users of instantiations may all be different, the four levels of control provide significant 
flexibility in structuring and specifying protection for a system of modules. An 
may be used in any component of a four tuple to denote a wild card (don't care) 
specification in the case the owner of a module does not need this level of fine grain 
of control. 
The example discussed in the previous section can be modified as follows by using 
the four-tuple ACL:^ 
• The ACL of object HEALTH contains the entry ((S, INSURANCE.CLASS, 
INSURANCE, HEALTH.CHECK), GET); 
• The ACL of SALARY contains the entry ((S, TAX.CLASS, TAX, FEDERAL­
.TAX.CALC), GET); 
0 Object INSURANCE has the ((S, *, *, *), HEALTH.CHECK) in its ACL; and 
• The TAX object contains the ((S, *, *, *), FEDERAL.TAX.CALC) in its ACL. 
Then, S cannot access the GET procedure in the HEALTH or SALARY object di­
rectly. Also, on behalf of S, procedure HEALTH.CHECK has call access to only the 
GET procedure of object HEALTH, and procedure FEDERAL.TAX.CALC has call 
access to only procedure GET of the SALARY object. In this solution, S can invoke 
HEALTH.CHECK in INSURANCE and FEDERAL.TAX.CALC in TAX from any 
procedure of any instance of any class. 
Note that the rights amplification mechanism which capability-based systems 
provide is not necessary in the four-tuple ACL, since for each procedure invocation, 
-In this discussion, we cissume the classes of INSURANCE and TAX to be INSUR-
ANCE.CLASS and TAX.CLASS, respectively. 
57 
a user may obtain a totally different execution environment from the previous envi­
ronment by changing its subject ID. In the above example, the purpose of the rights 
amplification of capability-based mechanisms is to prevent a user from direct access 
to the HEALTH and SALARY objects, and to provide access to these objects only 
through invocations of the FEDERAL_TAX_CAL and HEALTH.CHECK procedures. 
This can be easily done in the four-tuple ACL by specifying procedure names FED-
ERAL-TAX-CALC and HEALTH.CHECK in the fourth elements of the ACL entities 
in SALARY and HEALTH. In this example, the names of the modules encapsulating 
these procedures and their classes are also specified in the second and third elements 
of the ACLs to avoid name conflicts. 
In order to illustrate that the four-tuple ACL has the power to realize the least 
privilege principle, we will show a possible four-tuple ACL implementation of the 
bibliography example, which was introduced in [50]. The bibliography system provides 
for the following four procedures: 
1. U(pi,... ,pn) — update 
2 .  P ( p i , . . . , p m )  —  p r i n t  
3. PWOA(pi,... ,po) — print without annotation 
4. E() — erase 
where p^'s are parameters. 
There are five instances of bibliography, Bl, B2, B3, B4 and B5, and three users, 
Ul, U2 and U3. Each user has the following access rights: 
1. Ul has capabilities with CALLRTS for all of the procedures U, P, PWOA and E. 
Ul also has a capability for Bl with U, P, PWOA and E rights and a capability 
for B2 with U and PWOA rights.^ Thus, Ul may invoke all those operations 
on Bl, but can only perform U and PWOA on B2. 
2. U2 has capabilities for all of the procedures and three bibliographies B2, B3 and 
B4. The capabilities for the procedures have CALLRTS. The capability for B2 
has only a PWOA right, but the capabilities for B3 and B4 have U, P and E 
rights. Thus, U2 can invoke only PWOA on B2, but may perform U, P or E on 
B3 and B4. 
3. U3 has capabilities with CALLRTS for U, P and PWOA. It has also capabilities 
for Bl with P right, B4 with U and P rights, and B5 with U, P and E rights. 
Therefore, U3 may invoke U or P on B4 and B5, and P on Bl. Note that even 
though it has a capability for B5 with right to invoke E, U3 cannot actually 
perform the operation since it does not have a capability for E. 
With the four-tuple ACL in the RM system, the solution may be as follows. Since 
a module totally encapsulates data along with operations on the data, users need to 
know only the references (unique identifier) to the bibliography objects, which are the 
instances of class BIB.CLASS. The five instances of BIB-CLASS are Bl, B2, B3, B4, 
and B5. Rights to invoke exported procedures U, P, PWOA and E in those instances 
are specified by the ACLs. The ACL of each module contains the following entries: 
1. Bl — ((Ul,*,*,*) {U, P, PWOA, E}) and ((U3,*,*,+) {P». 
^In Hydra, procedures are also objects. Thus, in order for a user to invoke procedure 
P on data object O, the user must hold a capability for P with access rights CALLRTS, 
as well as a capability for O with access rights P. 
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2. B2 — ((Ul,*,*,*) {U, PWOA}) and ((U2,*,*,*) {PWOA}). 
3. B3 — ((U2,*,*,*) {U, P, E}). 
4. B4 - ((U2,*,*,*) {U, P, E}) and ((U3,*,*,*) {U, P}). 
5. B5 — ((U3,*,*,*) {U, P}). 
This realizes precisely the same access environment for Ul, U2 and U3 as provided 
by Hydra. 
In order to modify an entry of an ACL, a subject must hold the "ACL modification 
right" to the module. An instantiator of a module automatically becomes the owner 
of the module and by default is granted the ACL modification right to the module. 
Each module has only one owner. An owner can transfer the ownership of a module to 
another subject. However, once transferred, the ownership can not be regained unless 
a new owner transfers the ownership to the old owner. In addition to the owner 
of a module, two sets of subjects have rights to modify an ACL of a module; the 
system administrator and managers. The system administrator is a special user with 
no access restrictions, including the ACL modification rights, to any modules. The 
system administrator is similar to the UNIX super user. A manager must be granted 
the right to modify the ACL of the module by the owner and the owner can revoke 
the right from the manager any time. In order to implement a concept of managers, 
we introduce a special class operation called "MODIFY-ACL". The subjects whose 
IDs are listed in the ACL for MODIFY.ACL operation are managers of the module. 
Managers can modify ACLs for all operations but MODIFY.ACL. Only the owner 
of the module and the system administrator can modify the entries of the ACL for 
MODIFY_ACL operation. 
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In addition to user-defined class and ins.tance operations, all the class operations 
inherited from RESOURCE, such as DESTROY.CLASS and INSTANTIATE, have 
associated ACLs. Note that inheritance is also a right which must be protected and 
therefore it has an associated ACL. 
3.4.2 Access-rights expression 
Kieburtz and Silberschatz define two types of consistency for typed objects [34]: 
internal consistency and external consistency. Internal consistency states that each 
operator (exported procedure) transfers the resource state into an acceptable state. 
Internal consistency can be determined from the class definition alone. External con­
sistency specifies a sequential constraint upon the order of operators invoked by any 
individual user. For example, in order to access a file, a user must open the file, per­
form any number of read or write operations, then finally close the file. Determining 
external consistency requires the observation of each program that uses objects. 
Kieburtz and Silberschatz developed, in Concurrent Pascal, the concept of access-
rights expressions in order to enforce external consistency. An access-rights expression 
defines the order of invocation of procedures that each user must follow. This order 
is specified by a use of procedure names and four separators: the semicolon to denote 
sequencing, the comma to denote alternation, the bracket to denote repetition and 
parentheses to designate association. For example, the access-rights expression "P; 
Q; R" specifies that any user is allowed to invoke procedures P, Q and R only in the 
specified order. Expression "P, Q, R" allows a user to invoke only one of P, Q or R. 
Expression "[P; R]" specifies that a user is allowed to invoke the sequence P followed 
by R, zero or more times. Parentheses are used for grouping. Thus, "P; (Q, R); S" 
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specifies two possible sequence of invocations; "P; Q; S" or "P; R; S". 
Kieburtz and Silberschatz incorporated access-rights expressions in a manager, 
which is an extension of a monitor (Kieburtz and Silberschatz [33], Silberschatz et al. 
[46]), and in a clciss of Concurrent Pascal. For example, suppose manager Reader-
Writer defines procedures OpenRead, CloseRead, Open Write and Close Write, and the 
Filetype class defines procedures Read and Write. Note that in Concurrent Pascal, 
an instance of a class allows concurrent invocations of its exported procedures but an 
instance of a monitor (including manager) allows only a sequential invocation. In this 
case, the manager Reader-Writer implements the synchronization constraint under 
which only one user can access Write exclusively or an arbitrary number of users can 
access Read concurrently on an instance of the Filetype class. 
Class Filetype specifies the following access-rights expressions: 
access-rights Input = [Read] || Output = [Write] 
Manager Reader-Writer contains the following declarations: 
type Reader-Writer = manager of File_ref: Filetype; 
access-rights Reader = [OpenRead; Input; CloseRead] 
][ Writer = [Open Write; Output; Close Write] 
begin 
var Sharedfile: Filetype; 
end. 
Here, an instance RW of the Reader-Writer manager is called a resource manager and 
an instance of class Filetype is called a managed resource. The access-rights expres-
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s ions defined by manager RW have embedded subexpressions "Input" and "Output" 
which are defined by the corresponding managed resource. 
In order to access instances of these types, a user must instantiate the Reader-
Writer manager and the Filetype class in a program as follows: 
var RW : Reader-Writer; 
Infile : Filetype (Reader) from RW; 
The from clause declares that Infile is a type managed by RW. "(Reader)" is an 
instantiation parameter to select the access-rights expression "Reader = [OpenRead; 
Input; CloseRead]" defined in the Reader-Writer manager. It controls access to Infile 
by substituting "[Read]" for Input to form the access-rights expression "'OpenRead; 
[Read]; CloseRead]" The user now has static access binding to RW but yet no access 
binding to Infile. Thus, at this point, the user cannot invoke Read in Infile. In 
order to acquire a binding to Infile, the user must execute "Infile.OpenRead". Even 
though procedure OpenRead is defined in Reader-Writer whose instance is RW, this 
invocation is valid. A resource manager enhances its managed resource by adding the 
manager-defined procedures. This is called an enhanced type [33]. Use of a manager 
allows a programmer to dynamically allocate access binding to a managed resource. 
Thus, the execution of this statement dynamically binds Infile to the user; thereafter, 
the user can issue an arbitrary number of "Infile.Read" operation. 
The control of external consistency requires the cooperation of a programmer of 
classes and a user. If a user forgoes the enhanced operations provided by a manager, 
access may be acquired to a shared instance of a resource (in the above example, 
access to Infile) by statically allocating Infile [34]. This can happen because monitor-
based systems do not totally encapsulate resources. In this case, the user can read 
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and write from/to Infile without any constraint. 
We found access-rights expressions to be very useful in imposing external con­
sistency and have decided to incorporate this concept into our system. However, we 
believe that the control of external consistency should be in hands of a programmer of 
a resource module, not a user. Our proposed mechanism is to combine access-rights 
expressions with the four-tuple ACLs. The A[s,o] part of an access control list entry 
(s, A[s,o]) lists access-rights expressions that specify not only procedures in module 
"o" that "s" can invoke but also specifies the orders of invocations to these procedures 
which "s" must follow. There is no way "s" can circumvent the sequences of invo­
cations specified by a module. Syntactically, instead of a module having a list of (s, 
A[s,o]) entries, we associate each access-rights expression with an access control list. 
Thus, each ACL is a list of four-tuple entities, followed by an access-rights expression 
which governs the behavior of each entity in the list. 
As an example, suppose that an entity is required to open a file for reading 
(writing) prior to attempting to read (write) or close the file. The ACLs, in an 
instance of a file module, may appear as 
{(uidl,*,*,+),(uid2,*,*,*)}:OpenR;[Read];CloseR 
{(uidl,RMl,instl,procl)}:OpenW;[Write];CloseW. 
The first ACL specifies that any procedure of any instance of any class, executing on 
behalf of users "uidl" or "uid2", is constrained to the sequence "OpenR" followed 
by any number of "Reads" followed by "CIoseR". The second ACL specifies that 
procedure "prod" of the "instl" instance of the module class "RMl" executing on 
behalf of user "uidl" is constrained to the sequence "OpenW", followed by any number 
of "Writes" followed by "CloseW". Note that an associated EOPPE defined in the 
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synchronization component might have the form 
path = 1 : ({OpenR; Read*; CloseR}, (OpenW; Write*; CloseW)). 
The reader can observe that this is very similar to access-rights expressions. However, 
the open path expression imposes synchronization constraints on concurrent accessing 
entities (processes) and has nothing to do with the behavior of each individual entity, 
and if the expression is not satisfied, the corresponding request is temporarily blocked. 
On the other hand, the access-rights expression specifies the behavior of each accessing 
entity and if the expression is not satisfied, the corresponding request is rejected. In 
the degenerate case, an access-rights expression is simply a set of procedure identifiers. 
For example, the ACL for a procedure X might be 
{(A,stack,stackl,push),(*,queue,*,* )}:X. 
Unlike those of Kieburtz and Silberschatz, our access-rights expressions specify 
the invocation sequence of procedures within one module. If external consistency im­
poses a particular sequence on invocations of exported procedures defined in more than 
one module, a programmer can simply create a front-end module which accepts all the 
requests and invokes the corresponding requests in other modules. In the above file ex­
ample, assume that procedures OpenR, OpenW, Read, Write, CloseR and CloseW are 
defined in totally different modules, say, in modules M.OpenR, M.OpenW, M .Read, 
M.Write, M.CloseR and M.CloseW, respectively (even though this is probably an un­
realistic assumption). Then, the programmer may create a front-end module, called 
File of class File.CLASS, which declares exported procedures P.OpenR, P.OpenW, 
P.Read, P.Write, P.CloseR and P.CloseW, respectively and specifies access-rights 
expressions as follows: 
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{(uidl,*,*,*),(uid2,*,*,*)}:P.OpenR;[P_Read];P_CloseR 
{(uidl,RMl,mstl,procl)}:P.OpenW;[P.Write];P.CloseW. 
Each exported procedure is defined to call the corresponding procedure in another 
module. For example, the body of P.OpenR may be declared as follows: 
procedure P.OpenR(); 
begin 
M.OpenR.P.OpenR(); 
end. 
The access control list of module M.OpenR is defined cis follows: 
{(*, File.Class, File,P_OpenR)}:OpenR. 
The access control lists of other modules can be similarly defined. In order to grant 
or revoke access rights, only the ACLs in module File need to be modified. This is 
another example of the usefulness of the *-specification in four-tuple entities. Uidl 
and uid2 can not directly invoke OpenR, OpenW, Read, Write, CIoseR or CloseW 
without going through front-end module File. If uidl and uid2 invoke the operations 
in File, they have to follow the sequences specified by access-rights expressions 
P-OpenR;|P_Read];P_CloseR or P.OpenW;[P_Write];P.CloseW. 
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4 THE INFORMATION FLOW MECHANISM 
4.1 Definition of Flow Control and a Review of Previous Work 
An information flow control policy specifies the manner in which classified in­
formation may flow from one object to another. Let P be the set of all flows in an 
information flow system authorized by a given flow policy, and let E be the set of all 
the flows certified by a flow control mechanism. A flow control mechanism is 
1. secure if E Ç P, 
2. insecure if E - P ^ 0, 
3. precise if E = P, and 
4. imprecise if E C P. 
Two types of flow control models are well known: the access matrix model and 
the information flow model. 
4.1.1 Access matrix model 
In the access matrix model, the state of the system is defined by a triple (S,0,A), 
where S is a set of subjects, O is a set of objects, and A is an access matrix. Bell and 
LaPadula show how the rules of an access matrix can incorporate a flow control policy 
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[7]. Every subject is given a "clearance", and each object is assigned a "classification" 
that is based on the sensitivity of the information held in the object. Each subject 
also has a "current security level" which must be equal to or less than the clearance of 
the subject. In order to maintain the secure system state, the following two properties 
must hold; 
1. simple security property ; A subject is not allowed to hold read access to any 
object unless the classification of the object is less than or equal to the clearance 
of the subject. 
2. ^-property : 
• A subject is not allowed to have write access to an object unless the classi­
fication of the object is greater than or equal to the current security level 
of the subject. 
• A subject is not allowed to hold read/write access to an object unless 
the classification of the object is equal to the current security level of the 
subject. 
• A subject is not allowed to hold read access to an object unless the classi­
fication of the object is less than or equal to the current security level of 
the subject. 
Bell and LaPadula also define a set of operations which effect a transition from 
one state to another (e.g., get-read-access, give-write-access etc.), and they show that 
each operation preserves these properties. In general, access control models enforce 
the rules of an information flow control when subjects acquire access rights to objects. 
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4.1.2 Information flow model 
Information flow models regulate the flow of information between objects inde­
pendently of the clcissification of subjects. To formally describe an information flow 
policy, Denning introduced a lattice model (SC, <, ©, (g)) [15], where 
1. SC is a finite set of security classes; 
2. "<" is a binary relation which induces a partially ordering on the security classes 
in SC; 
3. "©" is an zissociative and commutative binary operator on SC, denoting the 
least upper bound, e.g., A © B is the least upper bound of classes A and B; 
4. "®" is an associative and commutative binary operator on SC, denoting the 
greatest lower bound, e.g., A 0 B is the greatest lower bound of classes A and 
B; and ' 
5. SC has a unique greatest lower bound LOW and a unique least upper bound 
HIGH such that LOW < A and A < HIGH for any A in SC. 
For notational convenience, if x is a storage object, then the security class of x 
will be denoted by x. 
Military organizations commonly designate a security class by an ordered pair 
(classification, compartment), where compartment is a subset of a set of departments. 
If "a" and "b" are classifications and "x" and "y" are compartments, then a partial 
order on the security classes is defined by 
(a,x) < (b,y) iff a < b and x Ç y. 
69 
The lattice defined by this partial order defines the information flow policy. For exam­
ple, let the classifications consist of TOPSECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and 
UNCLASSIFIED, and the departments consist of PACIFIC and ATLANTIC. Then 
there are four compartments: (PACIFIC, ATLANTIC), (PACIFIC), (ATLANTIC) 
and (). The lattice defining the resulting information fiow policy is shown in Figure 
4.1. For simplicity, the examples in this research assume a linear lattice of secu­
rity classes consisting of TOPSECRET (= HIGH), SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and 
{C, (P, A)} = HIGH 
{C,  (A)}  {U, (P, A)} {C.  (P)}  
A 
{IT .  (A)}  {C. ()} (P)} 
{U,  ( ) }  =  LOW 
U  :  U N C L A S S I F I E D  
C  :  C O N F I D E N T I A L  
P : PACIFIC 
A  ;  A T L A N T I C  
Figure 4.1. Lattice Structure Defining an Information Flow Policy 
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UNCLASSIFIED (= LOW). 
A variable may be either statically or dynamically bound to a security class. A 
"statically bound variable" is assigned a fixed security class at compile time. A secu­
rity class of a "dynamically bound variable" changes with the class of its associated 
information. 
An information flow from variable A to variable B is denoted by A => B. If B is 
statically bound, the flow A =>• B is secure if and only if the relation A < B is implied 
by the lattice. Otherwise, a security violation occurs. If B is dynamically bound, B 
becomes A and no security violation occurs. 
Flows can be classified as explicit or implicit. An explicit flow from variables 
aj,... ,an to variable x occurs when an execution directly assigns information derived 
from aj,..., are to X. An implicit flow from variables aj,..., to variable x occurs 
when the execution of an assignment to x is conditioned upon values derived from 
aj,..., On- Note that implicit flows occur even without the execution of an assignment 
statement. For example, the statement 
if a > 0 then x := y else y := z 
causes an explicit flow from "y" to "x" only when a > 0, and from "z" to "y" only 
when a < 0. The statement also causes implicit flows from "a" to both "x" and "y" 
regardless of the value of "a". Implicit flows must be considered since the values of 
"x", "y" and "z" before and after execution of the statement may be used to deduce 
whether or not "a" is greater than zero. 
The execution of a program causes both "direct" and "indirect" flows between 
variables. An information flow from A to B is called direct if it is the result of a 
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single assignment or conditional statement. It is called indirect if it is the result of a 
combination of statements. Consider the following program: 
if X = 0 then 
while Y > 0 do 
begin 
C := A + B; 
Y := Y - 1; 
end; 
D := C. 
There are direct flows from A, B, X and Y to C and from X and Y to Y. There is also 
a direct flow from C to D. Information also flows to D from A, B, X and Y, and these 
flows are indirect. Formally, we can say that an execution of a program defines a 
direct flow relation on the variables appearing in the program. The transitive closure 
of this relation gives all the flows that occur in the execution. 
Information flow models can be characterized by 
1. their ability to handle statically bound or dynamically bound variables, and 
2. whether or not security is verifled at compile time or run time. 
Fenton developed a run-time certification mechanism for programs with statically 
bound variables [24,25]. The mechanism is an extension of the Data Mark Ma­
chine in which each storage object has a tag field containing the security class of 
the object. The machine also hcis a hardware stack containing the class of a pro­
gram counter in order to account for implicit flows. The top of the stack holds the 
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least upper bound of the classes of variables on which the statement being executed 
is conditioned. If the instruction is an assignment to x, the hardware checks that 
"the class on the top of the stack" < x as well éis checking the explicit flow. Fenton 
proved that for a program with only statically bound variables, implicit flows that 
occur in absence of execution (e.g., when assignment statements are skipped) can be 
ignored. However, if a flow violation is detected, then 
1. execution of the statement causing the flow violation must be skipped, 
2. an error must not be reported to the subject, 
3. execution must continue as if no flow violation had occurred, and 
4. the program must terminate with a low security state in the program counter 
stack. 
Otherwise, an insecure program could leak one bit of information. For a program 
containing dynamically bound variables, the handling of implicit flows is even more 
complicated [24]. 
Denning developed a compile-time certification procedure for each statement type 
(e.g., assignment, if statement, while statement etc.) [14,17], assuming that all 
variables in a program are statically bound to security classes. Denning has also 
e x p a n d e d  F e n t o n ' s  r u n - t i m e  a p p r o a c h  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  i m p l i c i t  f l o w s  i n  p r o g r a m s  w i t h  
only dynamically bound variables [14]. This approach has the additional expense of 
run-time overhead. 
Andrews and Reitman's approach is based on Hoare's program verification method 
[6]. Axioms, based on the lattice model of information flow policy, are developed for 
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the various types of statements in a programming language, including the synchro­
nization statements — wait and signal. 
4.1.3 Restrictions of the access matrix model 
We consider access matrix models as described in the previous subsection to be 
too restrictive compared to information flow models for the following reasons: 
1. Access matrix models are applied to large storage objects such as files, while 
information flow models can be applied to variables in a program [37]. 
2. Access matrix models involve the clearance of a subject. Information flow models 
certify flows between objects. For example, suppose subject S reads data from 
object 01 and writes it to object 02, and the relationship of the classifications 
is S < 01 < 02, If a program running on behalf of subject S is memoryless, 
information flows only from object 01 to object 02 and this is a legal flow 
according to the lattice model of a flow policy. Access matrix models, however, 
regard the program to be insecure. 
3. Access matrix models do not consider flows of information which are internal 
to the program. This can lead to over-classification of variables. Hence, some 
secure programs may be regarded to be insecure (i.e., the mechanism is impre­
cise). For example, because of the ^-property, a subject S cannot hold read 
access to an object 01 and write access to an object 02 unless the security level 
of 01 is less than or equal to the current security level of S, and the current 
security level of S is less than or equal to the security level of 02 (01, < S < 
02). However, it may be that information written into 02 is not functionally 
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dependent on information in 01 and no illegal flow occurs. In order to reduce 
the possibility of over-cleissification, the ^-property is redefined by Feiertag et 
al. as follows [22]: 
A subject can modify object 01 which is functionally dependent on 
object 02 only if 01 < 02. 
Information flow models, on the other hand, analyze the internal structure of 
a program and certify actual flows caused by the execution of program state­
ments. Thus, information flow models may provide more precise certification 
than access matrix models. 
4. Access matrix models must maintain a changing set of conditions and proper­
ties'; therefore, they are more complicated than information flow models, which 
simply require that all information flows obey the flow relation specified by a 
lattice [37]. 
For these reasons, we have decided to adopt information flow models for our 
research. 
4.1.4 Problems of applying existing information flow models to the RM 
system 
4.1.4.1 Denning's compile-time mechanism Denning's compile-time mech­
anism allows only for statically bound variables. In [17|, Denning presented certifi­
cation semantics for various types of programming statements. For example, the 
certification semantics of the assignment statement "<variable> := <expression>", 
where <expression> contains operands ij,... ,xm, are given by 
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<expression> = xj © • • • © Xm 
if not (< express ion > < <variable>) 
then certify the assignment statement 
else report security violation. 
Thus, if the assignment statement to be certified is "X ;= A + B * C;", the certification 
mechanism requires "A © B © Ç < X". 
Because of the transitive property of the "<" relation, sequences of secure state­
ments are secure. Therefore, certification of a program requires only certification of 
direct flows caused by individual statements within the program. This approach is 
attractive from an efficiency point of view since no run-time certification is necessary. 
One major diflSculty of this approach, however, lies in procedure handling. Let Q be 
a procedure with formal IN parameters and formal OUT parameters 
y \ i  •  '  •  i V n -  S u p p o s e  t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  o f  P  e n c o u n t e r s  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  
call Q(IN aj,...,aj7î, OUT 6^,..., 6^). 
The certification semantics of a procedure call requires verification that 
1. Q is secure, 
2. aj^ < xjç for k=l, ... ,m, and 
3. yj < bj for j=l, ... ,n. 
If P and Q are compiled separately, the certification mechanism must defer the 
verification of the call. The compiler will output all the information necessary to 
verify the call, and subsequently a linker will use the information to certify the linkage 
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flows. In this model, since all parameters must be statically bound, separate versions 
of functionally equivalent procedures are required for parameters of different security 
classes. This is not only inconvenient for programmers, but it also severely reduces 
the possibilities for resource sharing. One possible solution for this problem is to 
impose the restriction that a procedure cannot access a global variable and cannot 
contain a variable with a lifetime longer than that of an execution of the procedure 
itself. Under this restriction, since the output parameters are functions of only the 
input parameters, the security of a procedure call may be established by verifying 
that 
a j  ©  . . .  ©  am <  ®  ®  hn-
where aj ... ojn are the actual IN parameters and ^ are the actual OUT pa­
rameters of the call. The inability to eflfectively handle state variables is considered to 
be a major restriction. Also, every actual OUT parameter is not always necessarily 
a function of all the actual IN parameters (possibly some subset of actual IN param­
eters). Thus, this verification mechanism potentially over-classifies security classes 
of actual OUT parameters of a procedure. Over-classification of security classes of 
variables in a program leads to potential imprecision in a certification mechanism. 
4.1.4.2 Denning's run-time mechanism This approach assumes that all 
variabl e s  are dynamically bound and program certification is performed at run time. 
The certification procedure relies on a hardware support mechanism which includes 
a tag field in each memory cell and processor register for storing the security class, 
and a stack HS which contains the security class on which the currently executing 
statement is conditioned. Stack HS is used to account for implicit flows. The security 
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class on the top of HS is denoted by HS. The "push(e)" operation places HS © e at the 
top of HS and the "pop" operation removes the class on top of HS. The compile-time 
mechanism transforms conditional statements by inserting push/pop operations into 
the program ELS follows: 
push(e); 
if e then SI [else S2]; => if e then Si [else S2]; 
pop; 
push(e); 
while e do S; => while e do begin S; pop; push(e); end; 
pop. 
When an assignment statement 
X  : =  F ( a i , . . .  , a n )  
is executed, the hardware automatically updates x to 
f l j  ©  . . .  ©  O n ©  HS. 
This mechanism is not powerful enough to detect illegal implicit flows that occur 
in the absence of the execution of statements. This is illustrated by the following 
example [16]: 
y := 0; z := 0; 
if X  = 0 then z := 1; 
if z = 0 then y := 1, 
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where x is initially bound to SECRET and takes a value of either one or zero, y and z 
are initially bound to UNCLASSIFIED. After execution of the program, the value of 
y is equal to the value of x. However, y erroneously remains UNCLASSIFIED since 
the mechanism described above is unable to detect implicit flows which occur when 
an execution of an explicit assignment is skipped. This type of information leakage 
occurs when a dynamically bound variable serves as an intermediary for implicit flow 
from one conditional statement to another. 
In order to account for implicit flows which occur in the absence of the execution 
of assignment statements, the compile-time mechanism must also insert into the source 
program "update b" operations, which update b to "b 0 HS". The statement 
if e then 81 [else S2] 
is transformed to 
push(e); 
if e then SI [else S2]; 
for X in ((VI U V2) - (VI n V2)), update x; 
pop, 
where VI and V2 are sets of variables to which values are assigned in Si and S2, 
respectively. 
Similarly, the statement 
while e do S 
is transformed into 
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push(e); 
while e do begin S; pop; push(e) end; 
for X in V update x; 
pop, 
where V is a set of variables to which values are assigned in S. 
With this addition to the mechanism, in the above example, z will be increased 
to SECRET even when the "then" branch is skipped. In turn, y will be increased to 
SECRET (= z) regardless of the value of z. 
Denning also presents a compile-time algorithm which avoids the insertion of 
unnecessary update operations [14]. This algorithm simulates the execution of a 
given program in order to calculate the lojvest and highest possible security classes 
that may be assumed at execution time by each variable and HS. If, in the above 
transformed code for the if statement, a variable "x" in ((VI U V2) - (Vl n V2)) or 
V has the lowest possible class which is greater than or equal to the highest possible 
security class of HS, then x © HS must equal x and the stcitement "update x" does 
not have to be inserted. 
The drawback to both of Denning's run-time approaches is that it requires special 
architecture and incurs significant run-time overhead. In addition, using this approach 
in our RM system would also require a mechanism to detect flow violations in the 
access component. This would violate our major design goal of completely separating 
the functions of protection from the access code. 
4.1.4.3 Andrews and Reitman's certification mechanism This method 
uses a compile-time verification technique. Since the classes of long term variables 
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(such as state variables) must be determined at compile time, these variables must 
be statically bound. Other variables may be either statically or dynamically bound. 
Implicit flows are classified into two types: local flows and global flows. A local flow 
is an implicit flow within a statement. A global flow is either (a) an implicit flow from 
the conditional variables of an iteration statement to all subsequent statements, or (b) 
a flow caused by process synchronization. For example, the sequence of statements 
X := 0; 
while y > 0 do; 
X := 1; 
causes a global flow from y to x since the last statement is conditionally executed, 
depending on the value of y. The following is an example of a global flow caused by 
signal/wait operations: 
process 1: 
if y > 0 then signal (sem); 
process 2: 
X := 0; 
wait (sem); 
X := 1. 
Here, a flow takes place from y to x via the semaphore variable "sem". 
In order to handle these two types of flows, Andrews and Reitman introduced 
special certification variables, local and global. A value in local becomes 
local © exp 
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within a conditional statement, where exp denotes the class of the conditional expres­
sion. Upon completion of the conditional statement, the value in local reverts to its 
previous value. Global, on the other hand, represents an accumulation of the clcisses 
of conditions which would be in effect upon completion of the execution of the body 
of a while statement or a wait statement. For example, global becomes 
exp © local © global 
immediately after a while statement. Note that global accumulates not only exp but 
also local in order to handle cases in which the while statement itself is nested within 
other conditional statements. 
Using these certification variables, Andrews and Reitman present proof rules for 
various types of statements. For example, the rule for "x := E;" is 
{Pjx <— E © local © global)} x := E {P} 
where F is an assertion that is true after executing x:=E, and P[x y] means P with 
every free occurrence of x replaced by y. 
Suppose the assignment statement "y := x + 1;" has the precondition 
[local = z, global = LOW]. 
Then, the post condition is 
[y = X © z, local = z, global = LOW], 
which states that after execution, the cléiss of y becomes at most as high as "x © z" 
and the classes in local and global remain unchanged. 
To illustrate the proof rule for procedure invocation, assume the procedure head­
ing 
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procedure PROC(x; var y); 
S /* procedure body */ 
with the following pre/postconditions for body S, 
{P, ^  local < I, global < g} 
S 
{Q}. 
Here, 
1. "x" is a sequence of "call by value" parameters, and "y" is a sequence of "call 
by value-result" parameters; 
2. Cj denotes an initial bound on the value-result parameter yf ,  and 
3. / and g denote the value of local and global at the point of call. 
The invocation "call PROC(IN a, OUT b)" is verified as 
{P(x a, y ^ b], ^ < Cj, local < I, global < g], R} 
call PROC(a, var b); 
{Qlx ^ a, y ^ b, ^ 4- Cj, I ^ 1, g], R} 
where, 
1. Cj-, 1 and g are actual bounds on the classes of the parameters and indirect flows 
at the point of the call, and 
2. R is an assertion for program variables that cannot be changed by S. 
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The verification of a procedure invocation requires previous verification of the body 
of the called procedure and previous establishment of the pre/postconditions. Also, 
the manner in which recursive calls are verified is not clear. 
For the RM system, we need a certification mechanism which can verify the 
"internal" security of a module independently of other called modules, some of which 
may not yet be certified or for which security information is not yet available. 
4.2 Overview of the Information Flow Control Mechanism 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In the RM model, we extend Denning's and Andrews and Reitman's information 
flow mechanisms to incorporate the following features: 
1. The security classes of program variables can be either dynamically or statically 
bound. This eliminates the need for more than one version of an exported 
procedure. 
2. Each procedure exported by an RM can be compiled and its "internal" security 
established independently of other procedures or modules. 
3. RMs invoked within a computation may be instantiated or determined dynam­
ically at run time. 
4. For efficiency and to satisfy our design goal, run-time information flow security 
checks will be performed by the protection component only at message passing 
time. 
84 
5. Since a shared RM and its internal state variables have a lifetime which may 
exceed that of individual programs calling on the procedures exported by the 
RM, the information flow control mechanism takes into account the security 
classes of state variables. 
6. OUT parameters of a procedure in an RM are not restricted to be functions of 
only IN parameters. Each OUT parameter is a function of some subset of the 
IN parameters and possibly the state variables of this and other RMs which are 
subsequently called. 
In order to implement these features, we employ both compile-time and run­
time mechanisms. The compile-time mechanism establishes the internal security of 
individual procedures and creates the necessary information structures to allow for 
efficient run-time certification of inter-module communications. The run-time mech­
anism completes the certification of the entire program at message passing time by 
verifying the information flow caused by the procedure invocations. 
Before explaining the compile-time and run-time mechanisms in detail, we first 
identify all possible input and output values to or from a procedure in an RM. We use 
the terms "input variable" and "output variable" to stand for variables which carry 
input values to the procedure and output values from the procedure, respectively. 
The syntax of the interface specificatioii for an exported procedure of an RM is 
procedure PROC (IN OUT yj,... , y m ) -
Then, the possible input variables of a called procedure PROC are: 
(1) formal IN parameters of PROC; 
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(2) state variables read by PROC (the values of the state variables of the module 
which contains PROC when the call is instantiated are considered input values 
to PROC); 
(3) actual OUT parameters from exported procedures which are called by PROC; 
and 
(4) constants and literals local to PROC (assigned the lowest security class of the 
system (=LOW)), 
The possible output variables of PROC are: 
(5) formal OUT parameters of PROC; 
(6) state variables written by PROC (the values of the state variables when the call 
terminates are considered output values from PROC); and 
(7) actual IN parameters for exported procedures which are called by PROC. 
The purpose of the compile-time mechanism is to generate equations which ex­
press the run-time information flow symbolically in terms of classes of input variables. 
The classes of dynamically bound input variables cannot be determined until run time. 
During compilation, the classes of these input variables are represented by security 
variables and are denoted by 
• procedure-name.parameter-name (for formal IN parameters), 
• module-name.procedure-name.parameter-name (for actual OUT parameters re­
turned from external procedures), or 
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• state-variable-name (for state variables). 
For example, if the procedure being compiled is specified by F (IN a, b, OUT c), 
then the clausses of "a" and "b" are denoted by F\a and F.b. respectively. If this 
procedure invokes a procedure G of a module RMl as RM1.G(IN x,y, OUT z), the 
class of the return value is denoted by RMl.G.z. These security variables are replaced 
by corresponding actual security classes carried by messages at run time to complete 
verification of the entire program. Symbolic class expressions are generated for 
output variables (5)-(7) in terms of the classes of the input variables (l)-(4). A 
symbolic class expression represents the clciss of a piece of information and consists 
of a security claiss and security variables connected by © operators. For example, the 
class of information in the expression 
A + B ^ G  —  D / E ,  
where A, B, C, D and E are input variables, is symbolically denoted by 
A © B ' © C © D © E .  
Our experience using simple reduction rules indicates that flow expressions tend to 
be short even for large programs. 
Based on these symbolic clciss expressions, the compile-time algorithm generates 
two types of symbolic equations: symbolic class equations and symbolic flow 
equations. Symbolic class equations are used at run time to calculate the outgoing 
security classes of output variables. One such equation is created for each parameter 
in (5) and (7), regardless of whether it is dynamically or statically bound, and for 
each dynamically bound state variable in (6). A symbolic class equation has the form 
87 
variable = "symbolic class expression" 
and means that the information in "variable" has a security class given by the "sym­
bolic class expression". 
Symbolic flow equations are used to detect flow violations. An equation is created 
for each statically bound variable. A symbolic flow equation has the form 
variable = security clciss <— "symbolic class expression" 
and means that the class of "variable" is statically bound to "security class" and the 
information whose class is given by "symbolic class expression" flows to "variable" 
during the execution. Both types of symbolic equations are stored in an information 
flow template in the object. 
The components of an information flow template are: 
EXPORT category: This stores symbolic cléiss equations for the formal OUT pa­
rameters of the procedure. 
IMPORT category: This consists of symbolic class equations for actual IN pa­
rameters of externally invoked procedures. Since there may be more than one 
externally invoked procedure, this part of the template consists of a list of all 
such procedure names, each of which is followed by equations for associated 
actual IN parameters. If the same external procedure is invoked from several 
different places in the procedure being certified, each invocation is treated as 
a distinct procedure since each invocation could have a difl'erent set of values 
(and, consequently, different security clcisses) for the actual IN parameters.^ 
'The formation of distinct names could be carried out by a preprocessor prior to 
compilation. 
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STATE category: This consists of symbolic clziss equations for dynamically bound 
state variables. Every dynamically bound state variable is assumed to have an 
associated tag value that represents its current security class. Class expres­
sions in this category are used to update these tag values upon termination of 
execution of the procedure. 
STATIC category: This consists of symbolic flow equations for statically bound 
variables. 
A security class is not associated with a module since information flow is checked 
at the level of procedure invocation within a module. Therefore, if an identifier of a 
resource module is passed as a parameter or is stored in a state variable, the compile-
time mechanism does not need to generate a symbolic class equation or a symbolic 
flow equation éissociated with the module identifier. Flow control is invoked when 
exported procedures of the module are called or information is returned to a caller. 
The information flow templates generated by the compile-time algorithm for the 
initialization procedure and for all exported procedures are stored in the class module. 
At run time, for each invocation of a procedure, an information flow instance 
is created in the protection component of the instance module. The information flow 
instance is a temporary copy of the information flow template stored in its class mod­
ule. When message passing takes place, the run-time mechanism uses the information 
flow instance corresponding to the procedure invocation and completes certification. 
It does this by replacing the security variables in symbolic class expressions with the 
actual security classes of the corresponding parameters carried by the message. Upon 
termination of the procedure invocation, the corresponding information flow instance 
is destroyed. If a procedure F calls a procedure G in another RM, part of the veri-
89 
fàcation of F may have to be deferred until G completes. Nevertheless, all run-time 
verification is confined to the protection components of the involved RMs. 
The program shown in Figure 4.2 will be used as the basis for a detailed discussion 
of these ideeis. For simplicity, we will not consider implicit flows between modules in 
this example. These will be discussed later in this section. More complete examples 
which includes such implicit flows will be shown in Section 4.5. 
In this example, procedure "max" has two IN parameters "a" and "b" and 
passes values "a" and "d" to procedure "mult" in an external module "Rl". The 
OUT parameter value returned from "mult" is assigned to "c". Because of the if 
statement, the formal OUT parameter "d" receives implicit flows from the state 
variable "RS" and from "c" as well as an explicit flow from either "RS" or "c". "a", 
"c" and "d" are dynamically bound variables. "b" and "RS" are statically bound to 
CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET, respectively. 
Based on this information, the compiler constructs the following information flow 
template which consists of equations for each of the output and statically bound vari­
ables. The template is stored in class module "R.class". The following information 
flow instance of this template becomes part of the protection state (within the pro­
tection component) in "R": 
EXPORT 
max(IN a, b; OUT c) 
Ç = SECRET © Rl.mult.e 
IMPORT 
Rl.mult(IN a, d, OUT e) 
a = m ax.a 
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R.class = class 
specification = 
max (IN a : integer; 
b : integer of security class CONFIDENTIAL; 
OUT c : integer); 
protection = 
{ list of calling entities }:max 
synchronization = 
path (max) end 
access = 
state 
RS : integer of security class SECRET; 
procedure max (IN a : integer; 
b : integer of security class CONFIDENTIAL; 
OUT c : integer); 
var d, e : integer; 
begin 
d := b; 
c := Rl.mult(IN a, d, OUT e); 
if (e > RS) then c := e else c := RS; 
RS := c; 
end 
end R.class 
Figure 4.2. A Simple Program Example to Illustrate the Information 
Flow Control Mechanism 
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d = CONFIDENTIAL 
STATE 
STATIC 
b = CONFIDENTIAL ^ max.b 
RS = SECRET ^ SECRET © Rl.mult.e. 
The symbolic class equation in the EXPORT category reflects the information flow to 
the caller. The symbolic class equations for a and d under procedure name "Rl.mult" 
in the IMPORT category reflect the information flows to "Rl.mult". Since there is 
no dynamically bound state variable in this example, the STATE category is empty. 
The symbolic flow equations in the STATIC category reflect the flows to statically 
bound variables in an instance of R.class. "Max.a" and "max.b" denote the security 
variables corresponding to the formal IN parameters of "max". "Rl.mult.e" is the 
security variable for the actual OUT parameter returned by procedure "Rl.mult". 
Suppose "max" is called from another module by the statement 
R.max(IN x, y, OUT z), 
where x = SECRET and y = CONFIDENTIAL. The run-time information flow mech­
anism in the protection component creates a new information flow instance of the 
template, replaces all the occurrences pf "max.a" and "max.b" by SECRET and 
CONFIDENTIAL, respectively, and verifies whether flow violations occur for stati­
cally bound variables. The information flow instance at this point is: 
EXPORT 
maLx(IN a, b; OUT c) 
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ç  = SECRET © Rl.mult.e 
IMPORT 
Rl.mult(N a, d, OUT e) 
a = max. a = SECRET 
d = CONFIDENTIAL 
STATE 
STATIC 
b = CONFIDENTIAL 4- max.b = CONFIDENTIAL 
RS = SECRET ^ SECRET © Rl.mult.e. 
The run-time algorithm validates the flows 
b = CONFIDENTIAL ^ CONFIDENTIAL 
RS = SECRET ^ SECRET. 
Since no flow violation is detected, the message is forwarded to the access component 
via the synchronization component. A new process corresponding to this message is 
created in the access component, and the execution is carried out. When "Rl.mult" is 
invoked, a message is constructed and forwarded to the protection component (via the 
synchronization component). In the protection component, the actual security classes 
SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL are attached to the parameter values "a" and "d". 
Suppose "Rl.mult" terminates normally and returns an OUT parameter value with 
security class SECRET. The run-time mechanism replaces Rl.mult.e with SECRET, 
and the information flow instance becomes: 
EXPORT 
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max (IN a, b; OUT c) 
Ç = SECRET © Rl.mult.e 
= SECRET © SECRET = SECRET 
IMPORT 
Rl.mult(N a, d, OUT e) 
a = SECRET 
d = CONFIDENTIAL 
STATE 
STATIC 
b = CONFIDENTIAL ^ CONFIDENTIAL 
RS = SECRET +- SECRET © Rl.mult.e = SECRET © SECRET 
= SECRET. 
Since "RS" is statically bound, the run-time mechanism validates the flow 
RS = SECRET <- SECRET. 
Since this flow is secure, the message is forwarded to the access component and the 
execution of "max" resumes. (Note that a return value from "Rl.mult" with security 
class TOPSECRET would cause a flow violation, resulting in abortion of the process 
and the initiation of some recovery mechanism (e.g., roll back)). Upon completion 
of the execution of "max", the access component constructs a message containing 
the return value. When the message reaches the protection component, the run­
time mechanism attaches security class SECRET to the message and sends it to the 
calling module via the underlying inter-module message passing facility. Finally, the 
corresponding information flow instance is destroyed. As illustrated in the above 
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example, the flow equations are generated at compile time and actual flow is certified 
at run time. 
4.2.2 Handling implicit flows 
Selection and iteration statements warrant special consideration. 
4.2.2.1 Information flow semantics of selection For selection statements, 
the compile-time algorithm accounts for the possibility of executing either alternative. 
For example, in the statement 
if a > 0 then x := b else x := c, 
the algorithm constructs the symbolic class expression "x = b © ç © a", accounting 
for the implicit flow from "a" and the explicit flows from both "b" and "c". 
Since information flows across module boundaries are certified at run time, special 
treatment of implicit inter-module flows is required. For example, suppose the 
following statement appears in procedure PROC: 
if a > 0 then b := Rl.f(x). 
Then, there is an implicit inter-module flow from "a" to the local variables of proce­
dure Rl.f() and to state variables encapsulated by Rl (and modules called by proce­
dures in Rl, etc.). 
To handle this flow, the compile-time algorithm constructs a special symbolic 
class equation in the entry for Rl under the IMPORT category of the information 
flow template for PROC. The clciss of the outgoing implicit inter-module flow is de­
noted by implicit and represents the least upper bound of the classes of the variables 
conditioning the procedure invocation. The equation heis the form 
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implicit = 5^1 ©... © SVn © PROC.implicit, 
where SV^ denotes the variable on which the invocation is locally conditioned and 
PROC.implicit denotes the incoming implicit inter-module flow to PROC from the 
module which called it. Note that an entry in the template for each external procedure 
has a symbolic class equation for implicit as well as a symbolic class equation for each 
of its IN parameters. 
At run time, a message from PROC for a procedure invocation of Rl.f() causes 
the run-time algorithm to evaluate the symbolic class expression for implicit of Rl.f(). 
The resulting value (which denotes the class of the outgoing implicit inter-module flow 
to Rl), as well as the security class of each parameter, is attached to the message. 
When object Rl receives this message, an information flow instance for Rl.f() is cre­
ated. The implicit flow class attached to the message replaces the security variable 
f.implicit which appears in class expressions in the information flow instance. Since 
f.implicit appears in each one of the symbolic class equations for implicit in the IM­
PORT category, subsequent procedure invocation requests from this object carry an 
accumulated class of all the previous implicit inter-module flows to this module. 
Implicit flows across module boundaries occur even when procedure invocations 
are skipped. This is clearly illustrated in the example program (adapted from [l6j) 
shown in Figure 4.3.^ Pi, Rl and Ql are instances of classes P, R and Q, respectively. 
Assume that actual IN parameter "x" to procedure h (IN x, OUT y) is bound to 
SECRET and takes value either one or zero, dynamically bound formal OUT param­
eter "y" of h(IN X, OUT y) is initially bound to UNCLASSIFIED, and dynamically 
^Only access specifications are described. 
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P = class 
state 
procedure h (IN xrinteger, 
OUT y:integer); 
begin 
var a : boolean; 
y:=0; 
if X = 0 then Rl.f(); 
Rl.g(OUT a); 
if a then Ql.k(); 
Ql.m(OUT y); 
end; 
end P; 
R = class 
state 
Z:integer; 
procedure f() 
begin 
Z := 1; 
end; 
procedure g(OUT y : boolean) 
begin 
if Z = 0 then y := true 
else y := false; 
end; 
initialize 
begin 
Z := 0; 
end; 
end R. 
Q = class 
state 
W:integer; 
procedure k(); 
begin 
W := 1; 
end; 
procedure m(OUT x : Integer); 
begin 
X ;= W; 
end; 
initialize 
begin 
W := 0; 
end; 
end Q. 
Figure 4.3. Implicit Flows Across Module Boundaries 
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bound state variable Z in Rl and W in Q1 are initially bound to UNCLASSIFIED. 
Suppose procedure h (IN x, OUT y) in module PI is executed. First assume "x" 
has value one. Since the invocation Rl.f() is skipped, the value of Z in Rl remains 
zero and its security class is still UNCLASSIFIED. The invocation Rl.g(OUT a) re­
turns the value true with class UNCLASSIFIED. Then, Ql.k() is invoked, and W in 
Ql becomes one and remains UNCLASSIFIED. Finally, the invocation Ql.m(OUT 
y) causes "y" to become one with class UNCLASSFIED. Now assume the value of 
"x" is zero. Since Rl.f() is invoked, the value of Z in Rl becomes one and has class 
SECRET. Thus, the invocation Rl.g(OUT a) returns the value false with class SE­
CRET in "a". Since Ql.k() is skipped, W in Ql remains zero and UNCLASSIFIED. 
Therefore, Ql.m(OUT y) returns zero and UNCLASSIFIED in "y". Note that after 
execution of h (IN x, OUT y), "y" is equal to "x". However, y erroneously remains 
UNCLASSIFIED. 
In order to take care of implicit flows which occur when invocations are skipped 
within conditional statements, the compiler must insert code to send run-time "probe" 
messages to cover branches not containing the calls. If necessary, the compiler creates 
such branches. A probe carries the class of the expression conditioning the procedure 
invocation. This class is the same as that of implicit for the procedure in which 
the invocation occurs. When a module M receives a probe for a skipped invocation 
M.PROC(), the run-time algorithm must verify the implicit flow to each one of the 
statically bound variables listed in the STATIC category of the information flow 
template for M.PROC() and send copies of the probe to potentially subsequently 
invoked modules listed in the IMPORT category. If all the subsequent modules 
certify the flow, the run-time algorithm updates the cléiss of each dynamically bound 
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state variable X listed in the STATE category of the template to 
X © "the class carried by the probe". 
This mechanism corresponds to the "update" instruction introduced by Denning (see 
Section 4.1.4.2). Procedure h (IN x, OUT y) in the above example would be trans­
lated into the following: 
procedure h(IN x, OUT y); 
var a : boolean; 
begin 
y := 0; 
if x = 0 then Rl.f() else send.probe(Rl.h); 
Rl.g(OUT a); 
if a then Ql.k() else send-probe(Ql.k); 
Ql.m(OUT y); 
end 
In the above example, the symbolic class expression associated with the probe ini­
tiated by "send.probe(Rl.f)" is "LOW © x © h.implicit", and the expression for 
"send-probe(Ql.k)" is "Rl.g.a © h.implicit". 
It is still possible for an insecure program to leak one bit of information to the 
user by reporting a security violation. Here, we assume that the clearance of the 
subject, denoted by SUBJECT, is equal to the security class of the user's output 
device or the information (file) that will be displayed on the device. The following 
example shows how implicit flows can be conveyed to a subject by means of a system 
generated message. Suppose that a program contains the statement 
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if a = 0 then M.f(OUT x) else send.prpbe(M.f). 
Furthermore, assume that 
• "x" is statically bound to SECRET, 
• the class of "a" is SECRET, 
• the user knows that M.f(OUT x) returns TOPSECRET information in "x" 
and that the inter-module implicit flow to M.f(OUT x) does not cause a flow 
violation, and 
• the clearance of the subject executing the program is CONFIDENTIAL (denoted 
by SUBJECT = CONFIDENTIAL). 
If "a" is nonzero, the "then" branch is skipped and no flow violation is detected. 
If "a" is zero, however, the flow violation is detected because M.f(OUT x) returns 
TOPSECRET information in variable x which is statically bound to SECRET. Thus, 
the subject can deduce whether "a" is zero or nonzero by observing the appearance 
or nonappearance of an flow violation error message on the console. Since this is not 
an information leakage from "a" to "x", the problem is not solved by introducing an 
else branch to certify the flow from "a" to "x" at run time. This problem occurs 
because the run-time certification could not check the flow from the return value of 
"m.f" to "x" until m.f(OUT x) is actually invoked. 
If the subject does not know the internal details of the program code, the error 
message may not play an important role. Otherwise, the following two solutions 
eliminate the problem. 
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The first solution is proposed by Fenton [24,25]. If a flow violation is detected at 
run time, 
1. the statement which causes the violation is skipped, 
2. the flow violation is not reported to the subject, and 
3. execution continues as if no flow violation were detected. 
Thus, the subject cannot tell whether or not a flow violation has occurred. However, 
this solution may be impractical. If a program skips some statements and continues 
execution, it may store incorrect data in state variables. Hence, integrity of informa­
tion may be lost when a flow violation is detected. Recovery could restore information 
integrity, but recovery may also cause a leak of information to the subject. 
The second solution is to disallow the invocation of an external procedure if the 
class of conditional expressions on which the invocation is conditioned is not less than 
or equal to the clearance of the subject. If such an invocation is attempted, the 
program is aborted. This approach involves not only the classes of objects but also 
the clearance of the subject. Thus, it does not strictly follow the definition of a pure 
information flow policy defined by a lattice model. However, since the clearance of 
the subject is involved only when external procedures are invoked, this approach is 
less restrictive than the access matrix model. 
The second approach can be readily implemented by the run-time algorithm. 
Upon receipt of a message at run time, after security variables are replaced by the 
corresponding security cléisses of parameters carried by a message, the algorithm com­
pares each implicit in the IMPORT category of an information flow template (which 
denotes the class of conditional expressions on which invocation of the procedure is 
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conditioned) with the clearance of the subject. If the relation "implicit < SUBJECT" 
does not hold for every implicit, the algorithm aborts the execution and the error 
may be reported to the subject. The subject cannot deduce values of variables since 
execution was not allowed to begin in the called module. Our run-time algorithm, 
presented in the following sections, assumes this approach. 
4.2.2.2 Information flow semantics of iteration Iterative constructs also 
require special consideration. For example, consider 
a := x; 
while a > 0 do 
begin 
Rl.fl(IN a, OUT b); 
R2.f2(IN b, OUT a); 
end. 
The first time the body of the loop is executed, the security class of actual IN pa­
rameter "a" for Rl.fl is x. However, in subsequent iterations, the claas of "a" is the 
security class of the OUT parameter value from R2.f2(IN b, OUT a) determined in 
the previous iteration. Since the number of times the loop body will be executed is 
unknown at compile time, the compile-time mechanism must provide for verification 
of all possible information flows. This requires simulating iterations of the body of 
the while statement until the symbolic class expressions stabilize. 
In addition, the compiler must insert code immediately following the body of the 
loop to send probe messages to the external procedures contained in the loop body. 
This is necessary to account for implicit flows from the conditional expression when 
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the body of the loop is skipped. The transformed code for the above example is: 
a := x; 
while a > 0 do 
begin 
Rl.fl(IN a, OUT b); 
R2.f2(IN b, OUT a); 
end; 
send.probe(Rl.fl); 
send.probe(R2.f2). 
Since there are possible flows from "x" and the return value of "R2.f2" to "a", it 
may appear that the symbolic class equation for "a" should be 
a = x © R2.f2.a. 
Then, the run-time mechanism would simply replace R2.f2.a with the class of the 
OUT parameter value when the object receives a return message from the first in­
vocation of R2.f2(IN b, OUT a). But this is incorrect since the security variable 
R2.f2.a would then disappear from the symbolic class equation for "a" and the equa­
tion would not reflect the actual information flows from subsequent invocations of 
R2.f2(IN b, OUT a). In order to correctly account for flows due to procedure calls 
in all iterations, the run-time mechanism must give special treatment to security vari­
ables corresponding to actual OUT parameters of procedures appearing in loops. In 
order to identify these security variables, the compile-time mechanism attaches an 
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accumulation flag (denoted by (*)) to them. Thus, the symbolic class equation for 
"a" in the above example is 
a = X © R2.f2.a(*). 
When a module receives a return message carrying a security class for a flagged 
security variable, the run-time algorithm must do the following; 
1. If the security variable appears in the symbolic class expression part of a sym­
bolic flow equation, the mechanism adds the class of the return value to the 
symbolic class expression instead of replacing the security variable. 
For example, suppose that an invocation R.g(OUT x) is in a loop and R.g.x 
appears in a symbolic flow equation 
S = SECRET 4- SECRET © R.g.x(*). 
If R.g(OUT x) returns CONFIDENTIAL information in "x" in the first itera­
tion of the loop, the resulting symbolic flow equation is 
S = SECRET ^ SECRET © R.g.x(*) © CONFIDENTIAL 
SECRET © R.g.x(*). 
Suppose that R.g(OUT x) returns TOPSECRET information in "x" in the 
second iteration. The resulting symbolic flow equation is 
S = SECRET ^ SECRET © R.g.x(*) © TOPSECRET 
= TOPSECRET © R.g.x(*), 
and the run-time mechanism detects the flow violation. 
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2. If the security variable SV(*) appears in the symbolic class expression part of a 
symbolic class equation, the run-time mechanism replaces it with SC (SV(*)), 
where SC is the cleiss of the corresponding return value and (SV(*)) is called a 
"security variable tag". The security variable tag indicates that security class 
SC is the result of replacing the security variable SV(*), 
For example, if invocation R.g{OUT x) in a loop returns TOPSECRET data 
for x, R.g.x(*) is replaced by "TOPSECRET (R.g.x(*))". The cléiss of a re­
turn value from R.g(OUT x) in a subsequent iteration replaces "TOPSECRET 
(R.g.x(*))". The value of a symbolic class equation containing security classes 
with security variable tags is the least upper bound of all the security classes 
with or without security variable tags. 
Suppose that R.g.x(*) appears in the symbolic class equation: 
y = CONFIDENTIAL © R.g.x(*). 
Assume R.g(OUT x) returns TOPSECRET in "x" in the first iteration. The 
run-time mechanism replaces R.g.x(*) with "TOPSECRET (R.g.x(*))" and the 
symbolic class equation becomes 
y = CONFIDENTIAL © TOPSECRET (R.g.x(*)). 
The class of "y" at this point is TOPSECRET. Now assume that R.g(OUT x) 
returns CONFIDENTIAL in "x" in the second iteration. The run-time algo­
rithm replaces "TOPSECRET (R.g.x(*))" in the class equation with "CONFI­
DENTIAL (R.g.x(*))". The resulting symbolic class expression is 
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y = CONFIDENTIAL © CONFIDENTIAL (R.g.x(*)). 
The class of "y" at this point is CONFIDENTIAL. 
4.2.3 Some remarks on probes and dynamically bound state variables 
Consider the following program segment: 
if a > 0 
then 
begin 
(instantiate a new module and stores its ID in Ql) 
Qi-p(); 
end 
else send.probe(Ql,p), 
where Ql is a variable whose value is determined within the then branch. If a 0 
and the else branch is executed, Ql is undefined and the run-time mechanism cannot 
determine to which instance module a probe should be sent. 
There are two approaches to this problem: 
1. Requiring all state variables to be statically bound. 
2. Requiring called modules to be specified by literal names. 
In the first approach, variables can be used to specify called modules. If procedure 
p and (potentially) subsequently called procedures do not access dynamically bound 
state variables, the run-time algorithm does not have to determine which specific 
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module is called. It can simply check for a flow violation in the STATIC category of the 
information flow template for procedure p (which exists in the class of Ql), since the 
same template applies to all instances of the clciss of Ql. In other words, the run-time 
algorithm can send probes to class modules instead of to specific instance modules. 
Since state variables are statically bound in the case of most actual implementations, 
we do not consider this solution to be too restrictive. Note that with this approach 
information flow templates will not have STATE categories. 
The second approach, which prohibits the use of variables to specify invoked 
modules, allows state variables to be dynamically bound. Since the identity of a called 
module is determined at run time (before the corresponding send.probe statement is 
executed), the run-time mechanism can update the classes of dynamically bound state 
variables by sending a probe to a specific instance module. 
If the second approach is used, the following problem must be considered. In an 
RM, information flow certification is a function of a protection component. Run-time 
flow certification is performed on incoming request messages before the requests reach 
the synchronization component. The order in which the protection component receives 
request messages may be difl'erent from the order of the execution of these requests in 
the access component. Therefore, the security verification process in the protection 
component might not reflect actual flows of information in the access component. 
For example, suppose a request A cissigns CONFIDENTIAL data to a dynam­
ically bound state variable ST; a request B assigns the value of ST to a variable X 
that is statically bound to CONFIDENTIAL; and the class of ST is currently SE­
CRET and message A arrives before B. Then, the security of each message will be 
certified. However, if request A should happen to be blocked in the synchronization 
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component until B terminates, or if B assigns the value of ST to X before A assigns 
CONFIDENTIAL data to ST, then a flow violation occurs which was not detected in 
the protection component. 
A possible solution to this problem is to perform information flow certification 
after the synchronization specification of the module is enforced. If this is done, the 
order of executing requests will be-the same as the order in which the information flow 
certification on these requests is performed. This indicates that a part of the function 
of a protection component should be placed after the synchronization component. In 
this case, the synchronization speciflcation needs to enforce exclusive write access to 
dynamically bound state variables. We assume this solution throughout this chapter. 
4.3 The Compile-Time Algorithm 
The purpose of the compile-time algorithm is to generate information flow tem­
plates for exported procedures and the initialization procedures of modules. 
4.3.1 Reduction rules 
The symbolic class expressions for program variables are given initial values as 
follows: 
1. The clciss expression for a statically bound variable is its fixed security class. 
2. The class expression for a dynamically bound local variable or formal OUT 
parameter is NULL. 
3. The class expression for a dynamically bound formal IN parameter is its corre­
sponding security variable. 
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Each time the algorithm changes the symbolic cléiss expression for a variable, the 
expression is reduced to a minimal form. A minimal form is either NULL or consists 
only of a fixed security clciss and zero or more security variables connected by "©" 
operators. A symbolic class expression is reduced as follows: 
Expansion Step : 
Each local or output variable is replaced by the symbolic claas expression representing 
the class of the variable. 
Minimization Step : 
• 1. All duplicate security variables are deleted. For example, 
"a © b © a" becomes "a © b". 
2. If the expression contains NULL along with security classes or security variables, 
NULL is removed. For example, 
"NULL © a" becomes "a". 
3. If the expression contains more than one security class, all the security classes 
are replaced by their least upper bound. For example, 
"LOW © HIGH © LOW becomes HIGH, and 
"CONFIDENTIAL © TOPSECRET" becomes TOPSECRET. 
The following illustrate how reductions are performed after changes are made for 
two successive assignment statements: 
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statment clciss equation 
c := a * b + a Ç = a © b © a 
d := a — c 
= a © b 
d = a © Ç 
= a © a © b 
= a © b. 
4.3.2 Generation of information flow templates 
The compile-time certification algorithm will be specified for programs using the 
following constructs: 
1. declaration statement (the declaration of an exported procedure or local vari-
2. assignment statement, 
3. compound statement, 
4. if statement, 
5. while statement, and 
6. procedure invocation statement. 
The compile-time algorithm requires two special compile-time variables: a stack 
type variable STACK and a simple variable GLOBAL. STACK contains the secu­
rity classes of the expressions on which the statement currently being analyzed is 
able). 
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conditioned. Thus, STACK accounts for implicit flows (local flows, in Andrew and 
Reitman's model). Following Denning's notation, we use 
1. STACK to denote the class on the top of STACK, 
2. "STACK.push(e)" to denote the operation that adds "STACK © e" to the top 
of STACK, and 
3. "STACK.pop" to denote the operation that removes the class on the top of 
STACK. 
GLOBAL contains a class which reflects 
1. implicit flows which will occur after completion of the executions of "while" 
statements,^ and 
2. the incoming implicit inter-module flow from the caller of a procedure being 
certified. 
If PROC is the procedure being certified, the implicit inter-module flow to PROC is 
denoted by security variable PROC.implicit. We use GLOBAL to denote the class 
contained in GLOBAL. GLOBAL is initialized to PROC.implicit. 
The algorithm also uses compile-time array variables SC and EXP. The domain 
of SC is the set of all the variables which are used in a procedure being certified. The 
domain of EXP consists of all the statically bound variables used in the procedure. 
For a dynamically bound variable x, SC[x] is the symbolic class expression for x. If x is 
an output variable, the algorithm uses SC[x] to construct the symbolic class equation 
^Andrews and Reitman's global includes these flows. 
I l l  
X = SC[x]. 
If X is a formal OUT parameter of the procedure being compiled, this equation is 
placed in the EXPORT category of the information flow template. If x is an actual 
IN parameter of a procedure to be invoked in another module, the equation is placed 
in the IMPORT category. If x is a dynamically bound state variable (assuming 
dynamically bound state variables are allowed), the equation is placed in the STATE 
category. 
If X is statically bound, SC(x| contains the fixed security class to which x is 
statically bound and EXP[x] contains the corresponding symbolic class expression. 
The algorithm combines these two to construct the symbolic flow equation 
x = SC(x] V- EXP[x], 
and places it in the STATIC category of the information flow template. 
Declaration statements For a procedure declaration of the form 
procedure PROC(IN xj :var.type [of security class C^j]; 
Xjç : var.type [of security class 
OUT j/j : var.type [of security class C'yj]; 
ym : var.type [of security class C y m \ ) \  
and local variable declarations 
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var aj : var_type[of security class 
ar : var .type [of security class Car]; 
the algorithm initializes SC and EXP as follows: 
1. For a formal IN parameter "x," of PROC, 
• if Xj is statically bound to 
SC|zJ := 
EXPlx,-] := PROC.x^-
• if Xj is dynamically bound, 
SC[Xj] := PROC.X; 
where PROC.XJ denotes the security variable for formal IN parameter "XJ" 
"PROC". 
2. For a local variable or formal OUT parameter Xj of PROC, 
• if Xj' is statically bound to C^-j, 
SC[Xjl := 
EXP[x,-| := NULL 
• if Xj is dynamically bound, 
SC[xj] := NULL. 
The algorithm also creates entries in SC and EXP for each state variables 
follows: 
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• for a statically bound state variable SV bound to Cgy, 
SC[SV] := CsY 
EXP[SV] := SV, and 
• for a dynamically bound state variable SV (assuming they are allowed), 
SC[SV] := SV. 
Finally, the algorithm initializes STACK to LOW and GLOBAL to PROC.implicit. 
Assignment statements For an assignment statement of the form 
X := F(AI, . . . ,AM),  
1. if "x" is a dynamically bound variable, the algorithm makes the assignment 
C[x] := SC[al] ©... © SCfcm] © STACK © GLOBAL. 
2. if "x" is a statically bound variable, the algorithm assigns 
EXP[x] © := SCjoj] ©... © SCjaTTî] © STACK © GLOBAL. 
where "A © := B" stands for "A := A © B". 
The following example shows why updating (rather than replacing) class expres­
sions is necessary for statically bound variables. Suppose A is a statically bound 
variable and initially SC[A]=CONFIDENTIAL and EXP[A]=NULL. Assume state­
ment  iS j -  a s s igns  the  va lue  o f  va r i ab le  X  to  A and ,  l a t e r  in  the  t ex t ,  s t a t ement  S j  
assigns the value of Y to A. Using simple replacement, the symbolic class expressions 
generated for and Sj would be 
114 
EXP[A] = X © STACK © GLOBAL, and 
EXP[A| = Y © STACK © GLOBAL. 
If "STACK © GLOBAL" is PROC.implicit for both and S j ,  and there are no other 
statements that assign values to A after Sj, the flow equation 
A = CONFIDENTIAL *- Y © PROC.implicit 
would be constructed and placed in the STATIC category of the template. Assume 
that at run time the classes of X ,Y and the incoming implicit inter-module flow 
are SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL and LOW, respectively. The run-time certification 
algorithm would replace Y and PROC.implicit in the symbolic flow equation for A 
with CONFIDENTIAL and LOW and would certify the flow. Even though A holds 
CONFIDENTIAL information at the end of the execution, the program violates the 
flow policy by storing SECRET information (class of X) in variable A during the 
time period between the executions of and Sj. Therefore, instead of replacement, 
the clciss expressions for statically bound variables must be accumulated using the © 
operator in order to account for all possible information flows. The correct symbolic 
flow equation for A in the above example is 
A = CONFIDENTIAL ^ X © Y © LOW © PROC.implicit. 
Suppose a record is involved in an assignment statement. Each field of the record 
may have its own security class and should be treated as a distinct variable. This is 
also true for arrays, but for simplicity, we assume that every element of an array has 
the same security class. As pointed out by Denning [17], when an array receives a 
value, information can flow from the subscripts of the array to the array itself. For 
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example, suppose array X which is initialized to all zeros receives a non-zero value 
to its element (e.g., X[n]:=l). Then, by locating the position of the non-zero 
element of the array after the assignment, the value of "n" can be determined. For 
the same reason, if an array reference is in an expression on the right hand side of an 
assignment, there are flows from both the array and the subscripts to the receiving 
variable. 
Compound statements For the statement "begin end", the 
compile-time certification algorithmes applied successively to 
If statements For the statement "if E then SI [else S2]", the algorithm must 
first perform STACK.push(E) in order to account for implicit flows caused by the con­
ditional expression E. The variables receiving flows in Si and/or S2 can be classified 
into the following three categories: 
(i) the variables which are cissigned values in both Si and S2, 
(ii) the variables which are assigned values only in SI, and 
(iii) the variables which are assigned valued only in S2. 
Since the actual execution path is not determined until run time, the algorithm 
must account for all three possibilities. Assume the temporary arrays of symbolic class 
expressions SCI and SC2 are initialized to SC before the if statement is processed. 
The algorithm is recursively applied to SI using SCI and to S2 using SC2. Then, the 
symbolic class expression for the dynamically bound variables for the if statement is 
derived as follows: 
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(1) For a variable "x" in category (i), assign SC[x] := SCl[x) © SC2[x]. 
(2) For a variable "x" in category (ii), assign SC[x] © := SCl[x]. 
(3) For a variable "x" in category (iii), assign SC[x] © := SC2(x]. 
For the statically bound variables, the algorithm accumulates symbolic class expres­
sions in the global array EXP during the processing of Si and 82. Upon termination, 
the algorithm restores STACK to its previous value (by performing "STACK.pop"). 
Finally, it inserts, in the appropriate branches of the if statement, "send .probe" state­
ments for procedure calls invoked within either Si or S2. For example, if procedure 
RM.PROC() is invoked only within Si, the "send_probe(RM.PROC)" statement is 
inserted in S2. 
The algorithm for the if statement is 
1. Perform STACK.push(E). 
2. Create new sets of class expressions SCI and SC2, and initialize SCl[x] and 
SC2[x] to SC[x| for all x. 
3. Apply the compile-time certification algorithm (recursively) to Si using SCI 
and EXP. 
4. Apply the compile-time certification algorithm (recursively) to S2 using SC2 
and EXP. 
5. Let Vl = {x I X is a dynamically bound variable that receives a flow in Si}, and 
V2 = {x I X is a dynamically bound variable that x receives a flow in S2}. 
Update SC[x] by: 
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SC[xI := SCl[x] © SC2[x], for x in (VI U V2), 
SC[x] © := SCl[x], for x in (VI - (VI n V2), 
SC[x] © := SC2[x], for x in (V2 - (VI n V2). 
6. Perform STACK.pop. 
7. Let FNl = {x I X is a procedure call invoked in Si}, and 
FN2 = {x I X is a procedure call invoked in S2}. 
For X in (FN2 - (FNl n FN2), 
insert "send_probe(x)" at the end of Si. 
For X in (FNl - (FNl n FN2), 
insert "send-probe(x)" at the end of S2. 
While statements The information flows that occur due to the statement 
while E do S, 
may depend upon the number of times S is actually executed. Consider, for example, 
the statement 
while a < 0 do 
begin 
a := b; 
b := c; 
c := d; 
end. 
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The direct explicit flows that occur during the first iteration of the body of the while 
statement are "b => a", "c =» b", and "d c". If there is a second iteration, the 
indirect explicit flows "c => a" and "d ^ b" occur. For three or more iterations, we 
also have the indirect explicit flows "d => a" and "d => b". Since the number of times 
the body of the loop is executed is not known until run time, the algorithm must 
simulate the execution and accumulate class expressions across iterations. The class 
expressions accounting for the explicit flows to "a", "b" and "c" would be "a © b © 
Ç © d", "b © Ç © d", and "c © d", respectively. Note that at run time, if the loop 
terminates after the first execution of the body, the flows from "c" to "a", "d" to "a", 
and "d" to "b" do not actually occur. Thus, the mechanism may be imprecise. 
After processing the while statement, GLOBAL is updated to the value 
GLOBAL © STACK © E 
in order to account for the global flows from the conditional expression E. Finally, the 
algorithm inserts "send.probe" statements immediately after the while statement for 
procedures invoked inside the loop. 
The algorithm consists of the following steps, where 
• ÇE denotes the accumulated class of information in the conditional expression 
E, and 
• CHANGED is a flag which denotes whether SC and ÇE have changed during 
the simulated execution of Si. 
1. Assign ÇE := LOW. 
2. Assign CHANGED := false. 
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3. If CE is not equal to "CE © E", assign ÇE := ÇE © E and CHANGED := true. 
4. Perform STACK.push(CE) (This accounts for the implicit flows to S caused by 
E). 
5. Create new class expressions SCI and EXPl, initialized to SC and EXP, respec­
tively. 
6. Apply the compile-time certification algorithm (recursively) to S using SCI and 
EXP. 
7. If SC is not equal to "SC © SCI", assign SC := SC © SCI and CHANGED := 
true. 
8. Perform STACK.pop. 
9. If CHANGED = false and EXP = EXPl, then go to step 10; otherwise go back 
to step 2. 
10. Assign GLOBAL © := LOCAL © CE. 
11. For each procedure x invoked in S, insert "send.probe(x)'" immediately following 
the while statement. 
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The following theorem guarantees that the above algorithm terminates. 
Theorem 4.1 
Steps 2 through 9 of the algorithm are performed no more than ((|5l| + |a2| + l) * 
(|u| + pi) + 1) times, where si is the set of dynamically bound variables which receive 
direct flows in S, s2 is the set of statically bound variables which receive direct flows 
in S, V is the set of all security variables in the procedure being processed, and pi is 
the maximum path length of the security lattice. 
Proof 
Each time steps 3, 6 and 7 are performed, SC(x] for x in si, EXP[x] for x in s2, or ÇE 
can change. If at lezist one of the above class expressions changes, the algorithm does 
not terminate on the current pass. However, suppose a class expression has reached 
the form: 
5^1 © ^  © ... © © HIGH 
where 5V^- denotes the security variable. Then, the class expression cannot change 
further. Since each change made to a class expression must add one or more security 
variables and/or increase the security class, a class expression can be altered only 
finitely many times. 
The worst case occurs when 
• all the symbolic class expressions for variables which receive direct flows in S 
are NULL before the algorithm processes the while statement and eventually 
become 
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«S'Vj © SV'^ ©... © © HIGH, and 
# each pass alters only one of the class expressions either by adding one security 
variable or by increasing the security class by one level. 
Then, ((|sl| + |s2l + l) * (|v| + p i )  + l) passes are necessary before the algorithm 
terminates. • 
Note that if while statements are nested, a "send.probe" statement correspond­
ing to a procedure invocation in an internal while statement must be inserted imme­
diately following each surrounding while statement. Suppose that while statement 
B surrounds while statement A, and procedure 0.g{) appears in A. If the body of 
B is iterated ten times, the number of probes sent for 0.g() is eleven (one for each 
termination of A within B and one for the termination of B itself). The algorithm can 
easily be modified so that a probe is sent only after the outer most loop terminates. 
This probe carries the accumulated class of all the nested conditionals. However, the 
major draw back of this approach is that detection of a possible information flow viola­
tion may be delayed until the outer most loop terminates, thereby wasting computing 
resources. 
Procedure invocation statements We assume that the following pre-proc­
essing has been already taken place: 
1. Invocations of the same external procedure from different places in the text have 
been renamed to make all calls distinct, and 
2. An entry in the IMPORT category of the template has been created for each 
externally invoked procedure. 
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For an invocation of 
RM.g(IN OUT t/i,... ,yn), 
the corresponding entry in the IMPORT category is 
RM.g(IN OUT y i , . . . , yn )  
implicit = NULL 
xi = NULL 
1772 = NULL. 
When the compile-time algorithm encounters the procedure invocation statement 
RM.g(IN OUT yi,...,yn), 
it accumulates the entries in the IMPORT category of the template as follows: 
1. implicit © := STACK © GLOBAL 
2. Xj © := SC[ij-], for each actual IN parameter x^. 
Accumulation, rather than replacement, is required since the procedure invocation 
may be embedded in a while statement. 
For each actual OUT parameter y^, the algorithm does the following: 
1. if i/j is dynamically bound, 
SC[y^-j := RM.g.y,- © STACK © GLOBAL 
2. if y^ is statically bound 
EXP[y^] © := RM.g.y^ © STACK © GLOBAL 
Note that if RM.g is invoked within a while statement, security variable RM.g.y, must 
have the (*) mark. 
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End statement of the procedure When the compile-time algorithm en­
counters the end statement of the procedure under certification, it stores symbolic 
flow/class equations for the statically bound variables and for the dynamically bound 
state variables (if these are allowed) which receive flows in the body of the proce­
dure in the STATIC and STATE categories, respectively. It also stores symbolic 
clciss equations for the formal OUT parameters of the procedure in the EXPORT 
category of the template. 
For the statement "end PROC", the algorithm does the following: 
1. For each statically bound variable x, if EXP[x] is not NULL, place the symbolic 
flow equation 
X = SC[x] ^ EXP[x] 
in the STATIC category of the template, and check whether the flow is legal 
(by comparing SC[x] with the fixed security class in EXPjxj). 
If a flow violation is detected, abort the compilation and report the error. 
2. For each formal OUT parameter x of PROC, place the symbolic class equation 
X = SC|x] 
in the EXPORT category of the template. 
3. For each dynamically bound state variable x (assuming dynamically bound state 
variables are allowed), place the symbolic class equation 
X = SC[x] 
in the STATE category of the template. 
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4.4 The Run-Time Algorithm 
The run-time algorithm is applied whenever the protection component of a mod­
ule receives a message either from other modules or from the synchronization compo­
nent. 
Messages from other modules are; 
1. requests to invoke procedures which are exported by the module, 
2. return messages from external procedures invoked by procedures running in the 
access component, and 
3. probe messages. 
Messages from the synchronization component are: 
1. requests to invoke procedures in other modules, 
2. return messages from exported procedures which terminate in the access com­
ponent, 
3. a message reporting termination of the initialization procedure in the access 
component, and 
4. probe messages initiated by procedures running in the access component. 
When a resource module RMl is instantiated, the run-time algorithm: 
1. creates an information flow instance for the initialization procedure (i.e., a copy 
of the information flow template for the initialization procedure stored in the 
class module) in the protection component. 
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2. replaces the security variables corresponding to dynamically bound state vari­
ables with their current security classes'^ (this step is performed only if dynam­
ically bound state variables are allowed), 
3. replaces the security variable init.implicit, which accounts for the class of the 
implicit inter-module flow from the module that instantiates RMl, with the 
corresponding security class carried by the instantiation message, and 
4 .  checks for flow violations in each flow equation in the STATIC category and 
certifies the relation 
implicit < SUBJECT 
for each implicit in the IMPORT category. 
If all the equations are certified to be secure, the request is forwarded to the access 
component via the synchronization component and a new process for the initialization 
procedure is initiated. 
When the initialization procedure terminates, the run-time algorithm updates the 
classes of dynamically bound state variables based on the symbolic class equations in 
the STATE category (if dynamically bound state variables are allowed), deletes the 
information flow instance and notifies the protection component so that the module 
can receive invocation requests for its exported procedures. If the module does not 
define any exported procedure, the module is destroyed. 
••The classes of dynamically bound state variables may be LOW at instantiation 
time by default. 
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When RMl receives a request to invoke an exported procedure PROC, the algo­
rithm 
1. creates an information flow instance (which is a copy of the information flow 
template for PROC) in the protection component, 
2. replaces the security variables corresponding to dynamically bound state vari­
ables with their current security classes (an information flow instance at this 
point is referred as an "initial information flow instance"),^ 
3. replaces (PROC.implicit) and the the security variables for formal IN parame­
ters with the corresponding actual security clcisses carried by the message, and 
4. checks for flow violations in each flow equation in the STATIC category and 
certifies the relation 
implicit < SUBJECT 
for each implicit in the IMPORT category. 
If all the equations are certified to be secure, the request is forwarded to the ac­
cess component via the synchronization component and a new process for PROC is 
initiated. 
If PROC invokes an external procedure, say "RMl.prod", execution of PROC 
is suspended in the access component and the request for invocation is forwarded to 
the protection component via the synchronization component. The run-time algo­
rithm finds the entry corresponding to "RMl.prod" in the IMPORT category of 
^This step is performed only if dynamically bound state variables are allowed. 
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the information flow instance for PROC and determines the classes of the actual IN 
parameters and implicit. Then, the algorithm attaches the security classes to the 
corresponding actual IN parameters and stores implicit and the class associated with 
the clearance of the subject in the message. 
In general, the symbolic class equation (in the information flow instance) corre­
sponding to actual IN parameter "x" of "RMl.procl" has the form 
X =  SCq  © 5 'Cj ( iS 'KT ' j )  ©  . . .  © SCmjSVTm)  © 5^^% © . . .  © SVn  
where {0  <  i  <  m)  stands for the security class, SVT^  (1 < i < m)  stands 
for the security variable tag, and SVj {1 < j < n) stands for the security 
variable. The security variables are temporarily ignored since they denote the security 
classes of variables which, at this point, are not yet flowing into "x". Therefore, the 
algorithm only uses 
SCQ © ISCJ(ISVJ) © . . .  © 5CMJSVTM) 
to determine the current security class of "x". The flows to "x" from these input 
variables may occur later (in the case of loops), or they have already been skipped and 
will never occur in this execution (in the case of if statements or already terminated 
loops). 
When the module receives a return message from another (previously invoked) 
module, the algorithm updates the information flow instance by replacing every occur­
rence of the security variables for the actual OUT parameters with the correspond­
ing security classes carried by the message. If a symbolic class expression contains 
a security clciss with a security variable tag which corresponds to a returned OUT 
parameter, say SCl(SV(*)), the algorithm replaces this tagged security class with 
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SC2(SV(*)), where SC2 is the returned security class. If a security variable ^ cor­
responding to a returned OUT parameter is marked with (*), the algorithm either 
1. adds the returned security class to the expression (if the security variable appears 
in the class expression of a symbolic flow equation), or 
2. replaces SV(*) with SC(SV(*)) where SC is the returned security class (if the 
security variable appears in the class expression of a symbolic class equation). 
The algorithm then checks for flow violations in each symbolic flow equation in the 
STATIC category and also certifies the relation 
implicit < SUBJECT 
for each implicit in the IMPORT category. If no flow violation is detected, the 
message is forwarded to the access component via the synchronization component 
and the (blocked) calling process is resumed. 
When PROC terminates in the access component, the return message is con­
structed and forwarded to the protection component via the synchronization compo­
nent. The run-time algorithm finds the security classes corresponding to the formal 
OUT parameters in the EXPORT category of the information flow instance and 
attaches these classes to the message. The algorithm also updates the classes of dy­
namically bound state variables based on the symbolic class equations in the STATE 
category of the information flow instance (if dynamically bound state variables are al­
lowed). After sending the return message to the calling module, the algorithm deletes 
the information flow instance. 
When PROC performs the "send.probe(RMl.procl)" operation in the access 
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component, PROC is blocked and the probe is sent to the protection component (via 
the synchronization component). The run-time algorithm 
1. generates a unique probe identifier (probe.ID), 
2. determines implicit from the "RMl.procl" entry in the IMPORT category of 
the information flow instance, 
3. attaches the site identifier (site.ID), the module identifier (moduleJD), probe_ID 
and implicit to the probe, and 
4. sends the probe to RMl, or if dynamically bound state variables are not allowed 
(in which case RMl may be a variable), to the class of RMl, say Cl. 
When instance module RMl or class module Cl receives a probe, the run-time 
algorithm instantiates the information flow template corresponding to the procedure 
"prod", replacing all occurrences of prod.implicit with implicit. If no flow violation 
is detected, the algorithm looks at the IMPORT category of the information flow 
template. If there are no entries for external procedures, the algorithm 
1. updates the security class of each dynamically bound state variable to 
implicit © its current security class (this applies only to RMl), 
2. sends "probe.certifled" to the sender of the probe, and 
3. deletes the information flow instance. 
A "probe.certifled" message notifies the sender that no flow violation has been de­
tected in this module or in subsequently called modules. If the IMPORT category 
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does contain entries for external procedures, copies of the probe are sent to all the 
listed instance modules (for RMl) or to the cléisses of all the listed modules (for CI). 
If "probe.certified" messages are received for all probes sent, the module performs 
the certification steps given above. If a module receives a probe which it has received 
before, the algorithm immediately sends a "probe.certified" message to the sender 
and does not need to perform steps 1 and 3. This may happen in a program with 
recursive invocations. 
When the module that initiated the probe receives a corresponding "probe.cer­
tified" message, the algorithm notifies the access component (via the synchronization 
component) to resume the blocked process. 
If a flow violation is detected at any point, the algorithm stops execution of the 
program and invokes a recovery routine. 
4.5 Program Examples 
In the example programs in this section and in Chapter 5, the specifications 
for access and synchronization components are not shown. Also, all the exported 
procedures shown are zissumed to be instance operations. We present two examples: 
one with dynamically bound state variables and one without. 
4.5.1 A program with no dynamically bound state variables 
The first example program contains only statically bound state variables. The 
program and its information flow templates are shown in Figure 4.4. Note that the 
information flow templates do not have STATE categories. The program consists of 
four modules: JOBl, STACKl, CONSOLEl and STRANGEl, which are instances of 
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JOB = class 
state 
initilize 
var i,x : integer; 
begin 
i := 0; 
while (i < 10) do 
begin 
i := i + 1; 
CONSOLEl.readint(OUT x); 
STACKl.push(IN x); 
end; 
{send_probe(CONSOLEl.readint);} 
{send.probe(STACKl.push);} 
i := 0; 
while (i < 10) do 
begin 
i := i + 1; 
STACKl.pop(OUT x); 
CONSOLEl.writeint(IN x); 
end; 
{send_probe(CONSOLEl.readint);} 
{send_probe(STACKl.push);} 
end initialize; 
end JOB 
Figure 4.4, An Example Program with No Dynamically Bound State Variables 
and Its Information Flow Templates 
132 
STACK = class 
state 
S ; array[1..20j of integer of security class SECRET; 
PTR : integer of security class SECRET; 
procedure push (IN a : interger); 
begin 
PTR := PTR + 1; 
if a >= 1000 then STRANGEl.convert (OUT a); 
{else send.probe(STRANGEl.convert);} 
S[PTR] := a; 
end push; 
procedure pop(OUT x : integer); 
begin 
pop := S[PTR]; 
PTR := PTR - 1; 
if pop <= 0 then STRANGEl.convert (OUT x); 
{else send.probe(STRANGEl.convert);} 
end pop; 
end STACK 
STRANGE = class 
state 
A : integer of security class TOPSECRET; 
procedure convert (OUT a : integer); 
begin 
a := A; 
end convert; 
end STRANGE 
Figure 4.4. (continued) 
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CONSOLE = class 
state 
KEYBOARD : DEVICE of security class SECRET; 
DISPLAY : DEVICE of security class SECRET; 
procedure readint(OUT i : integer); 
begin 
read integer from KEYBOARD device and return the value 
in formal OUT parameter i 
end readint; 
procedure writeint(IN x : integer); 
begin 
output the integer value x to the DISPLAY device 
end writeint; 
end CONSOLE 
The information flow template for JOB.initialize 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
CONSOLEl.readint (OUT x) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
STACKl.push(IN x) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
X = LOW © CONSOLEl.readint.x(*) 
© init.implicit 
STACKl.pop(OUT x) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
CONSOLEl.writeint(IN x) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
X = LOW © STACKl.pop.x(*) © init.implicit 
STATIC 
Figure 4.4. (continued) 
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The information flow template for STACK.push 
EXPORT 
push (IN a) 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert(OUT a) 
implicit = LOW © push.implicit © push.a 
STATIC 
S = SECRET SECRET © push.implicit © push.a 
© STRANGEl.convert.a 
PTR = SECRET SECRET © push.implicit © push.a 
The information flow template for STACK.pop 
EXPORT 
pop (OUT x) 
X = SECRET © STRANGEl.convert.x © pop.implicit 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert(OUT x) 
implicit = SECRET © pop.implicit 
STATIC 
PTR = SECRET ^ SECRET © pop.implicit 
The information flow template for STRANGE.convert 
EXPORT 
convert (OUT a) 
a = TOPSECRET © convert.implicit 
IMPORT 
STATIC 
Figure 4.4. (continued) 
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The information flow template for CONSOLE.readint 
EXPORT 
readint(OUT i) 
i = SECRET © readint.implicit 
IMPORT 
STATIC 
The information flow tmplate for CONSOLE.writeint 
EXPORT 
writeint(IN x) 
IMPORT 
STATIC 
DISPLAY = SECRET ^ SECRET © writeint.x 
© writeint.implicit 
Figure 4.4. (continued) 
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class JOB, STACK, CONSOLE and STRANGE, respectively.® 
Module JOBl has only an initialization procedure. Within the first while state­
ment, the initialization procedure calls both procedure "readint" of module "CON-
SOLEl" and procedure "push" of "STACKl" ten times. Within the second while 
statement, it calls both "pop" of "STACKl" and "writeint" of "CONSOLEl" ten 
times. 
Class "STACK" has two state variables S and PTR, which are statically bound 
to SECRET. It implements a stack data structure with two exported procedures 
"push" and "pop". Procedure "push" pushes its IN parameter onto the stack if the 
value of the parameter is less than 1000. Otherwise, it pushes the value returned by 
procedure "STRANGEl.convert". Procedure "pop" removes the top element of the 
stack. It returns the value popped if this value is positive; otherwise it returns the 
value returned by "STRANGEl.convert". 
Class "STRANGE" has an exported procedure "convert" that returns the value 
in its state variable A, which is statically bound to TOPSECRET. Class "CON­
SOLE" has two exported procedures, "readint" and "writeint". The state variables 
KEYBOARD and DISPLAY are assumed to be real devices, and both have classifica­
tion SECRET. (Thus, only a user with clearance SECRET can use this CONSOLE, 
and SUBJECT = SECRET). The actual code for these procedures is not shown, but 
"readint" is assumed to return an integer value read from the device KEYBOARD 
along with the security class SECRET. Also, the value of the IN parameter "x" of 
"Even though literal names are used in this example, variables could be used to 
represent the called modules. Probes are sent to class modules rather than to instance 
modules whether variables or literal module names are used. 
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"writeint" is assumed to be output to SECRET device DISPLAY. 
When the compile-time algorithm processes the while statements in the ini­
tialization procedure of class "JOB", the class expressions of the variables to which 
values are assigned stabilize after the first simulated execution. Since procedures 
"CONSOLEl.readint" and "STACK 1.pop" are invoked within the while statements, 
the corresponding security variables "CONSOLEl.readint" and "STACKl.pop" are 
marked with an (*). 
At run time, JOBl is instantiated, and the information flow instance for the 
initialization procedure is created, in the protection component of JOBl, based on the 
information flow template stored in class module JOB. For this example, we assume 
that init.implicit is LOW. Next, the body of the initialization procedure is executed. 
Within the first while statement, procedure "CONSOLEl.readint" returns an integer 
value read from the device KEYBOARD along with the security class SECRET, and 
the information flow instance of the initialization procedure is updated to 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
CONSOLEl.readint(OUT x) 
implicit = LOW 
STACKl.push(IN x) 
implicit = LOW 
X = LOW © SECRET(CONSOLEl.readint.x(*)) 
STACKl.pop(OUT x) 
implicit = LOW 
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CONSOLEl.writeint(IN x) 
implicit = LOW 
z = LOW © STACKl.pop.x(*) 
STATIC. 
Note that since the security variable CONSOLEl.readint is marked with (*), the run­
time mechanism either adds the corresponding security class SECRET to the class 
expressions which contain CONSOLEl.readint.x(*) (for symbolic flow equations) or 
replaces CONSOLEl.readint with SECRET(CONSOLEl.readint.x(+)) (for symbolic 
class equation). Since the STATIC category is empty and 
implicit(= LOW) < SUBJECT(= SECRET) 
for all external procedure invocations, the flow is secure and the execution resumes. 
When the initialization procedure in JOBl calls procedure "push" in "STACKl", 
the message carries the integer value just read, along with the security class SECRET, 
and the class LOW for implicit. (SECRET and LOW are determined from the asso­
ciated entries in the information flow instance of the procedure). 
Upon receipt of the message, the run-time mechanism creates a new information 
flow instance in the protection component of STACKl based on the information flow 
template for procedure "push". Then, the mechanism replaces every occurrence of 
push.implicit or push.x with LOW or SECRET, respectively, and checks for a flow 
violation in each symbolic flow equation. The mechanism also compares implicit 
of STRANGEl.convert(OUT a) in the IMPORT category with SUBJECT. The 
information flow instance at this point is 
EXPORT 
139 
push (IN a) 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert(OUT a) 
implicit = SECRET 
STATIC 
S = SECRET 4- SECRET © STRANGEl.convert.a 
PTR = SECRET SECRET. 
Since no flow violation is detected, a new process for executing the "pop" procedure 
is created in the access component. If the parameter value is greater than or equal to 
1000, the procedure invokes "STRANGEl.convert". The message carries the class SE­
CRET to account for the implicit inter-module flow. "STRANGEl.convert" returns 
an integer value in "a" along with the security class TOPSECRET. The run-time 
mechanism replaces all occurrences of the security variable "STRANGEl.convert.a". 
in the information flow instance for "push" in "STACKl", with TOPSECRET, and 
detects a flow violation as follows: 
EXPORT 
push (IN a) 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert(OUT a) 
implicit = SECRET 
STATIC 
S = SECRET TOPSECRET (* * * flow violation * * *) 
PTR = SECRET ^ SECRET. 
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The run-time mechanism then immediately stops the execution and invokes a recovery 
routine. 
If the value of the parameter to "push" is less than 1000, the procedure sends 
a probe with security class SECRET to class STRANGE. Since the IMPORT and 
STATIC categories of the information flow template of "STRANGE.convert" are 
empty, the run-time mechanism immediately returns a "probe.certified" message to 
STACK 1.push, and the execution resumes. Procedure "push" then pushes the value 
onto the stack, sends the return message to the initialization procedure of JOBl 
and terminates. The corresponding information flow instance is also deleted from 
the protection component of the module "STACKl". If all ten values read from 
the device KEYBOARD are less than 1000, the first while statement terminates 
normally, and probes containing security class LOW are sent to class modules CON­
SOLE and STACK. Since the IMPORT and STATIC categories of the information 
flow template for "CONSOLE.readint" are empty, cléiss module CONSOLE imme­
diately returns a "probe.certified" message. When STACK receives its probe, the 
run-time algorithm creates an information flow instance and replaces every occur­
rence of push.implicit with LOW. The resulting information flow instance is 
EXPORT 
push(IN a) 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert (OUT a) 
implicit = LOW push.a 
STATIC 
S = SECRET push.a © STRANGEl.convert © SECRET 
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PTR = SECRET ^ SECRET © push.a. 
Since no flow violation is detected, a probe with security class LOW is sent to class 
module STRANGE, where the probe is also certified to be secure. When STACK re­
ceives the "probe.certified" message from STRANGE, the run-time mechanism erases 
the information flow instance and returns "probe.certified" message to JOBl. Then, 
the second while statement in the the initialization procedure of JOBl is executed. 
"STACK 1.pop" and "CONSOLEl.writeint" are called ten times. The information 
flow instance created in the protection component of "STACK 1" when "pop" is called 
with implicit = LOW is 
EXPORT 
pop(OUT x) 
pop = SECRET © STRANGEl.convert.x 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert(OUT x) 
implicit = SECRET 
STATIC 
PTR = SECRET SECRET. 
If a value popped is greater than zero, the return value has the security class SECRET. 
If the value popped is less than or equal to zero, "pop" calls "STRANGEl.convert", 
and "STRANGEl.convert" returns an integer value in actual OUT parameter "x" 
along with the security class TOPSECRET. The information flow instance for the 
"pop", when STACKl receives the return value from "STRANGEl", is 
EXPORT 
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pop(OUT x) 
pop= TOPSECRET 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert (OUT x) 
inter-module = SECRET 
STATIC 
PTR = SECRET ^ SECRET, 
and the return value has a security class TOPSECRET. 
If "STACKl.pop" returns SECRET to JOBl, the information flow instance for 
the initialization procedure of JOBl is updated to 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
CONSOLEl.readint(OUT x) 
implicit = LOW 
STACKl.push(IN x) 
implicit = LOW 
X = SECRET(CONSOLEl.readint.x(*)) © SECRET 
STACKl.pop(OUT x) 
implicit = LOW 
CONSOLEl.writeint(IN x) 
implicit = LOW 
z = LOW © SECRET(STACKl.pop.x(*)) 
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STATIC. 
If the return value is of security class TOPSECRET, the information flow instance is 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
STACKl.push(IN x) 
implicit = LOW 
X = CONSOLEl.readint.x(*) © SECRET 
CONSOLEl.readint(OUT x) 
implicit = LOW 
STACKl.pop(OUT x) 
implicit = LOW 
CONSOLEl.writeint(IN x) 
implicit = LOW 
z = LOW © TOPSECRET(STACKl.pop.x(*)) 
STATIC. 
In the former case, the procedure invocation "CONSOLEl.writeint" carries a param­
eter and its associated security class SECRET. The information flow instance created 
in the protection component of CONSOLEl upon the receipt of the message is 
EXPORT 
writeint(IN x) 
IMPORT 
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STATIC 
DISPLAY = SECRET /- SECRET. 
Since the information flow is legal, the execution is carried out in the access compo­
nent. 
In the latter case, the actual parameter to "CONSOLEl.writeint" has security 
class TOPSECRET, and the information flow instance created for "writeint" is 
EXPORT 
writeint (IN x) 
IMPORT 
STATIC 
DISPLAY = SECRET ^ TOPSECRET (* + * flow violation * * *). 
Therefore, a flow violation is detected and the execution is stopped immediately. 
In summary, the program terminates normally only when ten integer values read 
from the device KEYBOARD are greater than 0 and less than 1000. If a value read 
is greater than or equal to 1000, an information flow violation is detected in the 
protection component of module "STACK 1". If a value read is less than or equal to 
0, a violation is detected in module "CONSOLEl". 
4.5.2 A program with dynamically bound state variables 
The second example program contains both statically and dynamically bound 
state variables. The program and the information flow templates generated by the 
compile-time mechanism are shown in Figure 4.5. Assume that Ml, M2, M3 and M4 
are instances of class CI, C2, C3 and C4, respectively. "Ml.initialize" invokes "M2.f" 
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Cl = class 
state 
LSI : integer of security class SECRET; 
LS2 : integer; 
initialize 
var a, b, c, d, e : integer; 
begin 
a := LSI * 2; 
b := LSI / 2; 
c := LS2 + 3; 
if a + b > 0 
then M2.f(IN a, OUT d) 
else 
begin 
d := 0; 
{send.probe(M2.f);} 
end; 
M3.g(IN b, c, OUT e); 
LSI ;= d + e; 
end 
end Cl 
C2 = class 
state 
procedure f(IN u : integer; OUT z : integer); 
var V, w : integer; 
begin 
V :=  u  /  2;  
w := u * 2; 
M4.h(IN V,  w ,  OUT z); 
end; 
end C2 
Figure 4.5, An Example Program with Dynamically Bound State Variables and 
Its Information Flow Templates 
146 
C3 = class 
state 
procedure g (IN 1, m : integer; OUT n : integer); 
var o, p : integer; 
begin 
o := 1 + m; 
p := 1 - 2; 
M4.h(IN o, p, OUT n); 
end 
end C3 
C4 = class 
state LS3 : integer; 
procedure h (IN a, b : integer; OUT c); 
begin 
LS3 := LS3 + 2 * a + b; 
c := LS3; 
end 
end C4 
The information flow template for Cl.initialze 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
M2.f(IN a, OUT b) 
implicit = SECRET © init.implicit 
a = SECRET © init.implicit 
M3.g(IN b, c, OUT e) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
b = SECRET © init.implicit 
Ç = LOW © LS2 © init.implicit 
STATE 
STATIC 
LSI = SECRET SECRET © M2.f.d © MS.g.e © init.implicit 
Figure 4.5. (continued) 
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The information flow template for C2.f 
EXPORT 
M2.f (IN u, OUT z) 
z = M4.h.z © f.implicit 
IMPORT 
M4.h(IN V, w, OUT z) 
implicit = LOW © f.implicit 
V = LOW © fVu © f.implicit 
w = LOW © Lu © Limplicit 
STATE 
STATIC 
The information flow template for C3.g 
EXPORT 
M3.g(IN 1, m, OUT n) 
n = M4.h.n © g.implicit 
IMPORT 
M4.h(IN o, p, OUT n) 
implicit = LOW © g.implicit 
o = g.m © gji © g.implicit 
p = LOW © g.m © g.implicit 
STATE 
STATIC 
The information flow template for C4.h 
EXPORT 
M4.h(IN a, b, OUT c) 
Ç = LOW © LS3 © La © © h.implicit 
IMPORT 
STATE 
LS3 = LOW © LS3 © La © Lb © h.implicit 
STATIC 
Figure 4.5. (continued) 
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and "M3.g". "M2.f" and "M3.g" invoke "M4.h". Ml has two state variables: LSI 
and LS2. LSI is statically bound to SECRET, and LS2 is dynamically bound. Note 
that since no information flows to LS2 while "Ml.initialize" is executed, there is no 
corresponding symbolic class equation for LS2 in the STATE category of the template 
for "Ml.initialize". M2 and M3 have no state variables, and M4 has dynamically 
bound state variable LS3. The run-time algorithm can determine which modules 
should receive probes since all modules calls must use literal modules names. 
Assume that the clearance of the subject is SECRET, state variables LSI and 
LS2 are initialized by the instantiation parameters, and the class of LS2 is LOW 
at instantiation time. When Ml is instantiated, an information flow instance for 
its initialization procedure is created in the protection component. We assume that 
init.implicit = LOW. The resulting information flow instance is 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
M2.f(IN a, OUT b) 
implicit = SECRET 
a = SECRET 
M3.g(IN b, c, OUT e) 
implicit = LOW 
b = SECRET 
Ç = LOW 
STATE 
STATIC 
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LSI = SECRET ^ M2.f.d © M3.g.e © SECRET. 
Since no flow violation is detected, the initialization procedure is invoked. During the 
execution, assume that "a + b > 0" and "M2.f" is invoked with actual IN parameter 
"a". The run-time algorithm determines implicit and a from the information flow 
instance (in this case, both are SECRET) and then attaches these classes to the 
message. 
When M2 receives the message, the algorithm instantiates a new information 
flow instance and replaces all the occurrences of f.implicit and fai with SECRET. The 
information flow instance at this point is 
EXPORT 
M2.f (IN u, OUT z) 
z = SECRET © M4.h.z 
IMPORT 
M4.h(IN V, w, OUT z) 
implicit = SECRET 
V = SECRET 
w = SECRET 
STATE 
STATIC. 
Since the flows are certified to be secure, the execution of f(IN a, OUT b) is initi­
ated in the access component. When procedure "f" invokes "M4.h" with actual IN 
parameters "v" and "w", the algorithm attaches implicit, v and w (all are SECRET) 
to the message and sends it to M4. 
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Assume LS3 is CONFIDENTIAL when M4 receives the message. The run-time 
algorithm creates an information flow instance and replaces LS3 with CONFIDEN­
TIAL, and h.implicit, h.a and Lb with SECRET forming 
EXPORT 
M4.h(IN a, b, OUT c) 
Ç = SECRET 
IMPORT 
STATE 
LS3 = SECRET 
STATIC. 
Since the flows are secure, the execution is carried out. Note that the synchroniza­
tion component must guarantee this invocation exclusive access to LS3. Otherwise, 
the class of LS3 may be changed by other computations after the flow is certified 
and before the invocation terminates. If this happens, the information flow instance 
above does not reflect the actual flow caused by this invocation. Upon termination, 
a message with return value "a" is created. The run-time algorithm attachs the class 
of "a" (= SECRET) to the message, updates the class of LS3 to SECRET, deletes 
the information flow instance, and sends the message back to M2. 
When M2 receives the return message, the algorithm replaces M4.h.z with SE­
CRET obtaining 
EXPORT 
M2.f (IN u, OUT z) 
z = SECRET 
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IMPORT 
M4.h(IN V, w, OUT z) 
implicit = SECRET 
V = SECRET 
w = SECRET 
STATE 
STATIC. 
Since no flow violation is detected, the execution of "M2.f" resumes. Upon termina­
tion, returns "z" with its class SECRET to "Ml.initialize". 
The information flow instance for "Ml.initialize" is updated to 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
M2.f(IN a, OUT b) 
implicit = SECRET 
a = SECRET 
M3.g(IN b, c, OUT e) 
implicit = LOW 
b = SECRET 
Ç = LOW 
STATE 
STATIC 
LSI = SECRET 4- SECRET © M3.g.e, 
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and no flow violation is detected. When "Ml.initialize" invokes "M3.g", the message 
carries actual IN parameters "b" (with class SECRET) and "c" (with class LOW), 
and implicit (= LOW). The run-time algorithm forms the following information flow 
instance in the protection component of M3: 
EXPORT 
M3.g(IN 1, m, OUT n) 
n = LOW © M4.h.n 
IMPORT 
M4.h(IN o, p, OUT n) 
implicit = LOW 
o = SECRET 
p = SECRET 
STATE 
STATIC. 
During the execution of "M3.g", "M4.h" is invoked with actual IN parameters "o" 
and "p". Since (l) the current class of LS3 is SECRET, (2) implicit is LOW, and (3) 
the classes of "o" and "p" are SECRET, the resulting information flow instance at 
M4 is 
EXPORT 
M4.h(IN a, b, OUT c) 
Ç = SECRET 
IMPORT 
STATE 
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LS3=SECRET 
STATIC. 
Therefore, "M4.h" returns SECRET for OUT parameter "c", and the class of LS3 
remains SECRET. 
Upon receipt of the return message from "M4.h", the information flow instance 
for "M3.g" is updated to 
EXPORT 
M3.g(IN 1, m, OUT n) 
n = SECRET 
IMPORT 
M4.h(IN o, p, OUT n) 
implicit = SECRET 
g = SECRET 
p = SECRET 
STATE 
STATIC, 
and "M3.g" returns SECRET for the OUT parameter "n". 
When Ml receives the return message from M3, the algorithm updates the infor­
mation flow instance to 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
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M2.f(IN a, OUT b) 
implicit = SECRET 
a = SECRET 
M3.g(IN b, c, OUT e) 
implicit = SECRET 
b = SECRET 
Ç = SECRET 
STATE 
STATIC 
LSI = SECRET ^ SECRET. 
Since no flow violation is detected, the execution of "Ml.initialize" resumes and ter­
minates normally. 
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5 LINK-TIME INFORMATION FLOW CERTIFICATION 
In Chapter 4, we proposed an information flow mechanism for a distributed 
object-oriented environment. The mechanism is a combination of the compile-time 
and run-time approaches. The compile-time mechanism generates information flow 
templates. When messages are passed, the run-time mechanism calculates security 
classes of output variables and detects information flow violations by using information 
flow instances generated from the information flow templates. 
In order to handle implicit flows between module boundaries, the run-time mecha­
nism sends probes. While probes are in progress, the sending process must be blocked. 
Thus, sending probes not only increases traffic on the network but also decreases the 
execution speed of a process. For each exported procedure call within a while state­
ment or an if statement, the mechanism initiates one probe. In addition, the module 
that receives a probe must send this probe to all the modules listed in the IMPORT 
category of its corresponding information flow template. Therefore, sending probes 
may be expensive in some systems, such as those with high communication costs or 
with programs containing many modules. 
In this section, we propose an alternative approach which requires no run-time 
certification of information flow. The mechanism combines compile-time and link-
time approaches. The compile-time mechanism is the same as that proposed in the 
previous chapter, except that (1) inserting "send.probe" statements is not necessary 
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and (2) the *-mark for security variables is not necessary. The link-time algorithm 
is performed after all of the invoked exported procedures in associated modules have 
been compiled and their information flow templates established, but before execution 
of the program is initiated. The link-time mechanism collects all the information 
flow templates of the invoked exported procedures, which exist in the corresponding 
class modules, at one site (called the base site)^ and solves, at the base site, every 
symbolic flow equation in the STATIC categories. If all the symbolic flow equations are 
certified to be secure, the entire program is secure and the program can be executed. 
Since the link-time mechanism certifies all the potential information flows caused by a 
program before the actual execution begins, no run-time checking is necessary. Also, 
potential information leakage from conditional variables to a subject does not have 
to be considered. However, since the actual execution sequence or execution path is 
unknown at link time, the link-time mechanism must consider all. possible information 
flows. Therefore, it is possible that this approach may regard a secure program to 
be insecure. Also, if a programmer modifies any of the exported procedures invoked 
within a program (which implies a modification of classes), the link-time algorithm 
must be performed again before the modified program is executed. 
Since dynamically bound state variables may change security classes during their 
life-times, their classes are not known at link time. Therefore, if a program has 
dynamically bound state variables, link time verification becomes impossible. The 
link-time mechanism presented in the following three sections allows only statically 
^The base site may be any site in the system. We assume that the base site is the 
one on which the main module of the program is instantiated. 
Note that collecting templates does require message passing. 
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bound state variables. As discussed in Section 4.2.3, however, this allows module 
invocations to use variables to specify invoked modules. 
The class of the implicit inter-module flow from a module that instantiates the 
main module of a program (denoted by init.implicit) must be the same in every in­
stantiation. We assume that this class is always LOW (i.e., execution of a program is 
not conditioned by any classified variable). In Section 5.4, we extend the above mech­
anism to allow dynamically bound state variables and different classes for init.implicit 
by combining compile-time, link-time and run-time mechanisms. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, since dynamically bound state variables are allowed, this approach 
requires that module invocations use only literal module names. 
The combined compile-time and link-time approach presented in this chapter is 
potentially applicable to conventional languages which do not depend on message 
passing to implement procedure calls. 
5.1 The Link-Time Mechanism 
Since the mechanism handles only statically bound state variables, information 
flow templates generated by the compile-time mechanism do not have a STATE 
category. Moreover, all the security variables appearing in symbolic class expressions 
in the information flow template of procedure P correspond to dynamically bound 
formal IN parameters of P, dynamically bound actual OUT parameters of exported 
procedures invoked by P or incoming implicit inter-module flows to P. Thus, the 
symbolic class expression corresponding to a security variable may be defined in either 
the EXPORT or IMPORT categories of the information flow template in which the 
security variable is defined or in other information flow templates. 
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A symbolic class expression corresponding to the actual OUT parameter of a 
procedure P which invokes a procedure Q is defined only in the EXPORT category 
of the template for Q. However, since there may be several procedures which invoke 
P, the symbolic class expressions corresponding to the formal IN parameter or the 
incoming implicit inter-module flow of P may be defined in the IMPORT categories 
of several templates. The algorithm at first combines the symbolic class equations 
which are in difi'erent IMPORT categories but represent the same IN parameter or 
the same implicit inter-module flow into one equation by concatenating these with © 
operators. Thereafter, there is always only one symbolic class equation corresponding 
to each security variable. 
The link-time algorithm is cis follows: 
For each symbolic flow equation, repeat the following until either a flow violation 
is detected or all symbolic flow equations are certified to be secure: 
1. Expansion Step: 
repeat the following on the symbolic class expression part of the symbolic flow 
equation until the expression becomes a single security class. 
(a) Replace every security variable in the symbolic class expression with the 
right hand side (the symbolic class expression) of the corresponding sym­
bolic class equation. 
(b) Apply the minimization step described in Section 4.3.1 to the expression. 
If the reduced expression is equivalent to an expression "SC2 ©5Kj © .. .© 
SVn" which has appeared in some previous iteration, replace the expression 
with "SC2". 
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2. Certification Step: 
Perform the following flow certification: The equation, at this point, is of form 
"variable = SCI SC2" where SCI and SC2 are security classes. If SC2 < SCI 
is implied by the lattice, certify this equation to be secure. Otherwise report 
the potential flow violation. 
In the algorithm, two reduced expressions are considered equivalent if they con­
tain the same security class and the same set of security variables. If an expression 
appears which is equivalent to some expression occurring in a previous iteration, we 
call this a "repetition". Repetition of an expression in the expansion step may occur if 
a program is recursive. It will be formally shown in the next section that the security 
class found in the expansion step is the value of the symbolic class expression in the 
symbolic flow equation under consideration. 
We now present two examples, one with recursive invocations and another with­
out. Note that à formal parameter name does not have to match the corresponding 
actual parameter name. Therefore, the name of a.security variable may be diff'erent 
from the left hand side of the corresponding symbolic class equation defined in another 
template. In our examples, we use the notation "SV (C.P)" to denote the security 
variable whose name is SV and which appears within the template for procedure F 
defined in class module C. Also, "init" denotes the initialization procedure. 
Consider the example program shown in Figure 4.4 in the previous chapter. This 
program does not have recursive invocations. The program causes a flow violation if 
at least one of the values to be read from device KEYBOARD is either greater than 
or equal to 1000 or less than or equal to 0. Otherwise, the program is secure. Since 
the values to be read from KEYBOARD are unknown at link time, the link-time 
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algorithm detects the worst possible case and regards the program to be insecure. 
This illustrates the possible imprecision of the algorithm. 
The information flow templates of all procedures in the program are shown in 
Figure 5.1. As mentioned in the previous section, the *-mark is taken out of the 
symbolic class expressions. There are four symbolic flow equations and the link-
time mechanism solves the equations one-by-one until the mechanism encounters an 
insecure flow or all the equations are verified to be secure. 
Since both "STACK.push" and "STACK.pop" call "STRANGEl.convert", the 
symbolic class equations corresponding to the security variable for the incoming im­
plicit inter-module flow of "STRANGE.convert" are combined as follows: 
• convert.implicit (STRANGE.convert) 
= implicit (STACK.push) © implicit (STACK.pop) 
= LOW © push.implicit (STACK.push) © push.a (STACK.push) 
ffi SECRET ffi pop.implicit (STACK.pop) 
= SECRET ffi push.implicit (STACK.push) © push.a (STACK.push) 
ffi pop.implicit (STACK.pop). 
We then find the symbolic class expression corresponding to each security variable: 
• CONSOLEl.readint.x (JOB.init) 
= 1 (CONSOLE.readint) 
= SECRET ffi readint.implicit (CONSOLE.readint) 
• STACKl.pop.x (JOB.init) 
= X (STACK.pop) 
= SECRET ffi STRANGEl.convert.X (STACK.pop) 
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The information flow template for J OB.initialize 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
CONSOLEl.readint(OUT x) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
STACKl.push(IN x) 
implicit = LOW © Init.implicit 
X = LOW © CONSOLEl.readint.x © init.implicit 
STACKl.pop(OUTx) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
CONSOLEl.writeint(IN x) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
X = LOW © STACKl.pop.x © init.implicit 
STATIC 
The information flow template for STACK.push 
EXPORT 
push (IN a) 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert (OUT a) 
implicit = LOW © push.implicit © push.a 
STATIC 
S = SECRET SECRET © push.implicit © push.a 
© STRANGEl.convert.a 
PTR = SECRET *— SECRET © push.implicit © push.a 
Figure 5.1. Information Flow Templates for Program with No Recursion 
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The information flow template for STACK.pop 
EXPORT 
pop (OUT x) 
X = SECRET © STRANGEl.convert.x © pop.implicit 
IMPORT 
STRANGEl.convert(OUT x) 
implicit = SECRET © pop.implicit 
STATIC 
PTR = SECRET SECRET © pop.implicit 
The information flow template for STRANGE.convert 
EXPORT 
convert(OUT a) 
a = TOPSECRET © convert.implicit 
IMPORT 
STATIC 
The information flow template for CONSOLE.readint 
EXPORT 
readint(OUT i) 
1 = SECRET © readint.implicit 
IMPORT 
STATIC 
Figure 5.1. (continued) 
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The information flow template for CONSOLE.writeint 
EXPORT 
writeint(IN x) 
IMPORT 
STATIC 
DISPLAY = SECRET SECRET © writeint.x 
© writeint.implicit 
Figure 5.1. (continued) 
pop.implicit (STACK.pop) 
push.a (STACK.push) 
= X (JOB.init) 
= LOW © CONSOLEl.readint.x (JOB.init) © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
push.implicit (STACK.push) 
= implicit (JOB.init) 
= LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
STRANGE 1.convert.a (STACK.push) 
= a (STRANGE.convert) 
= TOPSECRET © convert.implicit (STRANGE.convert) 
STRANGEl.convert.X (STACK.pop) 
= a (STRANGE.convert) 
= TOPSECRET © convert.implicit (STRANGE.convert) 
pop.implicit (STACK.pop) 
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= implicit (JOB.init) 
= LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
• readint.implicit (CONSOLE.readint) 
= implicit (JOB.init) 
= LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
• writeint.x (CONSOLE.writeint) 
= X (JOB.init) 
= LOW © STACKl.pop.x (JOB.init) © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
• writeint.implicit (CONSOLE.writeint) 
= implicit (JOB.init) 
= LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init). 
As mentioned earlier, we assume init.implicit = LOW. For the symbolic flow 
equation for PTR of "STACK.push", the algorithm expands the class equation as 
follows: 
PTR = SECRET ^ SECRET © push.a (STACK.push) 
© push.implicit (STACK.push) 
= SECRET © LOW © CONSOLEl.readint.x (JOB.init) 
© init.implicit (JOB.init) 
© LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
= SECRET © CONSOLEl.readint.x (JOB.init) 
© init.implicit (JOB.init) 
= SECRET © SECRET © readint.implicit (CONSOLE.readint) 
© LOW 
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= SECRET © readint.implicit (CONSOLE.readint) 
= SECRET 0 LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
= SECRET © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
= SECRET © LOW 
= SECRET. 
Since SECRET < SECRET, this flow is certified to be secure. 
For the symbolic flow equation for PTR of "STACK.pop", we have the expansion 
sequence: 
PTR = SECRET SECRET © pop.implicit (STACK.pop) 
= SECRET © LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
= SECRET © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
= SECRET © LOW 
= SECRET. 
This flow is also verified to be secure. 
The symbolic flow equation for S of "STACK.push" has the expansion sequence; 
S = SECRET ^ SECRET © push.a (STACK.push) 
© STRANG El.convert.a (STACK.push) 
© push.implicit (STACK.push) 
= SECRET © LOW © CONSOLEl.readint.x (JOB.init) 
© init.implicit (JOB.init) © TOPSECRET 
© convert.implicit (STRANGE.convert) © LOW 
© init.implicit (JOB.init) 
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TOPSECRET © CONSOLEl.readint.x (JOB.init) 
© convert.implicit (STRANGE.convert) 
© init.implicit (JOB.init) 
TOPSECRET © SECRET 
© readint.implicit (CONSOLE.readint) © SECRET 
© push.implicit (STACK.push) © push.a (STACK.pus 
© pop.implicit (STACK.pop) © LOW 
TOPSECRET © readint.implicit (CONSOLE.readint) 
© push.implicit (STACK.push) © push.a (STACK.pus 
© pop.implicit (STACK.pop) 
TOPSECRET © LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
© LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
© LOW © CONSOLEl.readint.x (JOB.init) 
© init.implicit (JOB.init) © LOW 
© init.implicit (JOB.init) 
TOPSECRET © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
© CONSOLEl.readint.x (JOB.init) 
TOPSECRET © LOW © SECRET 
© readint.implicit (CONSOLE.readint) 
TOPSECRET © readint.implicit (CONSOLE.readint) 
TOPSECRET © LOW © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
TOPSECRET © init.implicit (JOB.init) 
TOPSECRET © LOW 
TOPSECRET. 
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Since TOPSECRET ^ SECRET, this flow is found to be insecure, and therefore the 
whole program is regarded to be potentially insecure. 
Figure 5.2 shows the program and cissociated information flow templates for the 
second example. This program involves recursion. Modules 01, 02 and 03 are 
instances of classes 01, C2 and C3, respectively. "Cl.initialize" calls "02.f". "C2.f" 
calls "03.g", and "C3.g" calls "02.f". Even though literal names are used in this and 
previous examples to represent the called modules, variables could also be used. This 
is because the link-time algorithm needs to know only the class of a called module 
(not the particular instance). 
Since both "Cl.initialize" and "C3.g" call "02.f", the symbolic clciss equations 
corresponding to the security variables for the formal IN parameter and the incoming 
implicit inter-module flow of "C2.f" are combined as follows: 
• f%a (C2.f) = a (Cl.init) © z (C3.g) 
= TOPSECRET © init.implicit (Cl.init) © LOW © g^ (C3.g) 
© g.implicit (C3.g) 
= TOPSECRET © init.implicit (Cl.init) © g^ (CS.g) 
© g.implicit (C3.g) 
• f.implicit (C2.f) = implicit (Cl.init) © implicit (C3.g) 
= LOW © init.implicit (Cl.init) © LOW © g^ (C3.g) 
© g.implicit (C3.g) 
= LOW © init.implicit (Cl.init) © g^ (C3.g) © g.implicit (C3.g). 
For the other security variables, we have: 
168 
Cl = class 
state RSI : integer of securty class TOPSECRET; 
initialize 
var a, b : interger; 
begin 
a := RSI / 2; 
02.f(IN a, OUT b); 
RSI := b + 20; 
end 
end CI 
C2 = class 
state RS2 : integer of security class SECRET; 
procedure f(IN a : integer; OUT b : integer); 
var c : integer; 
begin 
c := a * 2; 
if a > 0 
then 
begin 
03.g(IN c, OUT b); 
RS2 := b; 
end 
else b := RS2; 
end 
end C2 
Figure 5.2. An Example Program with Recursion and 
Its Information Flow Templates 
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C3 = class 
state RS3 : integer of security class CONFIDENTIAL; 
procedure g (IN x : integer; OUT y : integer); 
var z : integer; 
begin 
z X + 2; 
if X < 100 
then 
begin 
02.f(IN z, OUT y); 
RS3 := y; 
end 
else y := RS3; 
end 
end C2 
The information flow template for Cl.initialize 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
02.f(IN a, OUT b) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
a = TOPSECRET © init.implicit 
STATIC 
RSI = TOPSECRET ^ TOPSECRET © 02.f.b © init.implicit 
Figure 5.2. (continued) 
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The information flow template for C2.f 
EXPORT 
f(IN a, OUT b) 
b = SECRET 0 © OS.g.b © f.implicit 
IMPORT 
03.g(IN c, OUT b) 
implicit = LOW © f\a © f.implicit 
Ç = LOW © La © f.implicit 
STATIC 
RS2 = SECRET <- SECRET © La © OS.g.b © f.implicit 
The information flow template for C3.g 
EXPORT 
g(IN X, OUT y) 
y = CONFIDENTIAL © g^ © 02.f.y © g.implicit 
IMPORT 
02.f(IN z, OUT y) 
implicit H LOW © gj( © g.implicit 
z = LOW © g^ © g.implicit 
STATIC 
RS3 = CONFIDENTIAL ^ CONFIDENTIAL © gjç © 02.f.y 
© g.implicit 
Figure 5.2. (continued) 
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• (C3.g) = Ç (C2.f) = LOW © (C2.f) © [.implicit (C2.f) 
• 02.f.b (Cl.init) = b (C2.f) 
= SECRET © La (C2.f) © 03.g.b (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f) 
• 02-f-y (C3.g) = b (C2.f) 
= SECRET © La (C2.f) © OS.g.b (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f) 
. OS.g.b (C2.f) = y (CS.g) 
= CONFIDENTIAL © g^ (CS.g) © 02.f.y (CS.g) © g.implicit (CS.g) 
• g.implicit (CS.g) = implicit (C2.f) = LOW © Lê (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f). 
Here, init.implicit is LOW. Each module has a state variable. Therefore, there are 
three symbolic How equations. The link-time algorithm solves the equation for RSI 
as follows: 
RSI = TOPSECRET ^ TOPSECRET © 02.f.b (Cl.init) 
© init.implicit (Cl.init) 
= TOPSECRET © SECRET © La (C2.f) © OS.g.b (C2.f) 
© f.implicit (C2.f) © LOW 
= TOPSECRET © La (C2.f) © OS.g.b (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f) 
= TOPSECRET © TOPSECRET © init.implicit (Cl.init) 
© g^ (CS.g) © g.implicit (CS.g) © CONFIDENTIAL 
© g^ (CS.g) © 02.Ly (CS.g) © g.implicit (CS.g) © LOW 
© init.implicit (Cl.init) © g^ (CS.g) © g.implicit (CS.g) 
= TOPSECRET © init.implicit (Cl.init) © g^ (CS.g) 
© 02.f.y (CS.g) © g.implicit (CS.g) 
= TOPSECRET © LOW © LOW © La (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f) 
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© SECRET © La (C2.f) © 03.g.b (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f) 
= TOPSECRET © La (C2.f) © 03.g.b (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f) 
[ repetition ] 
= TOPSECRET. 
Since TOPSECRET < TOPSECRET, this flow is certified to be secure. 
The equation for RS2 is solved as follows: 
RS2 = SECRET <- SECRET © La (C2.f) © OS.g.b (C2.f) 
© f.implicit (C2.f) 
= SECRET © TOPSECRET © init.implicit (Cl.init) 
© (C3.g) © g.implicit (C3.g) © CONFIDENTIAL 
© g^ (C3.g) © 02.f.y (C3.g) © g.implicit (C3.g) © LOW 
© init.implicit (Cl.init) © g^ (C3.g) © g.implicit (C3.g) 
= TOPSECRET © init.implicit (Cl.init) © g^ (C3.g) 
© g.implicit (C3.g) © 02.f.y (C3.g) 
= TOPSECRET © LOW © LOW © La (C2.f) 
© f.implicit (C2.f) © LOW © La (C2.f) 
© f.implicit (C2.f) © SECRET © La (C2.f) 
© 03.g.b (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f) 
= TOPSECRET © La (C2.f) © f.implicit (C2.f) © 03.g.b (C2.f) 
= TOPSECRET © TOPSECRET © init.implicit (Cl.init) 
© g^ (C3.g) © g.implicit (C3.g) © CONFIDENTIAL 
© g^ (C3.g) © 02.f.y (C3.g) © g.implicit (C3.g) 
© LOW © init.implicit (Cl.init) © g^ (C3.g) 
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© g.implicit (C3.g) 
= TOPSECRET © init.implicit (Cl.init) © (CS.g) 
© g.implicit (CS.g) © 02.f.y (C3.g) [ repetition ] 
= TOPSECRET. 
Since TOPSECRET ^ SECRET, this flow is found to be insecure and the whole 
program is regarded to be insecure. 
5.2 Termination and Correctness of the Link-Time Algorithm 
In the previous section, we described the link-time algorithm. In this section, we 
show that the algorithm is co^ect in the sense that it does not certify an insecure 
program to be secure. 
Theorem 5.1 
The link-time algorithm eventually terminates. 
Proof 
Since there are only finite number of symbolic flow equations within a given program, 
if the expansion step of the algorithm terminates on each symbolic flow equation, the 
entire algorithm eventually terminates. 
Since there exist only a finite number of security classes in the system and only 
a finite number of security variables within a program, only a finite number of non-
equivalent symbolic class expressions can be generated. Each application of the ex­
pansion step changes one symbolic class expression to another reduced expression. 
Therefore, a sequence of expansions will eventually produce a repetition unless the 
expression becomes a single security class, and so the expansion step terminates. • 
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Theorem 5.2 
If the expansion step in the link-time algorithm is applied to SC2® © ... 0 SVn, 
and terminates with the value SC<^, then SC2® © ... © SVn = 5'Cg. 
Step (a) in the expansion step replaces a security variable with the right hand side of 
the symbolic class equation for that variable. The reduction in step (b) replaces two 
or more security classes with their least upper bound. Neither of these replacements 
changes the value of the symbolic clciss expression. Therefore, if a sequence of the 
replacement steps results in a single security class, this security class is the value of 
the expression. 
Note that if steps (a) and (b) are applied to an expression SCj ©5Vj ©.. .©5Vyn 
and result in SC2 © SV^ © ... © then < SC2- The security class part of a 
reduced expression never decreases. 
Suppose the reduction step (b) produces an expression 5C3 © SVj" © ... © SV/^ 
which is equivalent to an expression which heis appeared in some previous iteration. 
Assume the expansion sequence: 
Proof 
X = iSCj <— 5(72®'^'^!© ...© SVfi (1)  
= 5C3 © © ... © SVin (2) 
= 5C3 © svj' ©... © sv^ (3) 
where (3) is equivalent to (2). 
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Suppose that 5Kj © ... © in (2) is expanded to SC^ © SV!^' ffi ,.. © SV^" 
before (3) is reached, where SC^ is a security class which is not less than or equal 
to 5C3. Because SC^ © 5C4 ^ 6'Cg, the resulting expression can never become (3). 
Thus, 
^  ©  . . .  ©  SVjn =  ©  . . .  ©  SV^ < 5C3 
and  5C3  © SV[ '  ©  . . .  © =  5C3.  •  
Theorem 5.3 
Suppose all state variables in a program are statically bound. If the link-time algo­
rithm certifies the program to be secure the program is secure. 
Proof 
The compile-time algorithm creates a template for each procedure in the system. A 
template reflects all information flows, from input parameters and statically bound 
variables to output parameters and statically bound variables, that potentially occur 
within a procedure. We will call such information flows "direct flows". The direct 
flows define a binary relation on the set of input and output parameters and statically 
bound variables. 
In order to combine the direct flows of difl'erent templates, we identify the output 
parameter of a procedure call with the input parameter of the called procedure. Now, 
within a program, an information flow from one statically bound variable to another 
is either a direct flow or is the result of a sequence of direct flows which defines a path 
(with respect to the direct flow relation) through the set of input parameters and 
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statically bound variables. All such flows are captured by the transitive closure of the 
relation defined by direct flows. We call this transitive closure the "flow relation". 
For each statically bound variable, X, the expansion step in the link-time algo­
rithm finds the least upper bound of the security classes of the set of statically bound 
variables that are related to X by the flow relation. Therefore, the link-time algorithm 
finds all possible flows from one statically bound variable to another. Hence, if the 
algorithm certifies the program, no flow violation can occur within the program. • 
5.3 The Modified Link-Time Mechanism 
In this section, we consider the imprecision of the link-time mechanism defined in 
the previous sections and present a modified link-time mechanism which avoids some 
of this over-classification. 
Over-classification may occur because the algorithm at first combines all the 
symbolic class equations in IMPORT categories representing either the same IN 
parameters or the same outgoing implicit flows. Consider the example shown in 
Figure 5.3. Assume OO, 01, 02 and 03 are instances of classes CO, Cl, C2 and C3, 
respectively. The program does not cause a flow violation, since when 01 and 02 call 
"03.f", "03.f" returns SECRET information to local variable "y" of procedure "h", 
and TOPSECRET data to variable "b" of procedure "g". However, if the proposed 
link-time algorithm is applied, this program is regarded to be insecure as follows. 
The symbolic class equations 
X (Cl.h) = SECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) 
in the information flow template of procedure "f" and 
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CO = class 
Initialize 
begin 
01.hQ; 
02.g(); 
end 
end 
CI = class 
state SVl : integer of security class SECRET; 
procedure h(); 
var X, y : integer; 
begin 
X := SVl * 2; 
03.f(IN X, OUT y); 
SVl := y + 1; 
end 
end 
C2 = class 
state SV2 : integer of security class TOPSECRET; 
procedure g(); 
var a, b : integer; 
begin 
a := SV2 / 3; 
03.f(IN a, OUT b); 
SV2 := b + 3; 
end 
end 
Figure 5.3. Over-Classification Caused by the Link-Time Algorithm 
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C3 = class 
procedure f(IN m : integer; OUT n : integer); 
begin 
n := m; 
end 
end 
The information flow template for CO.initialize 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
01.h() 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
02.g() 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
STATIC 
The information flow template for Cl.h 
EXPORT 
h() 
IMPORT 
03.f(IN X, OUT y) 
implicit = LOW © h.implicit 
X = SECRET © h.implicit 
STATIC 
SVl H SECRET +- SECRET © 03.f.y © h.implicit 
Figure 5.3. (continued) 
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The information flow template for C2.g 
EXPORT 
g() 
IMPORT 
03.f(IN a, OUT b) 
implicit = LOW © g.implicit 
a = TOPSECRET © g.implicit 
STATIC 
SV2 = TOPSECRET ^ TOPSECRET © 03.f.b © g.implicit 
The information flow template for C3.f 
EXPORT 
f(IN m; OUT n) 
n = fjn © [.implicit 
IMPORT 
STATIC 
Figure 5.3. (continued) 
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a (C2.g) = TOPSECRET © g.implicit (C2.g) 
in the information flow template of procedure "g" represent the same IN parameter 
"m" of procedure "f". Thus, the algorithm combines these equations into 
• Lm (C3.f) = X (Cl.h) © a (C2.g) 
= SECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) © TOPSECRET © g.implicit (C2.g) 
= TOPSECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) © h.implicit (C2.g). 
Also, implicit (Cl.h) and implicit (C2.g) are combined to form the expression for 
f.implicit (C3.f) as follows: 
• f.implicit (C3.f) = implicit (Cl.h) © implicit (C2.g) 
= LOW © h.implicit (Cl.h) © LOW © g.implicit (C2.g) 
= LOW © h.implicit (Cl.h) © g.implicit (C2.g). 
The symbolic class equations corresponding to other security variables are 
• h.implicit (Cl.h) = implicit (CO.init) = LOW © init.implicit (CO.init) 
• g.implicit (C2.g) = implicit (CO.init) = LOW © init.implicit (CO.init) 
• OS.f.y (Cl.h) = n (C3.f) = fjn (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) 
• 03.f.b (C3.f) = n (C3.f) = [m (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f). 
Note that init.implicit (CO.init) = LOW. Symbolic flow equation 
SV2 = TOPSECRET ^ TOPSECRET © 03.f.b © g.implicit 
in the information flow template of "C2.g" is transformed as follows: 
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SV2 = TOPSECRET <- TOPSECRET © 03.f.b (C2.g) © g.implicit (C2.g) 
= TOPSECRET © Lm (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) © LOW 
© init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © Lm (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) 
© init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © TOPSECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) 
© g.implicit (C2.g) © LOW © h.implicit (Cl.h) 
© g.implicit (C2.g) © LOW 
= TOPSECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) © g.implicit (C2.g) 
= TOPSECRET © LOW © init.implicit (CO.init) © LOW 
© init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © LOW 
= TOPSECRET. 
The flow to SV2 is therefore regarded to be secure. However, symbolic flow equation 
SVl = SECRET ^ SECRET © 03.f.y © h.implicit 
of "h" is regarded to be insecure because of the following transformation: 
SVl = SECRET ^ SECRET © 03.f.y © h.implicit 
= SECRET © fjn (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) © LOW 
© init.implicit (CO.init) 
= SECRET © f^m (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) © init.implicit (CO.init) 
= SECRET © TOPSECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) © g.implicit (C2.g) 
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© LOW © h.implicit (Cl.h) © g.implicit (C2.g) © LOW 
= TOPSECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) © g.implicit (C2.g) 
= TOPSECRET © LOW © init.implicit (CO.init) © LOW 
© init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © LOW 
= TOPSECRET. 
We now present a modification of the link-time algorithm which avoids this type 
of over-claasification. The example above shows that over-classification may result 
from combining class equations representing either the same actual IN parameters 
or the same outgoing implicit inter-module flows. The algorithm needs to distinguish 
between situations in which combining class equations is legitimate and those in which 
it is not. The following discussion is based on the examples in Figure 5.4 and Figure 
5.5. We assume the algorithm is solving a symbolic flow equation of procedure A. 
Also, we will not consider security variables for incoming implicit inter-module flows 
and symbolic class equations for outgoing implicit inter-module flows. Incoming and 
outgoing implicit inter-module flows can be treated in the same manner as the flows 
for formal and actual IN parameters. 
Figure 5.4 represents the case in which B calls C with actual IN parameter "a" 
and actual OUT parameter "b", then B calls A with actual IN parameter "c" and 
actual OUT parameter ^d". Formal IN parameters of A, B and C are V, "y" and 
"z", and formal OUT parameters of A, B and C are "u", "v" and "w", respectively. 
Beside these invocations, A is called from other procedures with actual IN parameters 
"i" and "j" ; B is called with actual IN parameters "k", "1" and "m" ; and C is called 
procedure A ^ 
procedure B procedure C 
Figure 5.4. Information Flow Paths Due to Procedure Invocations (Case l) 
rn 
procedure A procedure B procedure C 
Figure 5.5. Information Flow Paths Due to Procedure Invocations (Case 2) 
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with actual IN parameters "n" and "o". 
Assume the symbolic flow equation of A on which the mechanism is working con­
tains security variable x. Since A may be called from many procedures and the algo­
rithm needs to consider all possible information flows, all the symbolic claas equations 
representing the IN parameter "x" of A, which are stored in IMPORT categories 
of the calling procedures, must be combined. The symbolic class equations corre­
sponding to actual IN parameters "i", "j" and "c" must be combined to make up one 
equation. This combined equation may contain security variables corresponding to 
the actual OUT parameter "b" and formal IN parameter "y" of B. After replacing 
X with this combined equation, the security variables corresponding to "y" and "b" 
must in turn be replaced with the symbolic class equations corresponding to these 
variables. 
Consider security variable b first. There is exactly one equation which corre­
sponds to an actual OUT parameter, and it is found in the EXPORT category of 
the called procedure's template. The symbolic clciss expression for "w" found in C's 
template corresponds to security variable b. Thus, the mechanism replaces b with 
the expression for "w". If the expression for "w" contains security variable z, z must 
now be replaced by the expression corresponding to the actual IN parameter to C. 
According to the link-time algorithm shown in Section 2, the symbolic class equations 
for "a", "n" and "o" are all combined to replace z. The input variable to this specific 
invocation of C, however, is only the actual IN parameter "a", and the other actual 
IN parameters "n" and "o" are not involved in this invocation. Therefore, combining 
the equations for "a", "n" and "o" in this situation causes over-classification. The 
algorithm must be modified so that z is replaced only by the equation corresponding 
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to "a". 
Now consider security variable y. Information from actual IN parameters "k", 
"1" and "m" flows to B. Unlike the preceding case, information from any of these 
parameters may eventually flow to A as a result of other invocations. Thus, y must 
be replaced by the combined expressions of "k", "1" and "m". 
Figure 5.5 represents the case in which A calls B with actual IN parameter "a" 
and actual OUT parameter "d"; then B calls C with actual IN parameter "b" and 
actual OUT parameter "c". Formal IN parameters of A, B and C are "x", "y" and 
"z", and formal OUT parameters of A, B and C are "u", "v" and "w", respectively. 
A is called with actual IN parameters "i", "j" and "k". B is called with actual IN 
parameters "1" and "m" as well as "a". C is called with actual IN parameters "n" 
and "o"5 as well as "b". Assume the symbolic flow equation under evaluation contains 
both security variables d and x. 
Consider security variable x first. Procedure A may be called with each of the • 
actual IN parameters "i", "j" and "k". Therefore, the symbolic class equations cor­
responding to these parameters, which are found in the IMPORT categories of the 
calling procedures, must be combined into one equation in order to replace x. 
Now consider security variable d. The algorithm replaces d with the symbolic 
class equation for "v" of B. The resulting flow equation may contain security variables 
Ç and y. There is only one class equation corresponding to ç — that is, the equation 
for "w" found in the EXPORT category of procedure C. After the replacement, the 
flow equation may contain security variable z. Even though information from the 
three actual IN parameters "n", "o" and "b" eventually flows to C, only information 
from "b" flows to C as the result of this specific invocation. Therefore, the algorithm 
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should replace z with the equation for "b" and should not consider "n" and "o". 
Similarly, security variable y should be replaced with the equation for "a", and the 
equations for "1" and "m" should be ignored. 
This leads us to the following conclusions: 
1. If a security variable to be replaced in an original symbolic flow equation corre­
sponds to a formal IN parameter or an incoming implicit inter-module flow, the 
symbolic class equations for the corresponding actual IN parameters or outgo­
ing implicit inter-module flows (found in the IMPORT categories of the calling 
procedures) must be combined. 
For example, in Figure 5.4, security variable x corresponds to formal IN pa­
rameter "x". Therefore, the equations for "i", "j" and "c" are combined before 
replacing x. Similerly, in Figure 5.5, the equations for "i", "j" and "k" are 
combined into one equation to replace x. 
2. If a security variable corresponding to a formal IN parameter or an incoming 
implicit inter-module flow appears in a symbolic class expression during an 
expansion step as the result of a sequence of replacements of security variables 
for formal IN parameters or incoming implicit inter-module flows, that security 
variable must be replaced by the combined equation of the corresponding actual 
IN parameters or outgoing implicit inter-module flows. 
For example, in Figure 5.4, since y appears éis the result of replacing security 
variable x, which corresponds to formal IN parameter "x", with the equation 
for "c", the equations for "k", "1" and "m" must be combined to replace y. 
3. If a security variable to be replaced is for an actual OUT parameter, there is 
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exactly one symbolic class equation for the corresponding formal OUT parame­
ter (found in the EXPORT category of the called procedure), and the security 
variable is replaced by the equation. 
4. If a security variable corresponding to a formal IN parameter or an incoming 
implicit inter-module flow appears as the result of replacement of a security 
variable for an actual OUT parameter, that security variable must be replaced 
only by the equation corresponding to the actual IN parameter or the outgoing 
implicit inter-module flow of the caller. 
For example, in Figure 5.4, since z appears as the result of replacing b (which 
corresponds to actual OUT parameter "b" of B) with the equation for "w", z 
must be replaced by the equation for the corresponding actual IN parameter 
found in the template of the caller (in this case, the equation for "a" in B), and 
the equations for "n" and "o" should be ignored. In Figure 5.5, z appears as the 
result of replacing ç (which is the security variable for actual OUT parameter of 
B) with the equation for "w". Thus, z must be replaced only with the equation 
for "b". The equations for "n" and "o" must be ignored. 
5. As the result of the replacement described in 4, a security variable corresponding 
to a formal IN parameter may appear in the equation. In this case, the security 
variable should be replaced only by the equation for the corresponding actual 
IN parameter or outgoing implicit inter-module flow of the caller. If a security 
variable for a formal IN parameter or an incoming implicit inter-module flow 
appears cis the result of this replacement, that security variable must also be 
replaced only by the equation corresponding to the actual IN parameter or the 
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outgoing implicit inter-module flow of the caller. 
For example, in Figure 5.5, y may appear as the result of replacing z. Even 
though z corresponds to the formal IN parameter of C, y should be replaced 
only by the equation for "a" and the equations for 'T and "m" must be ignored. 
In order to keep track of a calling sequence, the algorithm could maintain mul­
tiple stacks. Each stack corresponds to a security variable for an actual OUT 
parameter in the original symbolic flow equation under certification. At first, 
the name of a procedure which contains the flow equation is pushed onto each 
stack. For each replacement of a security variable for an actual OUT parameter, 
the name of the procedure which contains the equation replacing the security 
variable is pushed onto the corresponding stack. If the replacement generates 
more than one security variable, a new stack is created for each security vari­
able. Each newly created stack is an exact copy of the stack on which the name 
of the procedure has just been pushed. For each replacement described in steps 
4 and 5, the name of the procedure which contains the corresponding equa­
tion appears second from the top in the corresponding stack. The algorithm 
finds the equation for the corresponding actual IN parameter or the outgoing 
implicit-inter module flow in that procedure and pops the top of the stack. 
For example. In Figure 5.5, the algorithm creates a stack for d (which appears 
in the original flow equation) and pushes A onto the stack. When d is replaced 
by the equation for "v", the algorithm pushes B onto the stack. When replacing 
Ç with the equation for "w", C is pushed onto the stack. In order to replace z, 
the algorithm looks for the template for B, whose name appears second from the 
top in the stack. Therefore, the corresponding equation in this case is the one 
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for "b". After replacing z with the equation for "b", the algorithm pops C from 
the stack. If y appears in the flow equation as the result of replacing z with the 
equation for "b", y should be replaced by the equation for the corresponding 
actual IN parameter of procedure A, whose name appears second from the top 
in the stack. 
In summary, the equations for actual IN parameters or outgoing implicit inter­
module flows should be combined to replace the security variable for a formal IN 
parameter or an incoming implicit inter-module flow only when that security vari­
able ether is in the original flow equation or appears as the result of consecutive 
replacements of only formal IN parameters or incoming implicit inter-module flows. 
Applying the modified link-time mechanism, the example program shown above 
is verified to be secure. For the symbolic flow equation of "h", the following expansion 
is applied. 
SVl = SECRET SECRET © 03.f.y (Cl.h) © h.implicit (Cl.h) 
= SECRET © Lm (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) © LOW 
© init.implicit (CO.init) 
= SECRET © fjn (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) © init.implicit (CO.init) 
= SECRET © SECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) © LOW 
© h.implicit (Cl.h) © LOW 
= SECRET © h.implicit (Cl.h) 
= SECRET © LOW © init.implicit (CO.init) 
= SECRET © LOW 
=SECRET 
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Even though security variable fjn in the template for "C3.f" corresponds to the formal 
IN parameter, it appears as the result of replacement of security variable 03.f.y in 
the template for "Cl.h", which corresponds to the actual OUT parameter "y" of 
procedure invocation "OS.f". Therefore, fjn must be replaced only by the equation 
corresponding to the actual IN parameter of the caller, which is "x" of "Cl.h". Thus, 
f.m must be replaced by the equation 
X = SECRET © h.implicit(Cl.h), 
found in the entry for 03.f(IN x, OUT y) in the IMPORT category of the template 
for "Cl.h". 
Similarly, f.implicit is replaced by the equation 
implicit (Cl.h) = LOW © h.implicit (Cl.h). 
For the symbolic flow equation of "g", the expansion sequence is as follows: 
SV2 = TOPSECRET ^ TOP'SECRET © 03.f.b (C2.g) © g.implicit (C2.g) 
= TOPSECRET © fjn (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) © LOW 
© init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © fjn (C3.f) © f.implicit (C3.f) 
© init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © TOPSECRET © g.implicit (C2.g) © LOW 
© g.implicit (C2.g) © LOW 
= TOPSECRET © g.implicit (C2.g) 
= TOPSECRET © LOW © init.implicit (CO.init) 
= TOPSECRET © LOW 
= TOPSECRET 
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Figure 5.6 shows a more complicated example. A calls C with actual IN parame­
ter "a" and actual OUT parameter "h". C calls D and B with actual IN parameters 
"b" and "d", respectively, and actual OUT parameters "c" and "e", respectively. D 
ca!]s E with actual IN and OUT parameters "f" and "g", respectively. A, B, C, 
D and E have formal IN parameters "v", "w", "x", "y" and "z", and formal OUT 
parameters "k", "1", "m", "n" and "o", respectively. These modules are also called 
with actual IN parameters "ly as shown in the figure. Assume that the modified 
link-time algorithm is certifying a symbolic flow equation in the template for B. Since 
security variable w in the equation corresponds to the formal IN parameter of B, the 
variable is replaced by the combined equation for actual IN parameters "zg", 
and "d". 
Suppose that the resulting equation has security variables x and c. Since x 
corresponds to formal IN parameter "x" of C and appears as the result of replacing 
the security variable corresponding to formal IN parameter "w" of B, it must be 
replaced by the combined equation of actual IN parameters "15", and "a". 
Security variable ç corresponds to an actual OUT parameter of C. Therefore, ç must 
be replaced by the equation corresponding to formal OUT parameter "n" of D. 
As the result of these replacements, security variables y, y and g may appear in 
the equation. Since y appears as the result of a sequence of replacement only of 
formal IN parameters, it must be replaced by the combined equation of "ÎJ" and 
"*2"- On the other hand, y appears as the result of replacing the security variable 
corresponding to the actual OUT parameter. Thus, y must be replaced only by the 
equation corresponding to the actual OUT parameter of the caller, in this case, "b" 
of C, and the equations for "îy" and "îg" should be ignored. Since g corresponds to 
procedure B procedure C 
procedure E 
procedure A 
17 Ï8 
procedure D 
Figure 5.6. Another Example for the Modified Link-Time Algorithm 
g 
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the actual OUT parameter of D, it is replaced by the equation for the corresponding 
formal OUT parameter "o" of E. 
After replacing g with this equation, security variable z may appear in the equa­
tion. Then, z must be replaced by the equation corresponding to "f" of D, and the 
equations for "îg" and "^lo" should be ignored. 
If the replacement generates security variable y in the symbolic flow equation 
under certification, even though y corresponds to the formal IN parameter of D and 
the previous replacement is for the formal IN parameter "z" of E, y must be replaced 
by the equation for actual OUT parameter "b" of the calling procedure C. The reason 
for this is that the replacement sequence to generate y includes the replacement for 
actual OUT parameters "c" of C and "g" of D. 
5.4 The Link-time/Run-time Algorithm Allowing Dynamically Bound 
State Variables 
In this section, we extend the approach presented in the previous sections to allow 
dynamically bound state variables and conditioning of the execution of a program by 
classified variables. Module invocations, however, will be required to use only literal 
module names. The extended algorithm combines the compile-time, link-time and 
run-time approaches. The link-time mechanism solves symbolic class equations in 
STATE categories and symbolic flow equations in STATIC categories in the same 
manner as the link-time algorithm given in Section 5.1. However, the expansion step of 
the new algorithm does not replace init.implicit or security variables corresponding to 
dynamically bound state variables and thus may not reduce a symbolic class expression 
to a single security clciss. Therefore, in general, the symbolic clciss expression part of a 
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resulting symbolic class equation or symbolic flow equation contains a single security 
class and security variables. These partially-solved equations are stored in a new 
template, called a reduced template, that has only STATE and STATIC categories. 
This template is stored in the class of the main module. 
Immediately before each execution of a program (i.e., before instantiation of the 
main module), the run-time mechanism solves each expression in the corresponding 
reduced template by replacing 
1. init.implicit with the class of the implicit inter-module flow from the module 
which initiates the program, and 
2. security variables for the dynamically bound state variables with their current 
security classes. 
In order to determine current security classes of the dynamically bound state vari­
ables, the run-time mechanism needs to send messages, called tokens, to invoked 
modules which contain dynamically bound state variables. The run-time mechanism 
can determine which modules are invoked, since only literal module names are used 
to specify called modules. When a module receives a token, the module must freeze 
itself and return the security classes of its dynamically bound state variables to the 
main module. If all the symbolic flow equations are verified to be secure, the execution 
can be carried out. The number of tokens required is the number of invoked modules 
(excluding the main module) which contain dynamically bound state variables. No 
further run-time checking is necessary. 
While a module is in a frozen state it can accept only messages sent from within 
the execution which froze it. A module remains in a frozen state until the run-time 
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mechanism sends a message to unfreeze it. If the mechanism detects a potential flow 
violation, it immediately unfreezes all frozen modules and the program is not executed. 
If no potential flow violation is detected, execution of the program is begun. When 
the execution terminates, the classes of the dynamically bound state variables are 
updated and the modules are unfrozen. 
The freezing mechanism is necessary because certification of a program P is 
performed before execution starts using the current security classes of the dynamically 
bound state variables appearing in P. The certification assumes these classes do not 
change until the execution terminates. However, they may change if during execution 
another program invokes a module invoked by P. This can happen even if P and 
the other computation invoke difl'erent procedures within the module. Thus, the 
mechanism must guarantee P exclusive access to all invoked modules which contain 
dynamically bound state variables until the execution terminates. Note that it is not 
necessary to freeze a module if it does not contain dynamically bound state variables 
or if information does not flow to or from its dynamically bound state variables during 
execution of a program. 
The certification process performed by the link-time and run-time mechanisms 
is demonstrated by using the example program shown in Figure 4.5 in the previous 
chapter. The information flow templates generated by the compile-time mechanism 
are shown in Figure 5.7. The link-time mechanism solves the symbolic class equation 
for LS3 and the symbolic flow equation for LSI. 
We first find the symbolic class expression corresponding to each security varia-
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The information flow template for Cl.initialze 
EXPORT 
initialize 
IMPORT 
M2.f(IN a, OUT b) 
implicit = SECRET © init.implicit 
a = SECRET © init.implicit 
M3.g(IN b, c, OUT e) 
implicit = LOW © init.implicit 
b = SECRET © init.implicit 
c = LOW © LS2 © init.implicit 
STATE 
STATIC 
LSI = SECRET ^ SECRET © M2.f.d © M3.g.e © init.implicit 
The information flow template for C2.f 
EXPORT 
M2.f (IN u, OUT z) 
z = M4.h.z © f.implicit 
IMPORT 
M4.h(IN V,  w, OUT z) 
implicit = LOW © f.implicit 
V = LOW © fai © f.implicit 
w = LOW © Lu © f.implicit 
STATE 
STATIC 
Figure 5.7. Information Flow Templates for Program with Dynamically 
Bound State Variables 
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The information flow template for C3.g 
EXPORT 
M3.g(IN 1, m, OUT n) 
n = M4.h.n © g.implicit 
IMPORT 
M4.h(IN o, p, OUT n) 
implicit = LOW © g.implicit 
o = g.m © gji © g.implicit 
p = LOW © g m © g.implicit 
STATE 
STATIC 
The information flow template for C4.h 
EXPORT 
M4.h(IN a, b, OUT c) 
Ç = LOW © LS3 © h^a © © h.implicit 
IMPORT 
STATE 
LS3 = LOW © LS3 © h^a © h.b © h.implicit 
STATIC 
Figure 5.7. (continued) 
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ble:^ 
• M2.f.d (Cl.init) = z (M2.f) = M4.h.z (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) 
• M3.g.e (Cl.init) = n (M3.g) = M4.h.n (M3.g) © g.implicit (M3.g) 
• M4.h.z (M2.f) = Ç (M4.h) 
= LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © l^a (M4.h) © h^b (M4.h) © h.implicit (M4.h) 
• f.implicit (M2.f) = implicit (Cl.init) = SECRET © init.implicit 
• fVu (M2.f) = a (Cl.init) = SECRET © init.implicit 
• g.m (M3.g) = b (Cl.init) = SECRET © init.implicit 
• gm (M3.g) = Ç (Cl.init) = LOW © LS2 (Cl.init) © init.implicit 
• g.implicit (M3.g) = implicit (Cl.init) = LOW © init.implicit 
• h^a (M4.h when called from M2.f) = v (M2.f) 
• = LOW © Lu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) 
• h^b (M4.h when called from M2.f) = w (M2.f) 
= LOW © fVu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) 
• h.implicit (M4.h when called from M2.f) = implicit (M2.f) 
= LOW © f.implicit (M2.f) 
• h^a (M4.h when called from M3.g) = o (M3.g) 
= g.m (M3.g) © g^ (M3.g) © g.implicit (M3.g) 
• h^b (M4.h when called from M3.g) = p (M3.g) 
= LOW © g.m (M3.g) © g.implicit (M3.g) 
• h.implicit (M4.h when called from M3.g) = implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © g.implicit (M3.g) 
-In this example, we use SV(M.P) to denote the security variable SV appearing in 
procedure F of instance module M for instance modules M2, M3 and M4. 
200 
• La (in STATE of M4.h) 
= V (M2,f) © g (M3.g) 
= LOW © Lu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) © gjn (M3.g) 
© g^ (M3.g) © g.implicit (M3.g) 
• Lb (in STATE of M4.h) = w (M2.f) © p (M3.g) 
= LOW © fVu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) © LOW © g.m (M3.g) 
© g.implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © Lu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) © g^ (M3.g) © g.implicit (MS.g) 
. h.implicit (in STATE of M4.h) 
= implicit (M2.f) © implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © f.implicit (M2.f) © LOW © g.implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © f.implicit (M2.f) © g.implicit(M3.g). 
For LSI, the link-time algorithm expands the equation as follows: 
LSI (Cl.init) = SECRET <- SECRET © M2.f.d © M3.g.e © init.implicit. 
For M2.f.d fCl.init). 
M2.f.d (Cl.init) = M4.h.z (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) 
= LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © La (M4.h) © Lb (M4.h) 
© h.implicit (M4.h) © SECRET © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LS3 (M4.h) © La (M4.h) © Lb (M4.h) 
© h.implicit (M4.h) © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LS3 (M4.h) © LOW © Lu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) 
© LOW © Lu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) © LOW 
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© f.împlicit (M2.f) © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit 
© f.u(M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) 
= SECRET © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit © SECRET 
© init.implicit © SECRET © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit. 
For M3.g.e (Cl.init): 
M3.g.e (Cl.init) = M4.h.n (M3.g) © g.implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © La (M4.h) © Lb (M4.h) 
© h.implicit (M4.h) © LOW © init.implicit 
= LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © La (M4.h) © Lb (M4.h) 
© h.implicit (M4.h) © init.implicit 
= LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit © g.m (M3.g) © g^ (M3.g) 
© g.implicit (M3.g) © LOW © g.m (M3.g) 
© g.implicit (M3.g) © LOW © g.implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit © g.m (M3.g) © g^ (M3.g) 
© g.implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit © SECRET © init.implicit 
© LOW © LS2 (Cl.init) © init.implicit © LOW © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LS2 (Cl.init) © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit. 
Therefore, 
LSI (Cl.init) = SECRET <- SECRET © LS2 (Cl.init) © LS3 (M4.h) 
© init.implicit. 
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For LS3, the algorithm expands the equation as follows: 
LS3 (M4.h) = LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © La © Lb © h.implicit. 
For h^a (M4.h), 
h.a (M4.h) 
= LOW © Lu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) © gjn (M3.g) © gm (M3.g) 
© g.implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © SECRET © init.implicit © SECRET © init.implicit 
© SECRET © init.implicit © LOW © LS2 (CI.init) 
© init.implicit © LOW © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LS2 (CI.init) © init.implicit. 
For h^b (M4.h): 
h.b (M4.h) 
= LOW © fVu (M2.f) © f.implicit (M2.f) © g.m (M3.g) 
© g.implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © SECRET © init.implicit © SECRET © init.implicit 
© SECRET © init.implicit © LOW © init.implicit 
© LOW © init.implicit 
= SECRET © init.implicit. 
For h.implicit (M4.h): 
h.implicit (M4.h) = LOW © f.implicit (M2.f) © g.implicit (M3.g) 
= LOW © SECRET © init.implicit © LOW © init.implicit 
= SECRET © init.implicit. 
203 
Therefore, 
LS3 (M4.h) = LOW © LS3 (M4.h) © SECRET © L^2 (Cl.init) © init.implicit 
© SECRET © init.implicit © SECRET © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LS3 (M4.h) © LS2 (Cl.init) © init.implicit. 
Thus, the reduced template in class CI is 
STATE 
LS3 (M4.h) = SECRET © LS2 (Cl.init) © (M4.h) © init.implicit 
STATIC 
LSI (Cl.init) = SECRET ^ SECRET © LS2 (Cl.init) © LS3 (M4.h) 
© init.implicit. 
Assume that init.implicit and LS2 are LOW at instantiation time. Immediately 
before instantiation of Ml, the run-time mechanism sends a token to M4 to determine 
the class of LS3 and freezes the module. First, consider the case in which the current 
class of LS3 is TOPSECRET. Then, M4 returns TOPSECRET, and the resulting 
reduced template becomes: 
STATE 
LS3 (M4.h) = SECRET © LS2 (Cl.init) © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LOW © TOPSECRET © LOW 
= TOPSECRET 
STATIC 
LSI (Cl.init) = SECRET +- SECRET © LS2 (Cl.init) © LS3 (M4.h) 
© init.implicit 
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= SECRET © LOW © TOPSECRET © LOW 
= TOPSECRET (*** flow violation * * +). 
Since there is a potential flow violation, execution of the program is prevented and 
the mechanism unfreezes M4 by sending a message to the module. 
Next, assume that the class of LS3 is less than TOPSECRET, say CONFIDEN­
TIAL. The resulting template becomes: 
STATE 
LS3 (M4.h) = SECRET © LS2 (Cl.init) © LS3 (M4.h) © init.implicit 
= SECRET © LOW © CONFIDENTIAL © LOW 
= SECRET 
STATIC 
LSI (Cl.init) = SECRET SECRET © L^ (Cl.init) © LS3 (M4.h) 
© init.implicit 
= SECRET © LOW © CONFIDENTIAL © LOW 
= SECRET. 
Since this execution is certified to be secure. Ml is instantiated and the execution is 
carried out. Upon termination, the run-time mechanism sends a message to M4 to 
update LS3 to SECRET and unfreeze the module. If Ml does not have any exported 
procedures, Ml is deleted. 
An advantage of this approach is that sending probes is not necessary at execution 
time and only n tokens and n responses need to be sent before each execution, where 
n is the number of modules within the computation (excluding the main module) 
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which contain dynamically bound state variables.^ A disadvantage is the potential 
for over-classification of dynamically bound state variables. For example, consider the 
program segment 
if X = 0 then Rl.P(OUT LSI) else LSI := 0, 
where LSI is a dynamically bound state variable, the classes of "x" and LSI are CON­
FIDENTIAL, and "Rl.P" returns a TOPSECRET value in LSI. If "x" is nonzero, 
the class of LSI stays CONFIDENTIAL. However, the algorithm increases the class 
of LSI to TOPSECRET regardless of the value of "x". 
The correctness of this algorithm follows by arguments similar to those used in 
the proof of Theorem 5.3. 
5.5 Comparisons of the Information Flow Mechanisms 
An information flow certification method combining compile-time and run-time 
approaches was proposed in Chapter 4. A combination of the compile-time and link-
time approaches was proposed earlier in this chapter. 
In this section, we compare our proposed information flow mechanisms with pre­
viously proposed methods — Fenton's run-time mechanism, Denning's run-time mech­
anism, Denning's compile-time mechanism and Andrews and Reitman's compile-time 
mechanism. We will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism. 
We will base our comparison on several properties which we consider essential 
for real applications: 
^Also, n messages must be sent after each execution to update the classes of dy­
namically bound state variables and unfreeze modules. 
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1. The ability to handle both dynamically and statically bound variables: 
If a mechanism handles only statically bound variables, programmers must spec­
ify a security class for every variable in a program. This is very inconvenient. 
In addition, many versions of functionally equivalent procedures for parameters 
of different security classes must be created, thereby reducing the possibility of 
resource sharing. If a mechanism can handle only dynamically bound variables, 
it cannot be applied in real systems since it requires even classes of output de­
vices such as terminals and printers to be dynamically bound. Secure systems 
cannot be constructed using such a mechanism. Some mechanisms require state 
variables to be statically bound in order to allow invoked modules to be specified 
by variables, even though other variables can be either dynamically or statically 
bound. Since this requirement reflects the case in most actual implementations, 
we do not consider this to be a significant disadvantage. Note that- if a mecha­
nism allows dynamically bound state variables, exclusive write access to those 
variables must be guaranteed by the mechanism.'^ 
2. Separate compilation of modules or procedures: 
If modules are constructed in different locations or at different points in time, it 
may be inconvenient and costly to require that all modules be brought together 
for compilation at one time. Therefore, it is preferable that each procedure or 
module can be compiled independently of the others. Also, if a program is very 
large, separate compilation is a virtual necessity. 
3. The ability to handle module invocations that use variables instead of literal 
''This would be normally controlled by the synchronization specification. 
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module names: 
In object-oriented systems, invoked modules are often dynamically instantiated, 
passed as parameters or determined by interaction with a subject at run time. 
Such modules are represented by variables within a program. Mechanisms al­
lowing dynamically bound state variables may not be able to handle such dy­
namically determined modules invocations. 
4. Efficiency: 
Since information flow checking is considered overhead by system's users, the 
mechanism must be efficient. Efficiency at compile time, link time and run 
time must be considered. However, run-time efficiency is most important since 
programs are run far more frequently than they are compiled and linked. 
5. Precision: 
It may be impossible to develop a mechanism which implements a given infor­
mation flow policy precisely, and may even be impossible to determine which 
of two imprecise algorithms is better. However, by comparing behaviors of al­
gorithms in particular cases, we can sometimes conclude that one algorithm is 
preferable to another. For example, consider the program segment 
if a = 0 then x := y else x := z. 
Since the execution path cannot be determined at compile time, a compile-time 
algorithm considers x to be "a © y © z" even though the class of "x" after 
the execution is either "a © y" or "a © z". On the other hand, a run-time 
béised algorithm considers x to be either "a © y" or "a © z" béised on the actual 
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execution path. In general, a run-time algorithm is better than a compile-time 
or link-time algorithm in the sense that it will not over-classify in the case of 
conditional statements. 
We will refer to 
1. the combination compile-time/run-time approaches proposed in Chapter 4 as 
"Algorithm 1", and 
2. the combination compile-time/link-time approaches proposed in this chapter as 
"Algorithm 2". 
Fenton's run-time mechanism allows separate compilation of each procedure but 
depends totally on run-time certification. This is inefficient and can handle only 
statically bound variables. Furthermore, this mechanism has a significant restriction. 
If an information flow violation is detected, the mechanism must skip the execution of 
the statement which causes the violation and continue running as though no violation 
had occurred. The error must be kept hidden from the user. This may put the system 
into an inconsistent state. Therefore, this approach may not be practical. 
Denning's run-time mechanism also allows separate compilation but is very inef­
ficient. This approach was developed for a nondistributed environment and Denning 
gave no suggestions as to how to expand the mechanism to work in a distributed 
environment. In order to adjust the mechanism for a distributed environment, the 
update mechanism should be replaced by sending probes as in Algorithm 1. The 
mechanism can handle only dynamically bound variables. At first glance, it appears 
that the the mechanism can easily be extended to handle statically bound variables. 
However, there is a problem. Consider the program segment 
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if X = G then y := z, 
where y is statically bound and the classes of a user, "x", "y" and "z" are UNCLASSI­
FIED, CONFIDENTIAL, CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET, respectively. Even if the 
flow from "x" to "y" is certified, the user can deduce whether "x" is zero or nonzero 
by observing the existence of an error message, since a flow violation occurs only if 
X is zero and y := z is executed. Therefore, extension of the mechanism to handle 
statically bound variables is not as easy as it looks and this mechanism too may be 
impractical. 
Denning's compile-time mechanism allows separate compilation, and no certifica­
tion is required at run time. However, the mechanism can handle only statically bound 
variables, and we consider this to be an unrealistic restriction. In her dissertation, 
Denning presented a possible method for handling dynamically bound parameters. 
However, her method does not allow a procedure to have access to long-term storage 
such as state variables, and this is too restrictive. 
Andrews and Reitman's compile-time mechanism does not allow dynamically 
bound state variables. Other variables can be either statically or dynamically bound, 
and no certification is required at run time. We do not consider the prohibition of 
dynamically bound state variables to be a significant disadvantage. In order to avoid 
over-classification, the mechanism considers values of variables whenever possible in 
attempt to determine the execution paths of conditional statements. Andrews and 
Reitman do not discuss how well the mechanism avoids over-classification. The biggest 
problem of their approach is that the mechanism does not allow separate compilation 
of procedures. If a procedure under certification invokes other procedures, those 
procedures must have been previously compiled and the flow information of these 
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procedures must be available to the mechanism. There are difficulties in applying 
this mechanism to a distributed environment and constructing a large program. Also, 
Andrews and Reitman did not show how to handle recursive invocations under this 
restriction. Even though they did not suggest it in their paper, it may be easy to 
expand the algorithm to allow invoked modules to be determined dynamically at run 
time since all the state variables must be statically bound. 
Algorithm 1 can handle both statically bound and dynamically bound variables, 
and allows separate compilation of procedures. Two approaches are possible; 
1. allowing module invocations to use variables instead of literal module names 
and requiring all state variables to be statically bound, and 
2. allowing dynamically bound state variables and requiring module invocations to 
use literal module names. 
This mechanism may require sending many probes at run time and therefore may 
be inefficient. Since each procedure is certified at compile time, the mechanism is 
imprecise. In particular, the class of a subject (a user) is involved in the verification 
algorithm. 
Algorithm 2 allows separate compilation and requires no certification at run time. 
It can use either of the approaches mentioned in Algorithm 1. The mechanism tends to 
over-classify variables, and this may be critical, especially if dynamically bound state 
variables are allowed, since it not only prevents the execution of some secure programs 
but may unnecessarily upgrade the cleisses of dynamically bound state variables. 
In summary, Andrews and Reitman's compile-time mechanism, algorithm 1 and 
algorithm 2 seem more useful for practical applications. Andrews and Reitman's 
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mechanism is suitable when 
1, no recursive invocations are involved, 
2. the procedures can always be compiled in a bottom up manner on the invocation 
dependency graph. 
With these restrictions, application to large programming projects may be difficult. 
Also, since the mechanism frequently needs to access flow information of other pro­
cedures while compiling, it is not practical unless communication costs are low. 
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 allow separate compilation of procedures. If dy­
namically bound state variables are disallowed, the algorithms allow invoked modules 
to be dynamically determined at run time. If invoked modules are specified only 
by literal names, they allow dynamically bound state variables. Algorithm 1 requires 
sending probes at run time. Consequently, networks in which this algorithm is applied 
should have low communication costs. Algorithm 2 needs no run-time overhead and 
is suitable for distributed computing environments in general. It is easily applied to 
conventional language environment. However, Algorithm 2 requires that the link-time 
algorithm be performed every time a class is modified. Algorithm 1 is suitable for 
program development. When program development is completed. Algorithm 2 is more 
suitable. Both Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are imprecise. However, as shown in the 
example program in Figure 4.4, there are programs which Algorithm 1 determines to 
be secure and Algorithm 2 regards as insecure. The converse does not appear to be 
true. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
The major thrust of this research was to investigate the problem of security within 
the context of a distributed object-oriented system. In Chapter 2, we proposed a "re­
source module" as a basic unit for structuring distributed network application soft­
ware. Resource sharing is assumed to be natural and desirable and concurrency is the 
rule rather than the exception. Protection and synchronization are separated from 
the access component, leading to very-high level specification languages. Software can 
be constructed using modularization techniques. The system incorporates common 
features of object-oriented systems such as instances, classes, METACLASS and in­
heritance. The role of each component, the naming convention, inter-/intra-module 
message flows and a prototype implementation model are presented. 
In Chapter 3, we introduced the concept of "four-tuple access control lists" and 
access-rights expressions as the basis for the specification language for a protection 
component of a resource module. The four-tuple access control list realizes the prin­
ciple of least privilege at a procedure invocation level. By combining access-rights 
expressions with the four-tuple access control list, the system provides the ability to 
effectively enforce the use of a resource module in a way defined by the programmer 
and the owner of the module. 
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Chapter 4 described the information flow control mechanism of the protection 
component. The mechanism combines compile-time and run-time approaches. For 
each exported procedure and the initialization procedure, the compile-time algorithm 
creates an "information flow template" which stores "symbolic class equations" and 
"symbolic flow equations". The information flow template is stored in the class module 
which defines the procedure. At run time, an "information flow instance" is created 
in the protection component of the instance module for each procedure invocation. 
An information flow instance is a copy of the information flow template. The run­
time algorithm solves symbolic class equations and symbolic flow equations on the 
information flow instance. This is done by replacing "security variables" appearing in 
the equations with the corresponding security classes carried by messages. Symbolic 
class equations are used to determine classes of output variables. Symbolic flow 
equations are used to detect flow violations. 
The mechanism incorporates the following features: 
1. Run-time information flow security checks are done only at message passing 
time. 
2. Program variables can be either dynamically or statically bound to security 
classes. (If dynamically bound state variables are allowed, invoked modules 
must be specified by literal names.) 
3. Each procedure can be compiled and its "internal" security established inde­
pendently of other procedures. And 
4. Invoked modules can be instantiated or determined dynamically at run time. 
(In this case, dynamically bound state variables are not allowed.) 
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Compile-time certification algorithms were presented for selected programming con­
structs. 
The mechanism presented in Chapter 4 requires the sending of "probes" in order 
to account for implicit flows between module boundaries which occur when proce­
dure invocations are skipped. The run-time overhead due to sending probes may be 
expensive in certain systems where communication costs are very high. 
In Chapter 5, we presented an alternative approach which requires no run-time 
certification. The mechanism relies on compile-time and link-time certifications. The 
link-time algorithm is performed after all of the invoked exported procedures in asso­
ciated modules have been compiled and their information flow templates established 
by the compile-time algorithm. To certify a program, the algorithm solves symbolic 
flow equations in the templates of procedures which are invoked within the program. 
This approach does not allow dynamically bound state variables, but module invoca­
tions may use variables to specify invoked modules. Since actual execution paths of 
a program are not known at link time, the link-time algorithm must account for all 
possible information flows. Hence, the algorithm sometimes over-classifies variables. 
In Section 5.3, we proposed a modified link-time algorithm which considers, to some 
extent, the execution paths of a program in order to reduce the over-classification. 
For a system with dynamically bound state variables, a mechanism which is based 
on a combination of compile-time, link-time and run-time certifications was presented. 
The link-time algorithm solves symbolic class and flow equations in the same manner 
as the link-time mechanism given in Section 5.1. However, the security classes of the 
incoming implicit flow from a module which instantiates the main module (denoted by 
init.implicit) and of dynamically bound state variables are left as security variables. 
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These partially-solved equations are stored in the reduced template. Immediately 
before each execution of a program, the run-time algorithm solves each equation in 
the corresponding reduced template by replacing init.implicit with the actual implicit 
flow from the instantiating module and replacing the security variables for dynamically 
bound state variables with the current security classes of those variables. It then 
certifies the program. In order to determine the security classes of dynamically bound 
state variables in remote modules, the run-time algorithm needs to send "tokens". 
The number of tokens required is the number of invoked modules (excluding the main 
module) which contain dynamically bound state variables and no further run-time 
checking is necessary. This approach requires that all module invocations use literal 
module names. 
Finally, we compared the proposed information flow mechanisms with the previ­
ous work done by Fenton, Denning, and Andrews and Reitman. 
6.2 Areas of Future Research 
The final goal of our research is to implement the system we have described and 
to evaluate its usefulness. Before implementation, however, we need to solve some 
theoretical problems. 
6.2.1 Access component 
The final version of the language for specifying an access component has not been 
defined. In order to allow exploitation of concurrency at all levels, the final language 
may be modeled after functional languages or data flow languages [1,18,20]. 
The information flow mechanism assumes the existence of a recovery routine in 
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order to maintain system consistencies when an information flow violation is detected. 
Our future research plans include an investigation of an efficient recovery mechanism 
for distributed object-oriented environments, 
6.2.2 Protection component 
Since the language for the access component has not been defined, we assumed 
a PASCAL-like conventional structured language constructs and developed compile-
time information flow certification algorithms for several statements including the 
assignment statement, if statement, and while statement. After a specification lan­
guage for an access component is defined, the run-time certification algorithms may 
need to be expanded. 
As suggested by Andrews and Reitman, a synchronization statement may cause 
an information leakage. Future research plans include an investigation of a possible 
information leakage due to extended open predicate path expressions in the synchro­
nization component. 
Also, we would like to apply our results to the development of certification se­
mantics for other synchronization primitives such as synchronizing resources [5] and 
ADA-like selective message passing [48]. 
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